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England and the Thirty Years' War

Adam Marks

BRILL

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By

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For my wife
Dr Cynthia Marks

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Stylistic Conventions

When discussing the British monarchy, the anglo-British style has been used (so James I not James VI) except when being discussed within a specifically Scottish context. The spelling of most individuals' names has been standardised across the monograph except in direct quotes or when it is not clear if the references are to the same person. I have also used modern spellings for place names (for example, Frankenthal not Frankendale) except where it is unclear what the modern equivalent is or within a direct quote. It is worth mentioning here that the Welsh are often not listed separately in the monograph's statistics since to do so would involve so much guessing to distinguish them from the English that the figures would be meaningless at best. Often contemporaries simply banded the English and Welsh together in their own statistics. I have, of course, identified individuals as Welsh, where possible, throughout the text.

When not specifically stated it should be assumed that instruments of government are English, for example, the Privy Council. The dates within the text are in the Gregorian form (i.e. with the year commencing on 1st January) where both the Julian and Gregorian are given in the source. This is not always clear, and in such cases they are quoted as they are found in the original. The exception to this is when dates are directly quoted from documents in which case the two calendars are indicated in square brackets, or if in an archival catalogue following the conventions of the individual archive concerned which should aid scholars in locating the original. Measures of weight and financial currencies have all been left as found in the sources except where explicitly stated.

Figures and Tables

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Abbreviations

APC	*Acts of the Privy Council of England*, ed. J. Dasent, (London, 1890–1964) 46 volumes.
CSPD	*Calendar of State Papers preserved in the Public Record Office for the Reigns of Edward VI, Mary, Elizabeth, James I, Charles I, the Interregnum, Charles II, James II, William and Mary, Anne: Domestic series*, eds. M.A.E. Green, R. Lemon, J. Bruce, W.D. Hamilton, F.H.B. Daniell, F. Bickley, W.J. Hardy, E. Bateson, R.P. Mahaffy and C.S. Knighton., (London, 1856 onwards) 95 volumes.
CSPV	*Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts relating to English Affairs, existing in the archives and collections of Venice, and in other libraries of Northern Italy*, eds. H.R.F. Brown, R.L. Brown, A.B. Hinds and G.A.F.C.R.H. Bentinck, (London, 1864 onwards).
KRA	Stockholm, Krigsarkivet.
NA	Den Haag, Nationaal Archief.
NRS	Edinburgh, The National Records of Scotland.
NYCRO	North Yorkshire County Record Office.
RAOSB	*Rikskansleren Axel Oxenstiernas Skrifter och Brefvexling*, (Stockholm, various series).
TNA, SP	London, The National Archives, State Papers.
SRA	Stockholm, Riksarkivet.
SRP	*Svenska Riksrådets Protokoll*, eds. N.A. Kullberg and S. Bergh, (Stockholm, 1878–1902).

Introduction

England, under James I, sank into a nervous and lethargic neutrality.[1]

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1618 marked a significant turning point in the history of Europe. The scale of the suffering and trauma caused by what came to be known as the Thirty Years' War created a series of deep scars that would be remembered for generations. Despite this, within the British Isles and Ireland, the conflict has failed to become a key part of the normal narrative of either English or British history. This is in part because the proximity of the conflict to the British Civil wars has led to a focus - in popular memory and subsequent historiography - on the 1640s while the 1620s and 1630s have been inevitably seen through the prism of what was to come. Some historians, such as Peter Wilson, have valiantly tried to bring this conflict into the wider 17th Century historiographical debate and even wider public discussion. These efforts are, however, for the most part the exception and the Thirty Years' War continues to be seen as something that happened elsewhere.[2] Indeed, the sudden peak of interest caused by the 400th anniversary of its outbreak was doubly revealing, not only for its relatively muted nature but also because many of those who tried to engage with the subject swiftly found themselves talking about the English Civil Wars, rather than anything that had taken place on the continent. Steven Pincus, it seems to me, was entirely correct to state that "seventeenth century English foreign policy has more often been written off than written about."[3] The other reason the Civil Wars have overshadowed the Thirty Years' War is that the complexity and at times contradictory nature of much of the foreign

1 N.M. Sutherland, 'The Origins of the Thirty Years War and the Structure of European Politics', *English Historical Review*, 107.424 (1992), p. 601. This is far from the only example that could be used here, another is L.J. Reeve, *Charles I and the road to personal rule* (Cambridge, 1989), p. 9.

2 P.H. Wilson, *Europe's tragedy: a history of the Thirty Years War* (London, 2009).

3 S.C.A. Pincus, *Protestantism and patriotism: ideologies and the making of English foreign policy, 1650–1668* (Cambridge, 1996), p. 1. This is a sentiment still being echoed by Mark Netzloff over a decade later in regard to diplomacy: M. Netzloff, 'The ambassador's household: Sir Henry Wotton, domesticity and diplomatic writing', in ed. R. Adams and R. Cox, *Diplomacy and early modern culture* (Basingstoke, 2011), p. 155.

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policies of James I and Charles I has made it difficult for historians to tackle the so-called 'German wars'.[4] Moreover, to tackle the subject properly would require largely monoglot English historians to visit a host of continental rather than just British archives which has long posed a linguistic deterrent. Indeed, the language skills alone mean it is difficult for any single individual to take on such a project.[5] Nevertheless, putting forward an explanation for the foreign policies of James and Charles Stuart that have been "written off" is one of the key aims of this monograph, largely because the extensive role of England within the Thirty Years' War - one of the most terrible conflicts Europe would see prior to the twentieth century - needs to be better understood. Not just because this is clearly significant in its own right, but also because events, such as the British Civil Wars that followed, can only be fully explained within this context.

The argument that will become clear across the chapters that follow is that England, under James, far from sinking into "lethargic neutrality" pursued a dynamic, subtle and wide ranging engagement within the conflict that raged across Europe.[6] At times it was borderline duplicitous but the motives of James and the skill of the diplomats who attempted to execute his policy should not be underestimated despite the ultimate failure of many of his policies.[7] Indeed, their failure is also a potential reason why historians have failed to engage with them, after all, even historians tend to enjoy a happy ending. In response to events Charles initially changed tack but, due to overstretched resources caused by traditional warfare and his own ineptitude, soon saw a number of setbacks. Although he reverted to James's policies by the 1630s, he never managed to carry them out with his father's subtlety or coherence. Given that even during James' reign public opinion had turned against these policies, the exasperation many felt by the 1630s is perhaps unsurprising. Most important, though, is the fact that both monarchs played active roles in the Thirty Years' War as did the armies and soldiers they sent into battle. The manner in which these two kings pursued and funded their policies has implications beyond

4 Pincus, *Protestantism and patriotism*, p. 6.

5 This book is indebted to the those who have helped me with translations and assisted in foreign archives. Without their help it would simply not have been feasible to write. I have included a full list of all those who I have relied on in the acknowledgements though obviously any errors are my responsibility.

6 Sutherland, 'The Origins of the Thirty Years War', p. 601.

7 For a thorough analysis of James's foreign policy before his assent to the English throne see: C. Fry, 'Diplomacy and Deception: King James VI of Scotland's Foreign Rleations with Europe (*c.* 1584–1603)' (PhD., University of St Andrews, 2014).

judgements on the success of each monarch's foreign policy. The use of non-Parliamentary revenue allowed James to pursue military action without the assent of the House of Commons and is of wider relevance for our understanding of the operation of Stuart government. The previous oversight of these policies illustrates the danger of viewing the king's actions through the prism of Parliamentary history.[8]

The granting of permission to levy soldiers for the armies of nations such as the Dutch Republic and Sweden provided both James and Charles with an alternative method of conducting foreign policy and war. Viewing it from this perspective adds to our understanding of how states, monarchs and armies operated during the early modern period. It is all the more remarkable when considering that over 50,000 Englishmen were levied to serve in the various theatres of war that thus far there has been so little research on these men. As the following table lists, these soldiers were levied for continental service in a wide variety of armies. It is worth clarifying that it is difficult to determine the actual number who served because it is often not feasible to ascertain the precise turnover of troops. For example, with regard to the Dutch Republic there were clearly more than 5,000 men levied throughout the thirty-year period but tracing each replacement would be a lifetime's work which may prove ultimately fruitless.[9] Equally, it should also be made clear that the number of troops levied, as shown here, does not take into account that in many cases soldiers would transfer from the service of one nation to another. Despite these caveats, the number of soldiers levied is an important indicator of the scale of English involvement, if for no other reason than that these levies were all authorised by the Stuart Crown.[10]

8 This argument, though not new, is still pertinent today. Thomas Cogswell, amongst others, has emphasised that understanding the relationship between the Crown and Parliament alongside other factors is important if Stuart foreign policy is to be fully explained. T. Cogswell, 'Foreign Policy and Parliament: The Case of La Rochelle, 1625–1626', *English Historical Review*, 99.391 (1984), p. 242.

9 R.B. Manning, *An apprenticeship in arms: the origins of the British Army 1585–1702* (Oxford, 2006), pp. 50–51. This is particularly difficult to determine since the attrition resulting from warfare and disease is difficult to ascertain. One example can be found in 1632 when permission was granted to levy a further 2,000 English soldiers to bring the brigades back to strength: *Papers illustrating the History of the Scots Brigade in the service of the United Netherlands, 1572–1782*, ed. J. Ferguson 3 vols (Edinburgh, 1899–1901) 1:416–417.

10 The processes behind the various levies will be discussed in each of the relevant chapters.

TABLE 1 Number of Englishmen serving the 'Protestant cause' during the Thirty Years' War[11]

Date	Number of Englishmen	Country of service	Specific army/Regiment
1618–1648	*c.* 5,000	United Provinces	Anglo-Dutch Brigade
1617–1618	600	Venetian Republic	Sir John Vere
1618–1623	500	Venetian Republic	Sir Henry Peyton
1620	1,000	Palatinate	Andrew Gray
1620	2,500	Palatinate	Earl of Essex, Earl of Oxford, Sir Horace Vere
1621	2,000 (English and Irish)	Poland	Arthur Aston
1624	6,000	Elector Palatine (Actually serves United Provinces)	Earl of Essex, Earl of Oxford, Earl of Southampton
1625	9,000	Elector Palatine / Mansfeld	Ernst von Mansfeld
1625	*c.* 10,000 (English and Irish)	Stuart Kingdom's	Viscount Wimbledon
1626–1629	4,300	Denmark-Norway	Charles Morgan et al.
1620–1648	*c.* 6,000	Sweden	George Fleetwood, Henry Muschamp, Arthur Aston, John Cassels, Marquis of Hamilton levy. There were also two English regiments under William Ballentine and James Ramsay
1630–1632	*c.* 2,000 (English and Scots)	Russia	Sir Alexander Leslie of Auchintoul
1637–1638	3,000	Elector Palatine (Charles Louis)	Lord William Craven

11 This data is compiled from a number of archival, printed and secondary sources listed throughout the monograph. For other historians' collations see: S. Murdoch, 'Introduction', in ed. S. Murdoch, *Scotland and the Thirty Years' War, 1618–1648* (Leiden, 2001), pp. 19–20; R.A. Stradling, *The Spanish monarchy and Irish mercenaries: the Wild Geese in Spain 1618–1668* (Dublin, 1994); Wilson, *Europe's tragedy*, p. 322.

Given the scale of English service outlined above it is worth spending a little more time assessing why it has been overlooked.[12] Some of the perceptions regarding the lack of British participation is due to the presentation of the Thirty Years' War by English language historians as a 'German' event rather than a European-wide event. C.V. Wedgewood's early twentieth-century work set a basic tone which has then been echoed by countless others ever since.[13] This focus on Imperial politics derives from some English contemporaries referring to the conflict as the 'German Wars' but this should not be taken to mean that the conflict was exclusively German.[14] Indeed, even contemporary texts which discuss the Thirty Years' War as a 'civil' war already placed it within a European context. One example is an anonymous 1638 pamphlet where the title places the intervention of foreign powers within a German context: *The invasions of Germanie with all the civill, and bloody warres therin* but where the author addresses the principal protagonists within a European context.[15] The participation of British troops in this military conflict is hardly surprising considering there were English, Welsh, Scottish and Irish troops undertaking military service abroad long before the outbreak of hostilities in 1618.[16] Clearly, there was a good deal of contemporary

12 One recent example is the otherwise excellent Ashgate research companion to the conflict. Passing comments refer to English soldiers, but there is little attempt seriously to explain the scale of their contribution, nor is it ever made clear what role the Stuart Crown played in their presence. The Scots and the Irish also receive scant comment outside their role in the assassination of Wallenstein. A. Marks, 'Review: The Ashgate Research Companion to The Thirty Years War, ed. Olaf Asbach and Peter Schröder', *English Historical Review*, 131.549 (2016); O. Asbach and P. Schröder, eds., *The Ashgate research companion to the Thirty Years' War* (Farnham, 2014).

13 G. Parker, 'Preface', in ed. G. Parker, *The Thirty Years' War* (London, 1997), p. xiv; C.V. Wedgwood, *The Thirty Years' War* (London, 2005 Original Publication 1938).

14 Within a Scottish context this is discussed in: D. Horsbroch, 'Wish You Were Here? Scottish Reactions to 'Postcards' home from the 'German Warres'', in ed. S. Murdoch, *Scotland and the Thirty Years' War, 1618–1648* (Leiden, 2001).

15 Gentleman well deserving, *The invasions of Germanie with all the civill, and bloody warres therin, since the first beginning of them in anno 1618 and continued to this present yeare 1638: wherein are described the severall battles, encounters, conflicts, and assaults, of cities, townes, and castles ... with a new and exact map of Germany...: together with the progresse of every army, marked with severall markes or lines, with the pictures of the chiefe commanders on both sides/faithfully collected out of good and credible originalls by a Gentleman well deserving that hath suffered much in those warres* (London, 1638), p. 5 (after item no. 7).

16 English and Scottish examples are given throughout this monograph but see R.I. Frost, *The Northern Wars: War, State, and Society in Northeastern Europe, 1558–1721* (Harlow, 2000); R.I. Frost, 'Scottish Soldiers, Poland-Lithuania and the Thirty Years' War', in ed. S. Murdoch, *Scotland and the Thirty Years' War, 1618–1648* (Leiden, 2001), pp. 191–203; S. Murdoch, 'Scotsmen on the Danish-Norwegian Frontiers, *c.* 1580–1680', in ed. A. Mackillop and S. Murdoch, *Military governors and imperial frontiers c. 1600–1800: a study of Scotland and empires* (Leiden, 2003), pp. 1–28; J.S. Nolan, *Sir John Norreys and the Elizabethan military*

awareness about the breadth of the conflict, however many historians would not automatically relate the English military enterprises within France, Spain and the Dutch Republic during the Thirty Years' War as necessarily linked, seeing this English military diaspora rather as a series of unrelated migrations.[17]

The perception of the Thirty Years' War as an exclusively German matter has played alongside English historians' tendency to focus on England as a geographic territory, rather than looking at the activities of Englishmen outwith England as well.[18] Significant work has been undertaken on the Scottish and Irish diasporas and this has led to a broader understanding of both nations' peoples by analysing factors such as the repatriation of wealth or the fomentation of revolt.[19] The majority of the very limited extant English research has been done in the shadow of this corpus of work and this has led to a situation where England is too often viewed in isolation from Europe.[20] This monograph will hopefully make some contribution to our understanding of the military diaspora of the English in the period, though clearly it is only one small part of the work that could be done on these overseas communities and hopefully in the

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world (Exeter, 1997); D.J.B. Trim, 'Sir Horace Vere in Holland and the Rhineland, 1610–1612', *Historical Research*, 72.179 (1999). The Irish were also active, particularly within the Habsburg lands. The Irish regiment in Flanders met the members of the "flight of the earls" on 30th October 1607: N.Ó. Muraíle, P. Walsh and T.Ó. Fiaich, eds., *Turas na dtaoiseach nUltach as Éirinn: from Ráth Maoláin to Rome: Tadhg Ó Cianán's contemporary narrative of the journey into exile of the Ulster chieftains and their followers, 1607–8 (the so-called "Flight of the Earls")* (Rome, 2007), p. 93. For a more complete history of the Irish during this period see Stradling, *The Spanish monarchy and Irish mercenaries*.

17 C. Carlton, *This seat of Mars: war and the British Isles, 1485–1746* (New Haven, 2011), pp. 79–95.

18 There have been some notable exceptions such as A. Games, *Migration and the origins of the English Atlantic world* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1999); J. Stoye, *English travellers abroad, 1604–1667: their influence in English society and politics* (New Haven, 1989); K.L. Sprunger, *Dutch Puritanism: a history of English and Scottish churches of the Netherlands in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries* (Leiden, 1982); F. Courtney, 'English Jesuit Colleges in the Low Countries, 1593–1794', *The Heythrop Journal*, 4 (1963), pp. 254–263. Within an 18th and 19th Century context see S. Conway, *Britain, Ireland, and Continental Europe in the eighteenth century: similarities, connections, identities* (Oxford, 2011); T. Claydon, *Europe and the making of England, 1660–1760* (Cambridge, 2007); R. Young, *The idea of English ethnicity* (Oxford, 2008), pp. 196–230.

19 There is insufficient space here to analyse the state of Scottish and Irish diaspora studies but a number of very good summaries can be found within: D. Leishman et al., 'Exile and Return: Contexts and Comparisons', *Études Écossaises*, 10 (2010); T. O'Connor and M.A. Lyons, eds., *Irish communities in early modern Europe* (Dublin, 2006); A. Grosjean and S. Murdoch, 'Introduction', in ed. A. Grosjean and S. Murdoch, *Scottish communities abroad in the early modern period* (Leiden, 2005), pp. 1–26.

20 Nicholas Canny has also argued in favour of closer examination of the English diaspora: N. Canny, 'Writing Early Modern History: Ireland, Britain, and the Wider World', *The Historical Journal*, 46.3 (2003), pp. 742–743.

future others will undertake more details work on the religious, cultural and economic life of these communities.[21] Having said this, the work on the Scottish military diaspora has been crucial to the reassessment of Britain's diplomatic ties and allegiances during the period and it is from this body of research that this book springs.[22] Within a Scottish context a focus on northern European alliances has emerged, notably from Steve Murdoch, Alexia Grosjean and Kathrin Zickermann.[23] In particular, Murdoch's edited collection entitled *Scotland and the Thirty Years' War,* which was written almost 20 years ago, remains the definitive source for anybody looking at Scotland, Britain and the Thirty Years' War.[24]

Peter Wilson has commented on a few aspects of British intervention in the sister volume to his monograph, where he summarised that the historiography of Britain and Thirty Years' War as the following:

> Mercenaries from Britain have attracted considerable recent attention. The discussion is often illuminating, but at times rather magnifies their actual importance.[25]

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21 David Worthington has attempted to correct this deficit to some extent but his efforts have been inherently constrained by the lack of work undertaken on England. D. Worthington, 'Introduction', in ed. D. Worthington, *British and Irish emigrants and exiles in Europe, 1603–1688* (Leiden, 2010), pp. 1–30. There has also been some good work done on eastern European countries: Katalin Eperjesi has undertaken some research on Anglo-Transylvanian contacts K. Eperjesi, *English-Transylvanian contacts in the 17th century: the early Stuarts and Transylvania during the Thirty Years' War* (Saarbrucken, 2008), pp. 11–18, Alfred Thomas's research into the cultural contact between England and Bohemia A. Thomas, *A blessed shore: England and Bohemia from Chaucer to Shakespeare* (Ithaca N.Y., 2007).

22 See: P. Dukes, G.P. Herd and J. Kotilaine, *Stuarts and Romanovs: The Rise and Fall of a Special Relationship* (Dundee, 2009); A. Grosjean, 'Royalist soldiers and Cromwellian allies? The Cranstoun Regiment in Sweden 1656–1658', in ed. S. Murdoch and A. McKillop, *Fighting for identity: Scottish military experience c. 1550–1900* (Leiden, 2002); A. Grosjean, *An Unofficial Alliance: Scotland and Sweden 1569–1654* (Leiden, 2003); Murdoch, 'Scottish Ambassadors and British Diplomacy, 1618–1635'; S. Murdoch, *Network North: Scottish kin, commercial and covert association in Northern Europe, 1603–1746* (Leiden, 2006); D. Worthington, 'Alternative Diplomacy? Scottish Exiles at the Courts of the Habsburgs and their Allies, 1618–1648', in ed. S. Murdoch, *Scotland and the Thirty Years' War, 1618–1648* (Leiden, 2001); J.R. Young, 'The Scottish Parliament and European Diplomacy 1641–1647: The Palatinate, The Dutch Republic and Sweden', in ed. S. Murdoch, *Scotland and the Thirty Years' War, 1618–1648* (Leiden, 2001); K. Zickermann, *Across the German sea: early modern Scottish connections with the wider Elbe-Weser region* (Leiden, 2014).

23 S. Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway and the House of Stuart, 1603–1660: a Diplomatic and Military Analysis* (East Linton, 2000); Grosjean, *Unofficial Alliance*.

24 Murdoch, 'Introduction', pp. 1–23.

25 P.H. Wilson, *The Thirty Years War: a sourcebook* (Basingstoke, 2010), p. 337. See also A. Marks, 'Review: P. Wilson, Europe's Tragedy: A history of the Thirty Years' War (London, 2009)', *Northern Studies*, 43. pp. 134–136.

This is a curious criticism considering some of the recent work by historians, such as Alexia Grosjean, has actually reduced the estimated number of soldiers serving.[26] Moreover, Wilson suggests the opening of the British civil wars ended any continued Scottish participation in the continental conflict and in so doing fails to take cognizance of their ongoing recruitment into continental armies throughout the 1640s.[27] The English too continued to serve. Nevertheless, the only substantive work to be undertaken on English soldiery abroad focussed on the Elizabethan period, whilst any levies under the Stuart regime were only picked up as either an afterward of Elizabethan England or a footnote of early Stuart Britain. That said, the present volume, alongside Steve Murdoch's work on Scotland, builds on the work of David Trim on Elizabeth I's armed forces.[28] His thesis contains a huge wealth of research which makes clear the scale of English investment in financial, military and spiritual terms.[29] Despite the initial focus of his thesis being on the Elizabethan military he rapidly appreciated the need for systematic research of the structures of the English military that existed outwith England's geographic territory during the Stuart period too and has subsequently publish a number of articles that have begun to look at the field.[30] The reality is that, as he was forced to admit, there has been a lack of any engagement on the subject by anyone.[31]

Perhaps one of the most crucial things to take from both the work of Trim on the Anglo-Dutch brigade, or indeed from Rory Rapple's research on English soldiery in Ireland during the Elizabethan period, is the overlap between the

26 Grosjean reduced Alf Åberg's estimate from 35,000 men since it did not take into account re-enlistments. Grosjean, *Unofficial Alliance*, p. 106.

27 Wilson, *Europe's tragedy*, p. 594. This assertion is robustly challenged in S. Murdoch and A. Grosjean, *Alexander Leslie and the Scottish Generals of the Thirty Years' War, 1618–1648* (London, 2014), pp. 145–168.

28 D.J.B. Trim, 'Fighting 'Jacob's Wars'. The Employment of English and Welsh Mercenaries in the European Wars of Religion: France and the Netherlands, 1562–1610' (PhD., King's College, 2002). The work of Steven Gunn and David Grummitt on this earlier period is also significant S.J. Gunn, D. Grummitt and H. Cools, *War, state, and society in England and the Netherlands 1477–1559* (Oxford, 2007).

29 Trim, 'Jacob's Wars', p. 309.

30 A selection of his work includes: Trim, 'Vere in Holland and the Rhineland'; D.J.B. Trim, 'Calvinist Internationalism and the English Officer Corps, 1562–1642', *History Compass*, 4.6 (2006), pp. 1024–1048; D.J.B. Trim, 'Conflict, religion and ideology', in ed. F. Tallett and D.J.B. Trim, *European warfare, 1350–1750* (Cambridge, 2010), pp. 278–299; D.J.B. Trim, 'English Military Émigrés and the Protestant Cause in Europe, 1603–*c.* 1640', in ed. D. Worthington, *British and Irish emigrants and exiles in Europe, 1603–1688* (Leiden, 2010), pp. 237–260.

31 Trim, 'English Military Émigrés', p. 240.

Tudor and Stuart monarchies in terms of the continuity of military service.[32] Too many historians of the Stuart monarchy commence their studies in 1603, failing to realise that English foreign policy during the early seventeenth century would continue to be influenced by the Anglo-Dutch brigades and Elizabeth's earlier policies. Peace with Spain undoubtedly represented a massive break from what had gone before, but the other pillar of Elizabethan policy - support for the Dutch Republic - remained, albeit in a more covert way. Indeed, English policy under James I was brought into line with previous Scottish support supplied to the Dutch Republic through the service of the Scottish-Dutch brigade. By realising that the Eighty Years' War continued and that the systems, administrations, personnel and policies of Tudor England did not disappear overnight, it is possible to see the engagement of the English within the Thirty Years' War as a continuation of policy rather than a radical break from it.

Having discussed England and Scotland in some detail it would be remiss not mention Wales. There are countless examples of Welsh soldiers operating within the English military during this period and wherever possible I have identified them.[33] However, the reality is that many were simply identified by their contemporaries as English (a problem also associated with research into Irish soldiers in Habsburg service) and as such I have never specifically separated them within statistics but included them as part of the 'English' forces.[34] Equally, because the research presented here has not specifically focussed on

32 R. Rapple, *Martial Power and Elizabethan Political Culture: Military Men in England and Ireland, 1558–1594* (Cambridge, 2009).

33 The University of St Andrews MA dissertation by Vikki Yee concerning the Welsh in the Thirty Years' War remains the only dedicated research on this topic. It is published online as: V. Yee, 'An Investigation into Welsh involvement in the 'Protestant' side of the Thirty Years' War' 2016. Available from https://jddavies.com/2016/09/12/an-investigation-into-welsh-involvement-in-the-protestant-side-of-the-thirty-years-war/ Accessed June 2019. Doctoral research has also been undertaken concerning the Welsh within an Irish context: R. Morgan, 'From Soldier to Settler: The Welsh in Ireland, 1558–1641' (PhD., Cardiff University, 2011).

34 Robert Monro identifies Welsh soldiers as such, for example, Captain Francis Trafford and his company. Robert Monro, *Monro his expedition wth the worthy Scots Regiment* (*called Mac-Keyes Regiment*) *levied in August 1626. by Sr. Donald Mac-Key Lord Rhees, colonell for his Majesties service of Denmark, and reduced after the Battaile of Nerling, to one company in September 1634. at Wormes in the Paltz Discharged in severall duties and observations of service; first under the magnanimous King of Denmark, during his warres against the Emperour; afterward, under the invincible King of Sweden, during his Majesties life time; and since, under the Directour Generall, the Rex-chancellor Oxensterne and his generalls. Collected and gathered together at spare-houres, by Colonell Robert Monro ... for the use of all worthie cavaliers favouring the laudable profession of armes. To which is annexed the*

the Welsh it would be misleading to provide any statistical analysis since this would almost certainly under-estimate their contribution. Clearly there is a major research project for someone in the future.

The legal context to these soldiers is important since all too often they have simply been described as mercenaries or volunteers. These soldiers' actual motivations will be discussed at length in the first chapter of this book, but it is worth initially laying out some of the legal context within which the Thirty Years' War was fought. As David Trim has gone to great lengths to show, the treaties signed at Münster and Osnabrück bonded the ideas of non-intervention of foreigners to national sovereignty as a response to the policies of many nations throughout the conflict.[35] Indeed, a measure of how far the separation of military force and national sovereignty had come is illustrated by the Swedes' unsuccessful attempt to justify their invasion purely in terms of securing Stralsund and claiming their actions did not end the neutrality between Sweden and the Empire.[36] This case reveals that an area of crucial importance was whether or not a national government was in overall official command of a campaign, and that where this was not the case troops could be supplied without a formal declaration of war. This is something astutely pointed out by Manning when he summarises the state of affairs prior to 1648 stating:

> according to International Law, the widespread practice of one country lending part of its military or naval forces to a foreign country or recruiting soldiers for a belligerent power did not necessarily involve the government of that country being in a state of war with the opposing belligerent power.[37]

The fact that various European powers were indirectly providing military aid without formally entering the conflict can be seen as a contributing factor to the duration of the war, and certainly one that has made understanding the

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abridgement of exercise, and divers practicall observations, for the younger officer his consideration; ending with the souldiers meditations going on service (London, 1637), pp. 11, 82.

35 Trim, 'Conflict, religion and ideology', p. 292. This formed part of a series of discussions surrounding territorial integrity and the conduct of foreign policy which are discussed within: D. Onnekink and G. Rommelse, 'Introduction', in ed. D. Onnekink and G. Rommelse, *Ideology and foreign policy in early modern Europe (1650–1750)* (Farnham, 2011), pp. 1–10.

36 P. Piirimäe, 'Just War in Theory and Practice: The Legitimation of Swedish Intervention in the Thirty Years War', *The Historical Journal*, 45.3 (2002), pp. 506–507 and 513.

37 Manning, *An apprenticeship in arms*, p. 43.

policy of a particular power complicated.[38] The service of soldiers across various national armies was a problem that contemporaries, such as Hugo Grotius, were keenly aware of and attempted to influence. Grotius created a series of detailed arguments to set out the code of conduct in war between 'supreme rulers', 'subordinate rulers' and 'private persons'.[39] Effectively this was an attempt to codify how war was fought in an age when "even public wars were often fought between armed forces comprised of nobles, various classes of warriors, and mercenaries".[40] Crucially, any "agreements relating to war" had to operate across all of these levels to be effective.[41] The peace of Westphalia theoretically legislated an end to the kind of warfare undertaken by the Stuart monarchy and others but these changes did not take effect immediately and English soldiers continued to serve abroad during the remainder of the century.[42]

David Parrot's recent work on the armies commanded by these entrepreneurs has been helpful in moving forward this conversation. In particular, Parrot has argued that the 'business of war' as conducted by these entrepreneurs needs to be assessed in the context of the military revolution which all too often assumes that war is the "business of the state".[43] This acknowledges the complicated systems that existed within early modern warfare. Crucially, it shows that early modern warfare was not funded or legally justified within the same framework as existed from the nineteenth century to the present. As will be argued in this monograph, warfare, even when pursued by the state, was not always funded by conventional means and at times was conducted through covertly supporting other nations' armies. Only through appreciating all of these aspects of war and politics can the military and political events that took place during this period be fully understood. For instance it is clear

38 The case for this lengthening of the conflict has been effectively analysed in D. Parrott, 'From Military enterprise to standing armies: war, state, and society in western Europe, 1600–1700', in ed. F. Tallett and D.J.B. Trim, *European warfare, 1350–1750* (Cambridge, 2010).

39 K. Makoto, 'Agreements between Nations: Treaties and Good Faith with Enemies', in ed. O. Yasuaki, *A Normative approach to war: peace, war, and justice in Hugo Grotius* (Oxford, 1993), p. 327.

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid.

42 For example, see the regiments in Portugal during the 1660s. *SP Portugal*, eds. C.R. Boxer and J.C. Aldridge 3 vols (London, 1979–1983) 1:SP89/5-7. There are also countless other examples of continued service of men outwith their own nation after the peace of Westphalia, for example, Grosjean, 'Royalist soldiers and Cromwellian allies?'; G. Rowlands, 'Foreign Service in the Age of Absolute Monarchy: Louis XIV and His Forces Étrangères', *War in History*, 17.2 (2010), pp. 141–165.

43 D. Parrott, *The Business of War: military enterprise and military revolution in early modern Europe* (Cambridge, 2012), p. 2.

that Englishmen were conscious of the latest tactical developments during the period and whether or not this was from within either formal national armies or otherwise does not change or diminish that knowledge.[44] Such cognizance clearly shows that not only were the English aware that warfare was changing but also that they were capable of using these new tactics.

The idea of the Netherlands and Ireland as 'reservoirs' of English military talent has been convincingly argued for in an Elizabethan context.[45] Ed Furgol has illustrated how Scotland used such a system (within the context of Sweden) to train, levy and then defeat the armies of Charles I in 1639 and 1640.[46] Indeed, it is interesting here to contrast Scottish and English historiography since north of the border the military diaspora has dominated debate at the expense of domestic systems such as wapinshawings, whereas in England the reverse has been the case.[47] Paul Hammer correctly emphasises that during the reign of Elizabeth the English army was "distinctly international in character" since after the loss of Calais the English military switched its focus to the Dutch Republic as a place to entrench English military skill.[48] This was an important development as it resulted in the creation of an English military diaspora which would continue to serve England until the creation of permanent standing armies. The accession of James to the English throne in 1603 removed the need for a garrison in Berwick-upon-Tweed which, combined with the previous loss of Calais under Mary Tudor, meant that the only substantial permanent military institutions were located within the Low Countries and Ireland.

This fed into a perception of military decline based upon the domestic context and this was widely commented on.[49] The armourers of London wrote

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44 P. Edwards, *Horse and man in early modern England* (London, 2007), pp. 146–150. An analysis of printed cavalry manuals can be found: D.R. Lawrence, *The complete soldier: military books and military culture in early Stuart England, 1603–1645* (Leiden, 2009), pp. 270–311.

45 M.C. Fissel, *English warfare 1511–1642* (London, 2001), p. 154; Trim, 'Jacob's Wars'; Rapple, *Martial Power*.

46 E.M. Furgol, 'Scotland turned Sweden: the Scottish Covenanters and the Military Revolution', in ed. J.S. Morrill, *The Scottish National Covenant in its British context* (Edinburgh, 1990), p. 134 and 136.

47 There have been a number of excellent studies of the domestic military during the Tudor period such as: D. Grummitt, 'War and Society in the North of England, *c.* 1477–1559: The Cases of York, Hull and Beverley', *Northern History*, 45.1 (2008), pp. 125–140.

48 P.E.J. Hammer, *Elizabeth's wars: war, government, and society in Tudor England, 1544–1604* (Basingstoke, 2003), p. 259 and 262. For the Scottish domestic miltary landscape and its influence upon the Thirty Years' War see Murdoch and Grosjean, *Alexander Leslie*, pp. 14–24.

49 John Rushworth, *Historical collections of private passages of state Weighty matters in law. Remarkable proceedings in five Parliaments. Beginning the sixteenth year of King James,*

to Parliament that, of the thirty-five armour makers in London that existed in Elizabeth's time, only five now remained.[50] Throughout this period there were also considerable problems related to funding and corruption within the ordnance office of the state.[51] The failings of the ordnance office were distinct from the actual arms industry within England which meant that despite this body's failings in 1624 the "lightly supervised ordnance industry was capable of fulfilling such demands at short notice."[52] Considering the significance of the Dutch Republic to the English expeditions of the 1620s, it is perhaps unsurprising that the process of equipping these was also, at least in part, undertaken abroad.[53] Indeed, the key illustration of this is that 2,000 men of the Cadiz expedition, which departed from England in 1625, were actually equipped in the Dutch Republic.[54]

The awareness of the English military's model of operation was also reflected in the attempts made to improve the domestic systems of defence. For example, in 1626, during a period of open war, whilst commenting on the trained bands Charles I wrote:

> We have caused a certain number of experienced solders to be sent from the Low Countries hither, to be distributed into several counties there to teach the captains and other officers and leaders of files in each company the true and modern use of their arms and order of soldiers, that the officers being well instructed may teach the soldiers.[55]

This order was passed on to local governments and was therefore repeated across England. In 1626 the Lords of the Council's letters to the Earl Marshall

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anno 1618. And ending the fifth year of King Charls, anno 1629. Digested in order of time, and now published by John Rushworth of Lincolns-Inn, Esq (London 1659), p. 172.

50 Hatfield, Hatfield House, the Cecil Papers, CP 196/94 The Armour makers, Gunmakers, and like artificers of London and the Suburbs, to the Upper House of Parliament (1604).

51 Richard Stewart's detailed analysis of the English Ordnance office stops in 1625 but provides an indication of the problems that the Stuart government had created. R.W. Stewart, *The English Ordnance Office, 1585–1625: a case study in bureaucracy* (Woodbridge, 1996).

52 Ibid., p. 79.

53 *Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts, relating to English Affairs, existing in the Archives and collections of Venice, and in other Libraries of Northern Italy*, ed. A.B. Hinds 38 vols (London, 1864–1947) 16:322. Some of the equipment for the proposed (but never levied) army of 1621 was also to be purchased abroad. London, The British Library, Harley 389 Joseph Meade to Sir M Stuteville (26 February 1621), fol. 25.

54 TNA, SP, 84/130 List of arms for 2,000 men. (1625), fol. 231.

55 C.S. Petrie, ed. *The Letters, Speeches and Proclamations of King Charles I* (London, 1968), pp. 49–50.

ordered the use of officers from the Dutch Republic to drill the local militia in Norfolk.[56] The training regime implemented was continued throughout the late 1620s and local correspondence continued to note its positive effects.[57] There was also a concerted effort in 1618 to reform the Ordnance office under the Cranfield commission.[58] However, looking at some local records it is clear that the crucial period for improving local militias came in the late 1630s when the spectre of warfare within Britain began to assert itself. In Kirklees, for example, the wapentake appears to have begun to organise itself, on paper at least, more effectively from 1639.[59] Therefore, whilst Paul Hammer was correct in his assertion that the 'military revolution' became anchored within England in the 1640s, it was not a political revolution that drove this change, but the return of English soldiers to the geographic territory of England.[60] Understanding the actions of English soldiers abroad does not change our understanding of the failings of the domestic systems but they do provide a contrasting and much more complicated view of English military capability.[61]

During this period the focus of the English military continued to change from domestic militias to foreign regiments, a process begun under Elizabeth I. Manning's work has come the closest to acknowledging this when he said that: "on the eve of the British and Irish civil wars, England [in 1638] had no standing as a military power … however, the British Isles had been a major source of military manpower for mainland European armies since the late sixteenth century."[62] This fits in with the work of a number of historians

56 W. Rye and C.H.S. Firth, eds., *State Papers relating to Musters, Beacons, Shipmoney, &c., in Norfolk, from 1626 chiefly to the beginning of the Civil War. Edited from a MS. in his library by Walter Rye, with a preface by C. H. Firth* (Norwich, 1907), pp. 9–11.

57 Ibid., p. 12 and 169.

58 Stewart, *The English Ordnance Office*, pp. 54–62.

59 Kirklees, West Yorkshire Archive Service: Kirklees, DD /WBA/8 A List of members of Captain Thomas Beaumont esquire company in the wapentake of Agbrigg and Morley in the regiment of Colonel Sir William Saville (30 April 1639).

60 The impact of these veterans is also discussed by Ian Roy. See I. Roy, 'England turned Germany? The Aftermath of the Civil War in its European Context', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 28 (1978), pp. 132–133.

61 For an analysis of the domestic English systems see M.C. Fissel, *The bishops' wars: Charles I's campaigns against Scotland, 1638–1640* (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 190–214; J.P. Kenyon and J.H. Ohlmeyer, 'The background to the Civil Wars in Britain and Ireland', in ed. J.P. Kenyon and J.H. Ohlmeyer, *The civil wars: a military history of England, Scotland, and Ireland 1638–1660* (Oxford, 1998), pp. 3–5. David Grummitt's analysis of the Calais garrison illustrates that maintaining a professional body of soldiers across the Channel was not a new concept: D. Grummitt, *The Calais Garrison: war and military service in England, 1436–1558* (Woodbridge, 2008).

62 Manning, *An apprenticeship in arms*, p. 181.

discussing the English army in the Dutch Republic before the outbreak of civil war in England.[63] These ideas have become particularly associated with Barbara Donagan, whose work on the publication of military books has been built on by the work of David Lawrence and Hugh Dunthorne.[64] Donagan's monograph on *War in England* attempted a small scale assessment of various Englishman's roles in the Thirty Years' War but very much within the framework of the British Civil Wars.[65] The key problem with both the work of Manning, Lawrence, Dunthorne and Donagan is that although they have all skirted the issue of Englishmen serving within the Low Countries none have ever adequately acknowledged the link between the Crown and these men nor contextualised them into wider English political and military policies.

Against this backdrop, contemporary defence of the English military becomes more understandable. In 1618 the Venetian ambassador commented: "The English, Scots and Irish are all fond of war and make good soldiers."[66] In fact, he went on to conclude that "in the present state of affairs the republic cannot obtain better captains than from England."[67] This would be seen as an extremely optimistic assessment of the English (and indeed the Scottish) military if it was simply viewed as discussing the domestic systems in the British isles. It seems more likely that the ambassador and many of his contemporaries understood that this was not the case. The English in the Dutch Republic throughout the period of 1600–1630 were used as a *de facto* English standing army by the Stuart monarchy and were taken from Dutch command for their use when required, for instance between 1609–1614, 1620–1621 and 1625–1629.

63 Geoffrey Parker too has argued that the English 'flocked' to learn this "schoole of war" G. Parker, 'Foreword', in ed. M. Hoeven, *Exercise of arms: warfare in the Netherlands, 1568–1648* (Leiden, 1997), p. IX. See also: M. Glozier, 'Scots in the French and Dutch armies during the Thirty Years' War', in ed. S. Murdoch, *Scotland and the Thirty Years' War, 1618–1648* (Leiden, 2001), p. 128; Lawrence, *Complete Soldier*, p. 23; Wilson, *Europe's tragedy*, p. 141. Donagan famously used the phrase in her article: B. Donagan, 'Halcyon days and the literature of war: England's military education before 1642', *Past & Present*, 147 (1995), p. 70. It is repeated as a heading in B. Donagan, *War in England, 1642–1649* (Oxford, 2008), p. 40. The phrase has existed in a variety forms for much longer. See: A.C. Miller, *Sir Richard Grenville of the Civil War* (London, 1979), p. 10; F.T.R. Edgar, *Sir Ralph Hopton: The King's man in the west* (*1642–1652*) (Oxford, 1968), pp. 1–10. Within a Scottish context this has been used by Matthew Glozier: M. Glozier, *Scottish Soldiers in France in the Reign of the Sun King: Nursery for Men of Honour* (Leiden, 2004).

64 Donagan, 'Halcyon days', pp. 65–100; Donagan, *War in England*, pp. 33–61; Lawrence, *Complete Soldier*, pp. 1–17; H. Dunthorne, *Britain and the Dutch revolt, 1560–1700* (Cambridge, 2013), pp. 61–103.

65 Donagan, *War in England*, pp. 40–61.

66 CSPV, 15:387.

67 Ibid., 15:396.

Whilst clearly the army was different in form to that standing armies of Charles II and James II, this army was used by the earlier Stuart British monarchs to further their foreign policy aims to such an extent that I do not think it is a stretch to describe it as such.

This monograph has been an exercise in choosing what to exclude, rather than trying to find things to include, because of the scale of the conflict and of English engagement within it. Inevitably areas have not been covered which clearly could form the focus of future research. For instance, the following chapters do not address English service in the Catholic powers of the Thirty Years' War, as providing an adequate assessment of these could potentially require a book in its own right.[68] Englishmen did serve there, for example, in 1625 there were eighteen English (and eighteen Scottish) captains serving the Habsburgs.[69] In February 1622, the earl of Argyll was given permission to levy within England, Scotland and Wales for service within the Habsburg army.[70] Unlike the Protestant levies, Argyll's levy was focused on James's Catholic subjects: "orders were issued to the ports of the realm to allow English recusants and other subjects of his Majesty to pass without the customary examination and oath".[71] Secondly the following chapters say little on naval warfare despite the Royal Navy and large-scale privateering playing an important role in the conflict.[72] Indeed, at times it is clear that land and naval warfare went hand in hand, for example, in Norfolk the training of the local militia was often discussed alongside an analysis of maritime defence.[73] Again, this omission has been made purely for reasons of brevity. The final areas not discussed in detail are the English campaigns to Cadiz and La Rochelle and that is for different reasons, namely that the work has been done and that the campaigns were

68 As within the context of the 'Protestant Cause' the most up to date current work on England is found in Scottish scholarship: D. Worthington, *Scots in Habsburg service, 1618–1648* (Leiden, 2004). For details of Irish service see: D. Dickson, C. Brady and D. Downey, A Database on the Irish military presence in the Spanish Armies, 1580–1818 Dublin, 2007; Stradling, *The Spanish monarchy and Irish mercenaries*.

69 TNA, SP, 77/18 English and Scottish captains serving the Infanta (December 1625), fol. 259.

70 E.M. Thompson and A.L. Rowse, eds., *The Chamberlain letters: a selection of the letters of John Chamberlain concerning life in England from 1597 to 1626* (London, 1966), p. 290.

71 CSPV, 17:233.

72 The Royal Navy was a British institution by this period though it is clear that Englishmen still made up the majority of those serving in its ships. N.A.M. Rodger, *The safeguard of the sea: a naval history of Britain.* (*Volume 1, 660–1649*) (London, 1997), p. 347. For work on English privateering see S. Murdoch, *The terror of the seas? Scottish maritime warfare 1513–1713* (Leiden, 2010), pp. 127–140, 153–181 and 191–211.

73 Rye and Firth, eds., *SP Musters in Norfolk*, p. 9.

very different in nature to those looked at in this book. This in part stems from the fact that unlike many other aspects of British involvement in the Thirty Years' War, an overt declaration of war was made.[74] These two campaigns were only a part of English involvement in the conflict and were both organisational failures.[75] The fact that a number of experienced colonels who served at Isle de Rhé had served elsewhere in the Thirty Years' War before this event, notably in the Dutch Republic, has been ignored.[76] Despite George Villiers, 1st Duke of Buckingham, liking the presence of experienced soldiers he preferred to make the decisions himself and, therefore, a significant responsibility for the expedition's failures must be placed upon him.[77] Both expeditions were confused in command structure and were poorly organised both politically and militarily by the Stuart establishment.[78]

The structure of this monograph is therefore set to analyse the most interconnected parts of England's involvement within a complex war. The structure unashamedly takes its inspiration from Steve Murdoch's edited collection on Scotland and the Thirty Years' War, though obviously the countries looked at are tailored to the English experience. The opening chapters will deal with the motivations of those who fought and at the role of the Anglo Dutch brigades. Having set the stage, the following two chapters look at how these soldiers were used in the Palatinate and Bohemia during the opening stages of the conflict. This is closely linked to the previous chapter as many of the troops which served here, such as Sir Horace Vere's troops, were loaned and subsequently returned to Dutch service. It also considers the other levies made on behalf of the Palatinate and Bohemia in the early 1620s and explains the links to and extent of Jacobean foreign policy in order to reduce the confusion often associated with it. Building on previous work on British involvement in Denmark-Norway, chapter four evaluates the role of the English within the Emperor's War (*Kejserkrig*) of 1625–1629. Finally, the last chapter discusses the English soldiers who served in the Swedish army during the brutal battles of the

74 For example, see chapter 1 of K. Sharpe, *The Personal Rule of Charles I* (London, 1992); Carlton, *This seat of Mars*, pp. 81–86.

75 Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway*, p. 66.

76 Captain Robert Markham, *The description, of that euer to be famed knight, Sir Iohn Burgh, Colonell Generall of his Maiesties armie vvith his last seruice at the Isle of Rees, and his vnfortunate death, then when the armie had most need of such a pilote. Written by Robert Markham, captaine of a foote company in the same regiment, and shot also in the same seruice* (London, 1628), p. 19.

77 Manning, *An apprenticeship in arms*, p. 109.

78 In particular the lack of any overall strategic goal Fissel, *English warfare*, p. 268.

1630s. The legacy of these soldiers both abroad and at home should not be underestimated and will be looked at in the concluding remarks of this volume. The New Modelled Army is often portrayed as appearing from nowhere during the 1640s but when foreign military service is considered this military formation's appearance becomes more evolutionary than revolutionary.[79]

79 For example, Mark Kishlansky's account of the creation of the New Modelled Army fails to emphasise that a significant number of those involved were veterans of the Thirty Years' War. M. Kishlansky, *The rise of the New Model Army* (Cambridge, 1979).

CHAPTER 1

Why Fight?

> Neither let any man say; What is their affliction to vs? What are those parts to these? What is France or Germanie to England?[1]

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Perhaps the first question when confronted with the tens of thousands of English soldiers in the armies of the Thirty Years' War is "why were they there"? Why did so many Englishmen leave their homeland to find in Europe? Why were they serving in specific armies at particular times? What drove these men to leave their homes and participate in the worst conflict to envelope Europe until the twentieth century. Too often these men have they been described as 'mercenary' as convenient shorthand that explains away both the high and low politics of the Stuart Kingdoms. The temptation to use the term is obvious. It succinctly provides an answer to the why, and also means that such soldiers can be ignored, and foreign policy focussed on more conventional warfare and diplomacy. The reality, however, is far more diverse and complex. During the Thirty Years' War Englishmen served within armies across Europe and the reasons behind these choices were obviously highly individual. Motivations are rarely simple or singular and there were a host of motivations, often even within one person which over a thirty-year period evolved.[2] It is not always possible to ascertain the motivations of one soldier, but through studying groups and the countless others remained at home some conclusions can be drawn. Soldiers and civilians alike read about the conflict, listened to sermons on aspects of the war and drew their own conclusions. Jonathan Scott's warning that historians must take contemporary belief seriously is particularly pertinent, since contemporary standards and modern viewpoints differ

1 Thomas Gataker, *A sparke tovvard the kindling of sorrow for Sion A meditation on Amos 6. 6. Being the summe of a sermon preached at Sergeants Inne in Fleet-Street. By Thomas Gataker B. of D. and pastor of Rotherhith* (London, 1621), p. 33. For a detailed discussion of this text see P. Salzman, *Literary culture in Jacobean England: Reading 1621* (Basingstoke, 2002), pp. 52–54.

2 For example Peter Heylyn lost his sympathy for the Palatine family between the 1620s and 1630s. A. Milton, *Laudian and royalist polemic in seventeenth-century England: the career and writings of Peter Heylyn* (Manchester, 2007), pp. 155–156.

 | DOI:10.1163/9789004522695_003

markedly.[3] Such work is possible as the research focussed on soldiers during earlier periods of English or Scottish history have shown, and it is upon these foundations that much of this chapter is built.[4] Crucially, both Steve Murdoch and David Trim have argued compellingly that not all contemporary British soldiers behaved as mercenaries as we now understand the term.[5] Trim argues that English soldiers were mercenaries only by the strictest modern definition. Though Trim may be correct, the extent to which our primary understanding of the word as given by the *Oxford English Dictionary* is contentious: "A person primarily concerned with money or other reward" does not adequately describe their motivation.[6] It is true that the second part of the definition: "A hired soldier in foreign service" describes them but this is technical and clearly not what people take the word to mean in daily usage.[7] Therefore, although it is clear that the English operating within the Thirty Years' War meet the second criteria, as Trim points out, the primary meaning and implication of the word is defined in part one, which fails to describe their range of motivations. This chapter will examine the motives of individuals and in the process set out a far more complicated explanation for the activities of the English military establishment than the simple desire for profit.[8]

This chapter analyses what contemporary Englishmen themselves wrote about the conflict, and how they saw English engagement within it. Many contemporaries viewed the term mercenary as insulting, lending further significance to the distinction between professional soldiers who fought for principle and mercenaries who did not, albeit most wanted their pay.[9] Though the majority of the analysis of the term that follows concerns its modern meaning and our perception of these men, it is clear that contemporaries were also aware of this distinction. The starkest illustration of this is that the English (and Scottish) soldiers serving in the Danish army were referred to by the Danes as

3 J. Scott, *England's Troubles: seventeenth-century English political instability in European context* (Cambridge, 2000), pp. 43–66.

4 Trim, 'Jacob's Wars', pp. 59–95. Within a wider British context Steve Murdoch has also analysed this topic: Murdoch, 'Introduction', pp. 15–18.

5 Trim, 'Jacob's Wars', p. 59. David Parrott has also challenged negative perceptions of 'mercenaries' Parrott, *The Business of War*, pp. 8–10.

6 Oxford English Dictionary Online Oxford, Available from http://www.oed.com.

7 Ibid.

8 The definition from the 'International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries' also emphasises that any such person: "Is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain." S.V. Percy, *Mercenaries: the history of a norm in international relations* (Oxford, 2007), p. 248.

9 This is discussed within B. Donagan, 'The Web of Honour: Soldiers, Christians, and Gentlemen in the English Civil War', *The Historical Journal*, 44.2 (2001), pp. 381–382.

'hjælpetropper' or helptroops, crucially, not as hired soldiers or 'lejetropper'.[10] Understanding such a distinction adds a nuance to an over-simplistic view of contemporary motivations which often asserts one motivation across all the individual troops.[11] To illustrate mercenary service within an English context Sydnam Poyntz, who at different times changed both his religion and political master, is the author cited above all others.[12] His desire for profit and personal advancement at the cost of dynastic, religious or national loyalty, has combined with the accessibility of his published diaries, which in turn has led to an assumption that he represented the norm.[13]

This picture is further complicated by the distinction between mercenaries and professional soldiers. Mark Fissel, amongst others, has correctly emphasised that there was a clear difference between mercenaries and volunteers.[14] John Nolan has added to this debate by describing Sir John Norreys of the Elizabethan period as a "state sponsored mercenary".[15] Since he was indeed "state sponsored" the descriptor of mercenary seems a little misleading, but such ideas fit into many of the arguments that surround the development of standing armies within the seventeenth century.[16] The concept of a military entrepreneur has been added to this mix of terms by David Parrott and represents a step forward.[17] In many ways this term is a compromise between

10 *Kong Christian den fjerdes egenhaendige Breve*, eds. C.F. Bricka and J.A. Fridericia 8 vols (Copenhagen, 1887–1970) 2:231. See also chapter 4 and G. Lind, *Hæren og magten i Danmark, 1614–1662* (Odense, 1994), p. 307.

11 References to British mercenaries serving in Europe are commonplace and go largely unquestioned among even the most recent scholarship. J. Childs, *Warfare in the seventeenth century* (London, 2001), p. 38 serves well. This applies to general histories of warfare and histories of the Elizabeth period: M. Howard, *War in European history* (London, 1976), p. 73.

12 For example R. Bonney, *The Thirty Years' War 1618–1648* (Oxford, 2002), p. 68; C. Carlton, *Going to the wars: the experience of the British civil wars, 1638–1651* (London, 1992), p. 19; Childs, *Warfare in the seventeenth century*, p. 44 and 208.

13 S. Poyntz, 'The relation of Sydnam Poyntz, 1624–1636', in ed. A.T.S. Goodrick, *Camden Society, Third Series* 14 (London, 1908), p. 75.

14 Fissel, *English warfare*, p. 180. For an analysis of mercenaries in a legal and moral framework during the period see: Percy, *Mercenaries*, pp. 86–93.

15 Nolan, *Sir John Norreys*, p. 244.

16 O. van Nimwegen, 'The transformation of army organisation in early-modern western Europe, *c.* 1500–1789', in ed. F. Tallett and D.J.B. Trim, *European warfare, 1350–1750* (Cambridge, 2010), p. 167 and 171.

17 Parrott, 'Military enterprise to standing armies', pp. 75–76 and 81–84. For Parrott's work in a broader context see: Parrott, *The Business of War*. The marquis of Hamilton's British levy for Swedish service (see chapter five) has also been described in such terms: Percy, *Mercenaries*, p. 87.

the two extremes of mercenaries and national standing armies (not recruited from foreign nations) and is certainly attractive because they acknowledge the difference between military figures (such as Wallenstein) and nation states. Crucially this allows an explanation to be provided for the actions of those soldiers who remained loyal to a cause whilst fighting in armies which are often described as mercenary. For example, John Borough served in the Anglo-Dutch brigade, the army of the Palatinate, and directly for the Stuart crown showing steady loyalty to the Protestant cause, and indeed consistent obedience to Stuart policy. That Borough also fought in the army of Count Mansfeld, a military entrepreneur, does not change this as he did so under the same terms.[18] Indeed, the soldiers involved in this levy reported to an English Commander not to the Count, something that is often misunderstood.[19] Colonel Gray illustrated this when he enquired "to know what himself and his regiment shall do in case the count of Mansfeld perish in this warre, or that the peace be made."[20] Although in the service of a military entrepreneur, this statement shows for the soldiers concerned the ultimate authority over these regiments remained with Charles Stuart. Indeed, the chain of command is crucial to understanding that most of the soldiers operating within such systems did not behave as the modern definition of the word mercenary implies. Parrott has capably pointed out that even under Wallenstein the senior officers retained their loyalty to the Emperor rather than the *Generalissimo*.[21] The reality is that despite there being a wide variety of armies during this period, ranging from a conventional state army levied entirely domestically, to those armies containing foreigners or levied by entrepreneurs many of those serving still fought for a set of fixed loyalties such as their ruler or faith.

To fully understand the participation of foreigners within the various armies of the Thirty Years' War, their service must be analysed within a pre-Westphalian peace framework. Since this has already been assessed in the introduction there is no need to discuss it in much more detail here but the fact that various European powers were indirectly providing military aid

18 TNA, SP, 81/23 General account of the cost of forces in the Palatinate (17 January 1622), fol. 19; Den Haag, Nationaal Archief, 1.01.02 5889.214 List of Officers released to England from service of the States General for service under Charles I (21 November 1626); John Rushworth, *Historical collections*, pp. 157–158; Captain Robert Markham, *The description, of... Sir Iohn Burgh*.

19 Copenhagen, Statens Arkiver Rigsarkivet, TKUA, 63–7 Robert Anstruther to Christian Friis (*c.* 1622), fol. 21. This is discussed further in chapter 3.

20 TNA, SP, 81/34 Mansfelt's demands and Col. Grey's requests (1626?), fol. 158.

21 Parrott, *The Business of War*, p. 308.

without formally entering the conflict is crucial to understanding how so many English and Scottish soldiers managed to translate their motivations in service within a legal framework that was organised by the Stuart Crown. The consistent loyalty of many British soldiers to the Protestant cause and the level of professionalism within various nations' armies imply they were more than disciplined mercenaries and, in fact, loyal servants to the Stuart dynasty and Protestantism. This chapter will analyse the variety of motivations for foreign service, bearing in mind that many soldiers served for multiple reasons. Equally it is important to remember that many of the motivations felt in 1618 had evolved into quite different motivations by 1648. By analysing the matrix of motivations within the context of broader English interest on the 'home front' it is possible to build a more nuanced view of the incentives that drove Englishmen to invest both militarily and financially in the conflict.

1 Forced to Fight: Coercion during the Thirty Years' War

The most obvious method of creating an army was coercion, a practice maintained throughout the period.[22] Unsurprisingly, this method seems to apply primarily to common soldiers rather than officers which makes it more difficult to analyse but there are hints. In 1624 John Chamberlain noted: that "one that was pressed hung himself for fear or cursed heart, another ran into the Thames, and after much debating with the constable and officers, when he could not be dismissed, drowned himself. Another cut off all his fingers of one hand, and another put out his own eyes with salt".[23] Unfortunately, the lack of surviving evidence surrounding the lives and motivations of common soldiers means that this chapter will necessarily discuss mainly the officers. This is unfortunate and it would be wonderful to be able to delve into the motivations of men from shires to see why men left their homes, and indeed to understand how these men's motivations changed as the war developed. One of the few common soldiers who can be analysed is a Scot, drummer-major James Spens, whose correspondence was saved due to an archivist believing it to be written by the diplomat of the same name.[24] The corpus is the subject

22 A. McShane, 'Recruiting Citizens for Soldiers in Seventeenth-Century English Ballads', *Journal of Early Modern History*, 15 (2011), p. 106.

23 Thompson and Rowse, eds., *The Chamberlain letters*, p. 337.

24 Edinburgh, National Records of Scotland, RH 9/2/241 Twelve Letters of Drummer Major Spens (1628–1632). This corpus has been published. See A. Grosjean, S. Murdoch and

of an article by Alexia Grosean, Steve Murdoch and Siobhan Talbott and provides a valuable window into the mind of one common soldier and clearly indicates the significance of religion to his motives for fighting. However, it must be made clear that, unlike James Spens, not all of the men who entered Swedish service did so entirely of their own will. Obviously, one man does not represent everyone and there were clearly many who were not volunteers. Some of the soldiers dispatched in May 1629 were so poorly disciplined that reports were issued that "mutinies are raised in the ships".[25] Hamilton, too, was encouraged to levy "strong bodied vagrants and loose men."[26] These men, in part, come from the Swedish levies conducted under John Caswell and included "condemned persons as are capable of the benefit of the King's general pardon."[27] Common men were also pressed into the navy. One such case provides the names of those conscripted in Knaresborough in 1625. It seems likely that they were used either in the Cadiz or Danish operations, or more likely the defence of northern ports such as Hull.[28] These men were to be handed over to any captain that would receive them. This background of impressments clearly illustrates the plight of some of the Englishmen going to war. It also seems probable that there was more of a problem in England finding experienced soldiers than officers. This possibly points to the higher survival rate of officers to common men since recruiters would obviously have preferred veterans to raw recruits.[29] The case of drummer-major James Spens represents a unique find (to date), and the lack of surviving evidence related to common soldiers means it is impossible to draw solid conclusions. In contrast, the officers who commanded these soldiers did leave accounts, diaries and other records from which it is possible to observe a number of broad motivations for their service.

S. Talbott, 'Drummer Major James Spens: Letters Home from a Common Soldier Abroad, 1617–1632', *Northern Studies*, 47 (2015), pp. 76–101.

25 *Acts of the Privy Council of England*, ed. J. Dasent 46 vols (London, 1890–1964) 45:33.

26 TNA, SP, 16/195 The King to Sir Robert Ducie, Lord Mayor of London (June 1631), fol. 96.

27 *Calendar of State Papers preserved in the Public Record Office for the Reigns of Edward VI, Mary, Elizabeth, James I, Charles I, the Interregnum, Charles II, James II, William and Mary, Anne: Domestic series*, eds. M.A.E. Green et al. 95 vols (London, 1856-) 16: 546.

28 Northallerton, North Yorkshire County Record Office, ZDS /IX 2/3 Wapentake of Claro: An indenture of men pressed for the navy at Knaresborough by three justices under commission from Lord "Scropp", Lord Lieutenant of the north parts, and delivered to conductors for conveyance to Hull (2 June 1625).

29 For an assessment of the difficulties sometimes encountered levying in Tudor and Stuart England see: Manning, *An apprenticeship in arms*, pp. 44–45.

2 International Protestantism and Fear of Spain

The religious bond between the Stuart and the Palatinate families played a key role in the diplomatic language used by the two courts. A wide variety of factors fed into this solidarity, notably the continued service of English troops within the Dutch Republic, but also more diverse causes, such as the links between the English and Bohemian reformations.[30] Achatius de Dona, the Bohemian Ambassador, overtly described their joint actions in 1620 as a "Holy Enterprise" which was clearly an attempt to draw on a sense of Protestant solidarity between the two nations.[31] This correspondence was not written to the King, but instead to the lord lieutenants and sheriffs of England in his attempt to levy men and money for the Protestant cause. Such a sense of solidarity clearly was not new and had developed over the previous century. John Taylor in 1618 directly contrasted the Protestant credentials of a number of English monarchs.[32] Many, in fact, saw the conflict as a defensive war responding to Catholic aggression.[33] When Denmark entered the war in 1625 the appeal for troops was based on a similar premise requesting troops to be raised for "the true religion of God, and the comon cause of Christendome professinge the true Religion with vs, are in apparente daynger irrepayrably."[34]

The nature of international Protestantism and specifically Calvinism also fed into some of the actions undertaken by the Protestant cause during this period.[35] International Protestantism was not a new ideology to England in 1618. The work of Rory McEntegart has discussed the evangelical elements in Henry VIII's court that began to develop a foreign policy which courted the League of Schmalkalden during the 1530s.[36] The first Anglo-German Protestant

30 Z.V. David, 'Utraquism's Liberal Ecclesiology', *Bohemian Reformation and Religious Practice*, 6 (2007).

31 London, The British Library, Additional Manuscripts 46188 Letter to Lord Essex, Lord Lieutenant of Staffordshire, Copy, (May 1620), fol. 9; Hatfield, Hatfield House, the Cecil Papers, CP 129/176 Baron Achatus de Dona to the Lord Lieutenant, Sheriff and Others of Hertfordshire (31 May 1620).

32 John Taylor, *A briefe remembrance of all the English monarchs, from the Normans conquest, vntill this present. By Iohn Taylor* (London, 1618).

33 Hatfield, Hatfield House, the Cecil Papers, CP 130/36 Sir John Ogle to the Earl of Salisbury (25 March 1621).

34 Rye and Firth, eds., *SP Musters in Norfolk*, p. 36.

35 In a wider context see: O.P. Grell, *Brethren in Christ: a Calvinist network in Reformation Europe* (Cambridge, 2011), pp. 127–177.

36 R. McEntegart, *Henry VIII, the league of Schmalkalden, and the English Reformation* (Woodbridge, 2002), pp. 217–225.

alliance was mooted not by Elizabeth, James or Charles, but Thomas Cromwell over a century earlier.[37] Rory McEntegart has elegantly placed these negotiations into the context of 'great power' politics which often dominate the historiography of Henrician foreign policy. He concludes that:

> With Anglo-Schmalkaldic relations we see in English foreign policy something new; a concern that would remain of central importance to the realm's diplomacy for the rest of the Tudor century and long beyond: the Protestant Cause.[38]

Apart from the reign of Mary I these ideas continued to develop under Edward VI, Elizabeth and then James. Paul Hammer has commented on the impact of international Protestantism on Elizabeth's courtiers but it is David Trim who has discussed this in the greatest detail.[39] Trim has argued in favour of Elizabeth pursuing a set of broadly 'Protestant' (though crucially not Calvinist) set of goals during her reign.[40]

Concepts of Anglo-Protestant international policy did not end with the death of Elizabeth. Despite Elizabethan policy not being Calvinist per se, it is striking that many of those Englishmen who fought abroad into the 1630s were actually zealous Calvinists.[41] A brief look at the comments made by Robert Markham on the death of John Borough, a renowned Calvinist soldier, illustrates the centrality of faith to many of those who fought during the period: "Thy tongue was taught to pray, thy hands to fight. But both together for the

37 Ibid. This has become broadly accepted and is acknowledged in more recent general works on the English Reformation such as R. Rex, *Henry VIII and the English Reformation* (Basingstoke, 2006).

38 R. McEntegart, 'Towards an Ideological Foreign Policy: Henry VIII and Lutheran Germany, 1531–1547', in ed. S. Doran and G. Richardson, *Tudor England and its neighbours* (Basingstoke, 2005), pp. 99–100.

39 P.E.J. Hammer, *The polarisation of Elizabethan politics: the political career of Robert Devereux, 2nd Earl of Essex, 1585–1597* (Cambridge, 1999), p. 51; Trim, 'Jacob's Wars', pp. 72–95.

40 Amongst others Andrew Pettegree has pointed out that the early years of Elizabeth's reign were 'interventionist' though Trim disagrees with Pettegree's argument that this changed from 1563. D.J.B. Trim, 'Seeking a Protestant Alliance and Liberty of Conscience on the Continent, 1558–1585', in ed. S. Doran and G. Richardson, *Tudor England and its neighbours* (Basingstoke, 2005), pp. 139–177; A. Pettegree, 'Queen B', *History Today*, (1995), p. 50. Stephen Conway has also commented on the continued existence of these policies into the eighteenth centuries. Conway, *Britain, Ireland, and Continental Europe in the eighteenth century: similarities, connections, identities*, pp. 60–61.

41 Trim, 'Calvinist Internationalism', p. 1035.

Gospels right."[42] The link between religious fervour and military service was also illustrated within the domestic army of England. A breviate of 1626 emphasised "That our Captaynes and Soldiers be sufficient able men and religious," showing that religious loyalty was almost as important as military ability.[43] The famous memoirs of Robert Monro from 1637 also clearly emphasised the significant role of religion within the Thirty Years' War and though he was Scottish it is clear that many of his English counterparts felt the same; he was, after all, writing for an English audience.[44] Monro went on to state:

> Nothing earthly is more pleasant to be seene, than to see brethren in Christ cojoyned against Gods enemies, for advancing of the glory of God, in promoting of his Gospell, and for setting at libertie those poore soules (our brethren in Christ) that were kept long under the yoke and tyranny of the house of Austria, and the Catholique League their mortall enemies.[45]

One significant example of the importance of the Protestant faith to many of the troops was the employment of a chaplain.[46] Within the States General these men were important not only to the troops but also to broader English society. For example, John Paget, the preacher of Horace Vere's regiments played a central role in the foundation of the English church in Amsterdam.[47] The flourishing English churches of the Dutch Republic continued to provide refuge for a large number of expatriates. Amsterdam provides a further example of this when, in 1632, its members appealed to English ministers within England who were being "silenced" to come and preach to them instead.[48]

Printed pamphlets provide us with numerous indications of the strength of Protestant opinion towards European events. In 1629 *The Bible-Battels or the sacred art military for the rightly wageing of warre according to Holy Writ*

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42 Captain Robert Markham, *The description, of... Sir Iohn Burgh*, pp. 6, 4 and 13; Trim, 'Calvinist Internationalism', p. 1034.

43 Rye and Firth, eds., *SP Musters in Norfolk*, p. 26.

44 Robert Monro, *His Expedition*, pp. 1, 5. One copy was signed on 19 August 1639 by "Rich. Carberys" who it seems likely is the Welshman Richard Vaughan, 2nd Earl of Carbery. M. Petersson and M. Stenvall, eds., *Trettioåriga kriget: Centralantikvariatet Katalog 62* (Stockholm, 2010), p. 53.

45 Robert Monro, *His Expedition*, pp. 11, 62.

46 Trim, 'Calvinist Internationalism', p. 1033.

47 Amsterdam, Gemeente Amsterdam Stadsarchief, 318 Archief van de English Reformed Church (1607–1950). The English church in Amsterdam is discussed further in chapter 2.

48 Amsterdam, Gemeente Amsterdam Stadsarchief, 318/3 Notulen van het Consistory, vanaf eind 1821 Chamber of Ministers and Elders (1628–1700), fol. 18v. See also: Sprunger, *Dutch Puritanism*, p. 97.

emphasised the importance of Holy War to God's (Protestant) people.[49] Dudley Carleton emphasised whilst arranging for the shipping of English soldiers that prayers should occur "twice a day before the giving of victuals."[50] The Swedish army also attempted to use the history of Protestantism by means of prayers that linked their campaigns to the Old Israelites, Constantine and Martin Luther.[51] These were described in English publications to illustrate the godly nature of the war being waged. These pro-Protestant ideas were tied to a fear of Catholicism and knowledge of the successes of the counter-Reformation elsewhere in Europe only served to further English worries.[52] This fear of Catholicism had for a long time been associated with a broader fear of Habsburg and in particular, Spanish imperial power.

The relief expressed by many on the failure of the Spanish Match is perhaps the most effective illustration of the feelings towards Spain and Catholicism within parts of English society.[53] In August 1622 John Claydon, the minister for Hackney, complained of the Match comparing it to the ill effects of the arrival of Spanish sheep under King Edward I.[54] Half a year later, John Wilson, stood at the same pulpit and preached of the danger of a Spanish marriage

49 Richard Bernard, *The Bible-battells. Or The sacred art military For the rightly wageing of warre according to Holy Writ. Compiled for the vse of all such valiant worthies, and vertuously valerous souldiers, as vpon all iust occasions be ready to affront the enemies of God, our king, and country. By Ric. Bernard rector of Batcombe Somersetshire* (London, 1629).

50 TNA, SP, 84/127 Memorial for transporting 2,000 men to Plymouth (May 1625), fol. 142.

51 William Watts, *The Swedish discipline, religious, civile, and military. The first part, in the formes of prayer daily used by those of the Swedish nation, in the armie. Together with two severall prayers, uttered upon severall occasions by that pious King; which God immediately heard and granted him. The second part, in the excellent orders observed in the armie; whereof we here present you the articles, by which the souldiery is governed. The third part, in the Kings commission for levying of a regiment: his order for drawing vp of a private company; of a squadron; and of a brigade: with his manner of enquartering a private regiment; and of an army royall: vnto which is added the best manner of building and fortifying of a towne of warre. All, in fiue severall figures expressed and explained. Last of all, is the famous Battell of Leipsich, in two fayre figures also set forth: and now this second time more fully and particularly described* (London, 1632), pp. 1, 2 and 25. see also a reprint of this in; Anon, *The devotions and formes of prayer, daily vsed in the king of Swedens army: being the first part of our intended booke concerning the Swedish discipline; religious, civill, and military* (London, 1632).

52 C.M. Hibbard, *Charles I and the Popish Plot* (Chapel Hill, 1983), p. 4. These became particularly entrenched within the English Parliament: Scott, *England's troubles*, p. 56.

53 M.A. Breslow, *A mirror of England: English Puritan views of foreign nations, 1618–1640* (Cambridge (Mass.), 1970), pp. 45–73.

54 CSPV, 17:462; M. MacLure, *Register of sermons preached at Paul's Cross, 1534–1642* (Ottawa, 1989), p. 121.

showing that such polemic was still in use despite the arrest of Claydon.[55] On the return of Prince Charles and Buckingham to England in 1624 there was widespread celebration.[56] At Paul's Cross, the site of the previous complaints against the Match, a celebration broke out with "squibs, crackers, rackets, which most delightfully flew."[57] Anti-Spanish feeling varied in strength across the nation but it seems to have been particularly prevalent within London even long after the Match was abandoned.[58] Fear of Spanish invasion and what should be done if Spanish troops landed were prevalent in Englishmen's minds, particularly during the period of open war with Spain.[59] Nor was this simply a fear expressed within writings and evidence of the public mood. In 1626 the Lords of the Council ordered Hull to improve its coastal defences in case of an invasion.[60] Certainly public perception of events within the Empire entrenched these opinions and led to comments such as "The poore Palatinate shews us sufficiently what wee are to looke for from the Spaniard" which appeared within an anonymous 1630s pamphlet published abroad.[61] In 1621 George Wither was imprisoned for writing a poem criticising the role of Gondomar, the Spanish Ambassador:[62]

> You are deciu'd, if the Bohemian state
> You think I touch; or the Palatinate:
> Or that this ought of Eight-eight countaines;
> The Podwer-plot, or any thing of Spaines:
> That their Ambassador need question me,
> Or bring me iustly for it on my knee.[63]

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55 CSPD, 10:551; MacLure, *Paul's Cross sermons* p. 123.

56 Leeds, Leeds University Special Collections, MSLt /q/44 Collection of verse, much of it political and addressed to the Cecil family, and including many epitaphs; predominantly in a single hand (*c.* 1626), fols. 31–33v. Just one example is John Taylor, *Prince Charles his vvelcome from Spaine: who landed at Portsmouth on Sunday the fift of October, and came safely to London on Munday the sixt of the same, 1623. With the triumphs of London for the same his happy ariuall. And the relation of such townes as are situate in the wayes to take poste-horse at, from the city of London to Douer: and from Calais through all France and Spaine, to Madrid, to the Spanish court* (London, 1623).

57 MacLure, *Paul's Cross sermons* p. 124.

58 Scott, *England's troubles*, p. 102.

59 Hatfield, Hatfield House, the Cecil Papers, CP 139/77 Preparations against Invasion (1626).

60 Hull, Hull History Centre, C/BR/L216 The Lords of the Council to the Mayor Magistrates and chief officers (7 July 1626).

61 Anon, *Tom Tell Troath or A free discourse touching the manners of the tyme Directed to his Majestie by way of humble advertisement* (Holland, 1630), p. 10.

62 Salzman, *Reading 1621*, p. 119.

63 George Wither, *Wither's motto Nec habeo, nec careo, nec curo* (London, 1621), p. A6.

Such emotions were also undoubtedly linked to the continual evoking of the Elizabethan period as a golden age.[64] In 1626 William Hampton, whilst preaching, looked proudly back on the defeat of the 'invincible' Armada in 1588.[65] Of course there were exceptions to those who feared Spain. For example, in 1604 James withdrew the ban on overt Spanish trade and the Spanish Company of London had its rights and privileges restored, which clearly proved popular amongst those Englishmen who wished to trade with Spain.[66] Some Englishmen criticised those on either side of the religious divide. On 11 January 1618 John Everard preached that the Puritan faith was "worse than infidelity" whilst also condemning Catholics.[67]

Increasingly a number of historians have argued for the importance of 'popular politics' and of studying the beliefs or conversion of people.[68] It is clear that in the seventeenth century there were correspondence networks in place to enable the transfer of foreign news from the capital to other areas of England.[69] The starkest indicator of English interest in international Protestantism within the realm of popular politics is the scale and consistency of donations to the war effort made throughout the realm which occurred across the entirety of society and geography of the country. These did not just occur at the outbreak of war but lasted throughout the conflict, for example, in

64 George Wither directly contrasted James and Elizabeth within his poetry. Ibid.

65 William Hampton, *A proclamation of vvarre from the Lord of Hosts. Or Englands warning by Israels ruine shewing the miseries like to ensue vpon vs by reason of sinne and securitie. Deliuered in a sermon at Pauls Crosse Iuly the 23. 1626. By William Hampton Master of arts, and preacher of Gods word* (London 1627), p. 10.

66 'St. Gregory's College, Seville, 1592–1767', in ed. M. Murphy, *Catholic Record Society* 731992), p. 6. For a broader discussion of English trade during the Thirty Years' War see: H. Taylor, 'Trade, Neutrality, and the "English Road", 1630–1648', *The Economic History Review*, 25.2 (1972), pp. 236–260.

67 MacLure, *Paul's Cross sermons* p. 111. The sermon was published by Robert Sybthorpe, *A counter-plea to an apostataes* [*sic*] *pardon A sermon preached at Paules Crosse vpon Shroue-Sunday, February 15. 1617. By Robert Sibthorpe, preacher of the Word of God at Waterstratforde in Buckingamshire* (London, 1618).

68 A. Pettegree, *Reformation and the culture of persuasion* (Cambridge, 2005); E.H. Shagan, *Popular politics and the English Reformation* (Cambridge, England, 2003), pp. 305–310. Previous work on this subject (primarily from contemporary printed accounts) can be found in Breslow, *A mirror of England*, pp. 14–22.

69 Just one example is the transmission of news to Hull: Hull, Hull History Centre, C/BR/L171 John Lister to the Mayor and Alderman (24 April 1621); Hull C/BR/L172 John Lister to the Mayor and Alderman (3 May 1621).

1630 detailed accounts were made of around 300 people from Yorkshire who donated money towards the defence of the Palatinate.[70]

Some of these donations formed part of organised campaigns by either the Crown or representatives of the Palatinate within England. Ascertaining the overall scale of these donations is almost impossible since many went directly to the representatives but the large amounts given in individual cases implies that the total funding was significant.[71] 1620 marked the first wide scale request for money in aid of the Palatinate and was operated by the Bohemia ambassador with the consent of James.[72] Far from the supporters of these causes being one off donations by eccentrics, there was a constant supply of finance for the Protestant cause (in a variety of forms) from across English society.[73] In 1620 the Mayor and Alderman of the city of London furnished a number of loans amounting to a "good sum of money" which were given to the Bohemian Ambassador.[74] The appeal reached out across England even to small towns and parishes. One example of this is that Robert More wrote to Walter Stanhope of Otley concerning voluntary donations made to help the cause of Elizabeth of Bohemia and her family.[75] The fact these events in the German Lands deeply affected ordinary Englishmen and women far beyond the capital, or indeed any major metropolitan hub, shows the depth of feeling within the nation. There are particularly good records for Hertfordshire, which provides a window into one county and the donations given by a number of individuals.

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70 TNA, SP, 17/A/12 Collectors' accounts, Yorks [West Riding] for the defence of the Palatinate, specifying the names of contributors and the amount contributed (16 June 1630).

71 T. Cogswell, 'Phaeton's Chariot: The Parliament-men and the Continental Crisis of 1621', in ed. J.F. Merritt, *The political world of Thomas Wentworth, Earl of Strafford, 1621–1641* (Cambridge, 1996), p. 28; T. Cogswell, *Home divisions: aristocracy, the state and provincial conflict* (Manchester, 1998), pp. 34–39.

72 BL, Additional Manuscripts 46188 Letter to Lord Essex, Lord Lieutenant of Staffordshire, Copy, (May 1620), fol. 9; Hatfield, CP 129/176 Baron Achatus de Dona to the Lord Lieutenant, Sheriff and Others of Hertfordshire (31 May 1620).

73 Grell, *Brethren in Christ: a Calvinist network in Reformation Europe*, pp. 178–229.

74 BL, Additional Manuscripts 46188 Letter to Lord Essex, Lord Lieutenant of Staffordshire, Copy, (May 1620), fol. 9.

75 Bradford, West Yorkshire Archive Service: Bradford, SpSt 3/2 Robert More, of Guiseley, to Walter Stanhope, description concerning the collection of money for Bohemia (30 September 1620).

TABLE 2 Contributions by the inhabitants of Hertfordshire[76]

Amount	Collector	Amount	Collector
89l. 13s. 2d.	Sir Thomas Pope Blunt	30l. 13s 6d.	John Watts and Richard Wrothe
253l. 14s. 10d.	Sir Charles Moryson	41l. 3s. 9d.	?
76l. 4s. 0d.	Sir Richard Spencer	50l. 17s. 6d.	Thomas Hanchelt and Richard Wrothe
24l. 11s. 8d.	Beckingham Boteler, Earl of Salisbury	4l. 3s. 6d.	Richard Wrothe
55l. 9s. 6d.	John Clarke	112l. 18s. 2d.	Sir Robert Chester, Sir John Caesar and Thomas Newce
46l. 11s. 10d.	Sir John Garrad	75l. 6s. 5d.	Sir John Leventhorpe and Symon Brograve
21l. 14s. 4d.	Thomas Coningesbye, Matthias Milwarde, Mr Blacke and John Warren	Total	883l. 2s. 2d.

Another note records that within the division of John Westwood, a high constable for the 'Hundred of Broadwater', a total of 12*l.* 13*s.* 1*d.* was received by Sir Robert Boteler.[77] Sir Richard Lucie also collected money from the inhabitants of "Broxborne, Wormley, Bayford, Berkhamsted, Parva, Amwell, Hoddesdon and St. Margarets, Essenden, Cheshunt and Waltham Cross" in August 1620 totalling 127*l.* 7*s.* 6*d.*[78] By August 1100*l.* had already been collected and a further 205*l.* 11*s.* 8*d.* was added to this in November bringing the total to 1305*l.* 11*s.* and 8*d.* from one county.[79] This money was clearly used to directly support the Bohemian army and in September 1620 the ambassador wrote to the earl of Salisbury requesting whatever money had been collected be sent immediately to help levy more soldiers.[80] The ambassador also stressed that the "city of London and other provinces" had already done so, emphasising

76 Hatfield, Hatfield House, the Cecil Papers, CFEP Deeds 233/5 The King of Bohemia (August 24–September 9 1620).

77 Hatfield, Hatfield House, the Cecil Papers, CP 196/75 Benevolence for Bohemia (1620).

78 Hatfield, Hatfield House, the Cecil Papers, CP 211/10 Free Gifts to the King of Bohemia from Hertfordshire (31 August 1620).

79 Hatfield, Hatfield House, the Cecil Papers, CFEP Bills 113/4 Bohemia (30 August 1620).

80 Hatfield, Hatfield House, the Cecil Papers, CP 130/12 Achatius Bourgrave et Baron de Dona to the Earl of Salisbury (17 September 1620).

that Hertfordshire was far from a unique case.[81] A conservative estimate based on the amount collected in Hertfordshire and the number of English counties is that around 50,000*l.* was collected by the ambassador. Though this is far from conclusive, since there could have been significant variation from county to county, this figure would be remarkable since James himself ran a similar campaign which raised 35,000*l.* for the English exchequer.[82] This would mean around 85,000*l.* was collected in one year (admittedly one of the first years) purely from voluntary donations.

In 1622 the King again ran a further campaign throughout the nation seeking more voluntary contributions to aid the war and once again this raised money from across the kingdom.[83] For example, in March 1622 the Mayor of Hull received instructions from the Lords of the Council ordering a voluntary contribution to be made to support the Palatinate wars.[84] Albert Morton wrote in June thanking the Mayor for the payment received and confirming it was paid into the English exchequer.[85] This, alongside other evidence illustrates that once again these payments were put directly into the English exchequer, giving the King a degree of financial flexibility not appreciated by historians who just look at the Parliamentary subsidy instead of wider royal finances.[86] Between 1622 and 1624 there was around 90,000*l.* raised for the Palatinate purely from these voluntary campaigns.[87] Charles I attempted to continue this strategy, though with less success, as was revealed on 2nd August 1633 when the Council issued a call for money to aid in the recovery of the Palatinate. On 26th August they received a reply stating that nothing had been collected.[88] Considering the continued service of Englishmen in the Dutch Republic and Sweden, coupled with their interest in European events demonstrated within the broadsheets, it seems that this was representative of the breakdown between the Stuart crown and sections of English society, rather than with

81 Hatfield, Hatfield House, the Cecil Papers, CP 130/13 Achatius, Baron de Dona, to the Earl of Salisbury (23 September 1620).

82 Cogswell, 'Phaeton's Chariot', p. 28.

83 Hull, Hull History Centre, C/BRL/181 The Lords of the Council to the Mayor Sherrif and Aldermen (31 March 1622); Gloucester, Gloucestershire Archives, GBR H/2/2 Voluntary contributions requested by the Crown for war in Germany (1622).

84 Hull C/BRL/181 The Lords of the Council to the Mayor Sherrif and Aldermen (31 March 1622).

85 Hull, Hull History Centre, C/BR/L182 Albert Morton to the Mayor (June 1622).

86 Ibid.

87 Cogswell, 'Phaeton's Chariot', p. 46. Cogswell states these figures were raised for the English exchequer so any money levied from Scotland would be in addition to this amount.

88 Ipswich, Suffolk Record Office, EE1 /O1/1/73 Order from the Council (August 1633), fols. 67–67v.

the Protestant cause. Collections were not just held on behalf of armed intervention but also for those affected and displaced by the conflict. Continental refugees appeared in England and served as a physical reminder to English Protestants of the plight of their continental brethren.[89] In some cases this resulted in action such as in 1621 when the Lords of the Council wrote to the archbishop of York requesting that collections be made in churches on behalf of French Protestant refugees who had arrived in England.[90]

3 Elizabeth of Bohemia

When Achatius de Dona set about collecting the money outlined above, he wrote to Lord Essex and was quick to point out that the Queen of Bohemia was "the only daughter of the king your sovereign."[91] His comments are an interesting window on wider English (and British) interests and motivations in the conflict. He went on to argue: "I need not remonstrate unto you the state of the affairs of the King of Bohemia, my master, for the fame thereof is so public and your affections so good to the welfare of your Sovereign's children that you cannot be ignorant thereof."[92] This loyalty within English society to Elizabeth was felt beyond high politics and could also be seen in such lowly environs as the taverns of the realm. One commentator noted that "In your majesties owne taverves for one healthe that is begun to your self ther are ten drunke to the Princres your forayn Children."[93] The familial link between James, Charles, Elizabeth and her husband Frederick V cannot be overemphasised. A small indication of the significance of this is the scale of the gift given to Monsieur de la Greene who brought news of the birth of Elizabeth's second son. The gentleman was given a gold chain, worth 200*l.* and a medal of the King's picture, worth 10*l.* simply for being the bearer of good news relating to Elizabeth.[94]

89 Reeve, *Charles I*, p. 215.

90 Hull, Hull History Centre, C/BR/L174 The Lords of the Council to Archbishop of York (19 September 1621).

91 BL, Additional Manuscripts 46188 Letter to Lord Essex, Lord Lieutenant of Staffordshire, Copy, (May 1620). See also: Hatfield, CP 129/176 Baron Achatus de Dona to the Lord Lieutenant, Sheriff and Others of Hertfordshire (31 May 1620).

92 Hatfield, CP 129/176 Baron Achatus de Dona to the Lord Lieutenant, Sheriff and Others of Hertfordshire (31 May 1620).

93 Anon, *Tom Tell Troath*, p. 3.

94 Somerset, Somerset Archives and Local Studies, DD /MI/19/18 Warrant to Sir Henry Cary (2 January 1617/18).

The marriage of Elizabeth to Frederick of the Palatinate was significant to both countries and publications of works on the topic, such as John Taylor's work *Heavens blessing and earths joy* (1613) are illustrative of the broad celebrations that took place.[95] The marriage was not a radical shift in policy but part of the continued development of Anglo-German relations that had occurred over the previous hundred years at least. Almost a century before, the failed marriage of Anne of Cleves to Henry VIII arose from the culmination of a decade's work by the pro-evangelical sections of the English court.[96] Indeed, it was also proposed at this time that Mary Tudor marry the son of the Elector Palatine, illustrating that the marriage between Elizabeth and Frederick had precedent.[97] Relations between Bohemia and England were also far from new: in 1381 Richard II married Anne of Bohemia and from this point onwards cultural and religious contacts flourished.[98] John Wyclif proved important and influential during the later Bohemian reformation and the development of English and Czech language bibles was closely tied together.[99] There were a number of smaller cultural links such as the arrival in England of the engraver Wenceslas Hollar who left Bohemia in 1627 and eventually settled in England.[100] The arrival of Hollar is seen by many as a crucial turning point in the development of English visual print culture.[101] John Amos Comenius visited in 1641 during a brief period of exile from Sweden.[102] Yet perhaps the most famous link is through the work of William Shakespeare, due to the controversial line found within act 2, scene 3 of *The Winters Tale*:

> Thou art perfect, then, our ship hath touched upon
> The deserts of Bohemia?

95 John Taylor, *Heauens blessing, and earths ioy. Or a true relation, of the supposed sea-fights & fire-workes, as were accomplished, before the royall celebration, of the al-beloved mariage, of the two peerlesse paragons of Christendome, Fredericke & Elizabeth With triumphall encomiasticke verses, consecrated to the immortall memory of those happy and blessed nuptials. By Iohn Taylor* (London, 1613).

96 McEntegart, *Henry VIII, the league of Schmalkalden*, pp. 217–225.

97 D.M. Loades, *Mary Tudor: the tragical history of the first queen of England* (Kew, 2006), pp. 63–64.

98 Thomas, *A blessed shore*, p. 8. For an analysis of this marriage see M. Van Dussen, *From England to Bohemia: heresy and communication in the later Middle Ages* (Cambridge, 2012).

99 David, 'Utraquism's Liberal Ecclesiology', p. 167; Thomas, *A blessed shore*, pp. 8–9 and 98–118.

100 Thomas, *A blessed shore*, pp. 17 and 201–204.

101 A. Morton, 'Coming of Age? The Image in Early Modern England', *Journal of Early Modern History*, 15.5 (2011), p. 443.

102 Thomas, *A blessed shore*, pp. 9, 17 and 204–208.

It is likely that the play was originally written around 1610, although it was not published until 1623, when it was included in the 'first folio'.[103] The excerpt above is also of significance since it has often been cited as evidence that Shakespeare was ignorant of Bohemia, as it was a landlocked nation, and no ship could land there. However, it seems that the text was more complex than this since Bohemia had become a refuge of toleration. As Thomas has convincingly portrayed, the reality is that "by fusing the image of Bohemia on the sea with the idea of Bohemia as a refuge Shakespeare implicated the imaginary world of Greek romance in the real world of sixteenth century politics."[104] Indeed the *Winters Tale* (alongside the *Tempest*) was one of fourteen plays performed at the court of James I during 1613 when Frederick was to marry Elizabeth. Frances Yates has also argued that the role of Ferdinand and Miranda within the *Tempest* were in fact meant to be fictional surrogates of Frederick and Elizabeth.[105] Although the nature of Shakespeare's relationship to the Protestant cause is contested, the performance and subsequent publication of these plays further illustrates the significance of events within the Palatinate and Bohemia to England. These were of course far from the only plays to link the events of the Palatinate with England, as Hans Werner's work has shown.[106] The wider social interest in Elizabeth is also revealed in other areas. For example, a guide to motherhood that was published was dedicated to Elizabeth.[107] This loyalty was also reflected in visual culture. One contemporary print entitled 'The Triumph of the Reformation' contained an image of Elizabeth and Frederick flanked by Luther and fleeing Catholics, with the lion of England (amongst other nations) at their feet.[108] Demand for portraits of Elizabeth extended throughout the period, long after Charles Stuart had become less

103 William Shakespeare, *Mr. William Shakespeares comedies, histories, & tragedies Published according to the true originall copies* (London, 1623), p. 304.

104 Thomas, *A blessed shore*, p. 168.

105 J. Ross, *The winter queen: the story of Elizabeth Stuart* (London, 1979), p. 38; Thomas, *A blessed shore*, p. 182.

106 H. Werner, 'The Hector of Germanie, or the Palsgrave, Prime Elector and Anglo-German relations of early Stuart England: the view from the popular stage', in ed. R.M. Smuts, *The Stuart court and Europe: essays in politics and political culture* (Cambridge, 1996), p. 130. See also chapter 1.

107 Salzman, *Reading 1621*, p. 171; Dorothy Leigh, *The mother*[*s*] *blessing: or, The godly counsaile of a gentle-woman, not long since deceased, left behind for her children contayning many good exhortations, and godly admonitions profitable for all parents, to leaue as* [*l*]*egacy to their children. By Mrs. Dorothy Leigh* (London, 1621).

108 R.K. Marshall, *The winter queen: the life of Elizabeth of Bohemia, 1596–1662* (Edinburgh, 1998), p. 55.

popular.[109] Indeed, on 27th August 1636 the Mayor and Aldermen of Hull gave a license to John Simpson to display his portraits of "prince Ffredericke and the lady Elizabeth and her progeny."[110]

The relationship between Frederick V and James was also of key importance in its own right. The council of war, created for the restitution of the Palatinate in 1621, specifically referred to the King's son-in-law as a reason to levy the men which were sent out under the earls of Essex and Oxford.[111] In 1632 *The Swedish Discipline* also commented on the relationship between James and Frederick, praising James's response to the conflict and blaming any apparent English failures on the Stuart ambassadors.[112] This relationship was also strengthened further by the English Parliament naturalising Frederick as an Englishman in 1614. In fact, this was the only item of legislation to pass through both houses of Parliament in that year.[113] The bill itself is interesting since it asserted that Frederick was in fact a descendent of English kings (though there seems to be no evidence presented for this) further binding the history of England and the Palatinate together.[114] The bill finally passed stated:

> Upon the 16 [sic] of April the Palsgrave and all the children which he now has or hereafter shall have by the princess were naturalised; neither does the act extend to her children begotten by him or to his by her.[115]

The further significance of this is that all the children of Frederick and Elizabeth were also naturalized as English. The passage of the bill illustrates how even when King and Parliament could agree on nothing else, they did at least agree on the marriage of Elizabeth and the alliance it created. It also points to a deeper connection between the two dynasties and territories.

It is clear that for many within England there was a strong sense of guilt that both England (and more generally Great Britain) had failed to secure the

109 Ibid., p. 70.

110 Hull, Hull History Centre, C/BR/B3 Minutes of the formal Meetings of the Mayor and Alderman, Bench Book vol. 5 (1609–1650), fol. 420.

111 Leeds, Yorkshire Archaeological Society, DD 56/L3 Militia records, Order in council appointing a council of war for the affairs of the Palatinate (11 February 1621).

112 William Watts, *The Swedish discipline*, pp. 4, The Account of Leipsich.

113 *The life and letters of Sir Henry Wotton*, ed. L.P. Smith 2 vols (Oxford, 1907) 2:36; M. Jansson, ed. *Proceedings in Parliament 1614: House of Commons* (Philadelphia, 1988), pp. 53, 54, 80, 81–83, 85 and 88. The passage of this bill of naturalisation has led to a debate relating to whether the sitting of the 1614 Parliament was in fact a session of Parliament rather than a convention.

114 Jansson, ed. *Proceedings in Parliament 1614*, p. 53.

115 Ibid., p. 88.

Palatinate on behalf of Frederick and Elizabeth. In 1626 a verse from 'the nobility and gentry of Britain' issued "theire apologie to the never enough loved never enough to be lamented, the Queene of Bohemia".[116] In 1630 another writer commented on the "discord at home and dishonour abroad" caused by the lack of support for Elizabeth.[117] The writer went on to argue that troops should be committed to the restitution of the Palatinate to "redeeme the credit of our nation."[118] Some took their guilt into the confessional sphere and in August 1630 John Jones preached that the English Protestant defeats had been brought about through the sins of the English people and emphasised that since: "We see not the high way strewed with breathlesse carkasses, nor our streets swimming with blood. We cannot judge of the terrors of warre, but by report and heare-say."[119] This wider sense of guilt amongst some Protestants is illustrative that they felt England should have overtly entered the conflict. For many Englishmen, the desire to restore the Palatinate did not decrease as the war progressed. In 1630 the Spanish ambassador was aware that the restitution of the Palatinate was what "chiefly concerns his majesty" and used this to his advantage throughout negotiations for a treaty to end the Stuart-Spanish war.[120] The growth of a cult of personality around Elizabeth of Bohemia is of great significance and, as Elizabeth I had done before, she managed to capture the hearts of a significant part of England's population.[121] Affinity to Elizabeth extended long after loyalty to her brother had waned. It is interesting that by the outbreak of civil war, despite the efforts of James and then Charles (and

116 Leeds University Special Collections, MSLt /q/44 Collection of verse, much of it political and addressed to the Cecil family, and including many epitaphs; predominantly in a single hand (*c.* 1626), fols. 13–14v.

117 Anon, *Tom Tell Troath*, p. 5.

118 Ibid., p. 12.

119 John Jones, *Londons looking backe to Ierusalem, or, Gods iudgements vpon others, are to be obserued by vs* (London 1633), p. 38.

120 Hatfield, Hatfield House, the Cecil Papers, CP 131/45 England and the Low Countries (13 August 1630).

121 Breslow, *A mirror of England*, pp. 37–40. A direct comparison of the two is made within: John Harrison, *A short relation of the departure of the high and mightie Prince Frederick King Elect of Bohemia: with his royall & vertuous Ladie Elizabeth; and the thryse hopefull yong Prince Henrie, from Heydelberg towards Prague, to receiue the crowne of that kingdome Whearvnto is annexed the solempnitie or maner of the coronation. Translated out of dutch. And now both togither published ... to giue satisfaction to the world, as touching the ground, and truth, of his Maties. proceedings, & vndertaking of that kingdome ... As also to encourage all other noble & heroicall spirits* (*especiallie our owne nation, whom in hônour it first and chieffelie concerneth*) *by prerogative of that high, and soveraigne title, haereditarie to our kings & princes: defendees* [*sic*] *of the faith*) *to the lyke Christian resolution, against Antichrist and his adhaerents* (Dort, 1619).

arguably because of the nature of those efforts), those who had been loyal to Elizabeth all their life, such as Francis Nethersole, felt justified in rebelling against the Stuart dynasty in Britain.[122]

4 Pamphlets and Sermons during the Thirty Years' War

Within England, interest in the continental conflict was clear; men not only fought in the war but regularly wrote and published news of the engagements there.[123] Despite Charles I's view that foreign news was "unfit for popular view and discourse" the motivations of many Englishmen are perhaps best illustrated by the large body of printed material that was produced during the Thirty Years' War.[124] This corpus has attracted attention before, in particular as a precursor to the "news revolution" of the Civil Wars. However, it has also attracted some attention in its own right.[125] The work of Jayne Boys on the London news press illustrates effectively the scale of interest in the Thirty Years' War that was found in England.[126] In particular she has very effectively highlighted that a number of publications continued to provide news in London even after the 1632 effort to silence the corantoes.[127]

122 A. Hughes, *Politics, society and civil war in Warwickshire, 1620–1660* (Cambridge, 1987), p. 127.

123 For just one example see: Gentleman well deserving, *The invasions of Germanie*.

124 Cited in K. Sharpe, *The Personal Rule of Charles I* (London, 1992), p. 646.

125 An excellent summary of historiographical developments can be found in: D. Randall, 'Review: Recent work on Elizabethan News Pamphlets', *The Huntington Library Quarterly*, 67.3 (2004), pp. 457–472 and Cogswell has analysed the European context of events later in the 1620s. T. Cogswell, '"Published by Authoritie": Newsbooks and the Duke of Buckingham's Expedition to the Île de Ré', *Huntington Library Quarterly*, 67.1 (2004), pp. 1–25. White's thesis also addresses the issue but lacks an understanding of much of a European context: J.C. White, '"Your Grievances are Ours": Militant Pan-Protestantism, the Thirty Years' War, and the Origins of the British Problem, 1618–1641' (PhD., Brown University, 2008). Some of the best analysis can be found within J.E.E. Boys, *London's News Press and the Thirty Years War* (Woodbridge, 2011); D. Randall, *Credibility in Elizabethan and early Stuart military news* (London, 2008); R. von Friedeburg, 'The Continental Counter-Reformation and the Plausibility of Popish Plots, 1638–1642', in ed. C.W.A. Prior and G. Burgess, *England's wars of religion, revisited* (Farnham, 2011), pp. 49–73. Paul Salzman has also emphasised the significance of understanding the nature of texts and readers from the period since so many have been neglected Salzman, *Reading 1621*, pp. XVI, 140–154.

126 Detailed analysis of the various types of publication and the publishers involved can be found here. Boys, *London's News Press*.

127 Ibid., p. 1.

The presence of such a large body of polemical pamphlets on this topic serves to indicate that there was a market for the ideas they contained, and these consequently give a sense of popular contemporary English opinion. Beyond simply providing a window into public opinion pamphlets also helped to inform and develop opinion by stimulating public debate. Moreover, they provided a connection between public opinion and the institutions of state, such as Parliament. Peter Lake and Steven Pincus have convincingly argued that printed pamphlets from the sixteenth and seventeenth century need to be re-integrated into historical debate alongside manuscript sources which have increasingly been seen as superior.[128]

By the 1630s contemporary commentators wrote that books covering events in Germany, France and the Low Countries were issued on a daily basis.[129] The first three revisions of part one of the *Swedish Intelligencer* were imprinted over ten times and the fourth revision a further ten times.[130] One small example of this is the flurry of printing provoked by the death of Gustav II Adolf, the hero of the Protestant cause, which sparked a series of publications about the battle of Lützen. The publication of one sheet elegies on the death of Gustav Adolf also provides an indication of interest in foreign events. One notable sheet was by the Scottish irenicist John Durie who wrote a small pamphlet of commemoration which described the Pope as "The seaven-headed Beast and filthye Whore of Rome" placing the death of Gustav Adolf firmly into the context of a religious struggle.[131] There is also a case to be made that by alerting the population to the plight of Protestantism in Europe the author and sponsors of the pamphlets and books could encourage recruitment for continental service. *The Swedish Discipline,* when published in 1632, specifically stated in the closing verse of a prayer that the author wished all Englishmen would agree to support Gustav Adolf.[132] This shows that despite public dissatisfaction with some aspects of Stuart policy there was some awareness of the covert intervention used by the crown. The presence of such material means that it is not possible to ignore these policies when discussing the public debates that took place in the 1620s and 1630s. Interest in news from the continent did not cease with the outbreak of conflict within the British Isles and news of events continued to

128 P. Lake and S.C.A. Pincus, 'Rethinking the Public Sphere in Early Modern England', *Journal of British Studies*, 45.2 (2006), p. 288.

129 London, The British Library, Additional Manuscripts 22959 The Diary of John Rous (1625–1643), fol. 248.

130 Boys, *London's News Press*, p. 232.

131 Anon, *Gustavus triumphans Typus aurei numismatis Sigerodiani. Triumphi Gustaviani typo cupreo delineati explicatio* (Amsterdam?, 1632), p. 1.

132 William Watts, *The Swedish discipline*, p. 35. See another print of this in: Anon, *The devotions and formes of prayer*.

be reported in both manuscript and printed forms.[133] The significance of the English interest and the press that was created to drive it should not be underestimated. It was the experiences of the 1620s that laid the foundations for the 1640s when again pamphlets were used to promote various political and religious positions.

The impact of sermons in England is much harder to research but some of those who wrote pamphlets also gave sermons and most of the surviving sermons are those that were subsequently printed.[134] It would certainly be wrong to see the two forms at odds, as they were in fact closely aligned.[135] Sermons at Paul's Cross and St Mary Spital in London attracted huge crowds and were not always theological in nature. Many gave providential interpretations of European conflict. At least seven of these within the period specifically referred to foreign policy or European events.[136] The fact that any sermons were preached criticising government policy is a measure of popular feeling, considering that breaching the Crown's guidelines could result in imprisonment.[137] Despite this threat, numerous preachers condemned the Spanish Match, even from the policy's very earliest stages.[138] During the early period of the conflict both Archbishop George Abbot and a preacher Robert Bolton directed people towards James's previous anti-Catholic writings in a bid to further align the Stuart dynasty with the Protestant cause in Europe.[139] John Rous also reported that his neighbour had heard information from Europe at a sermon he had attended.[140] Other sermons were more overt in their calls for action in Europe.

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133 For example, this newsletter contains information relating to an attack on the Prince of Orange Hatfield, Hatfield House, the Cecil Papers, CP 131/171 Newsletter (30 September 1641). In 1638 on the outbreak of war a printed account of events since 1618 was produced: Gentleman well deserving, *The invasions of Germanie*.

134 The latest attempt to study their effect in a broader sense is by Emily Michelson in a project entitled: 'Sermon Reception and Religious Identity' (University of St Andrews, Reformation Studies Institute, 2011 onwards). Andrew Spicer has also recently undertaken a study of the space in which sermons were preached A. Spicer, 'Holiness and The Temple: Thomas Adams and the Definition of Sacred Space in Jacobean England', *The Seventeenth Century*, 27.1 (2012).

135 J. Raymond, *Pamphlets and pamphleteering in early modern Britain* (Cambridge, 2003), p. 122.

136 MacLure, *Paul's Cross sermons* pp. 117, 118, 121, 123 124, 131 and 136.

137 CSPV, 17:462. Mr. Clayton and Dr. Sheldon who went "beyond the usual limits" resulting in Clayton being arrested.

138 MacLure, *Paul's Cross sermons* p. 117.

139 J. Rickard, *Authorship and authority: the writings of James VI and I* (Manchester, 2007), pp. 199–200.

140 J. Rous, 'Diary of John Rous, Incumbent of Santon Downham, Suffolk, from 1625 to 1642.', in ed. M.A.E. Green, *Camden Society Old Series* 66 (London, 1856), p. 44. Robert von Friedeburg has argued that Rous was deeply interested in "the plight of 'Protestants in Germany'". von Friedeburg, 'The Continental Counter-Reformation', p. 71.

Thomas Gataker's sermons were published in a compilation in 1637, one entitled *A Sparke Towards the Kindling of Sorrow in Sion* taken from 1621 which discussed the plight of Protestantism in Europe.[141]

> Can we heare daily reports of our brethren in foraine parts, either assaulted, or distressed, or surprised by Popish forces, and a main breach made into the state of those that are by bonds, ciuill and sacred, so nearely knit to vs, and yet esteeme all as nothing, or thinke that we haue no iust cause to mourne and lament?[142]

This appeal illustrates the pan-European religious allegiances felt by many Englishmen. In July 1621, Samuel Buggs preached about the state of Protestantism throughout Europe in contrast to Britain:

> we distant the enjoying of that whole losse our Christians neighbours bewaile. The Christians of Polonia cry out for ayde: The Protestants in Bohemia groane under a heavie and intolerable burden: The Protestants of France send many sighs to heaven for peace or bare security. Happy Britaines, wee sit under our owne vines, and our own Fig trees.[143]

Buggs also clearly felt that the British were obliged to help their fellow Protestants across Europe. Just two years later Gataker published another sermon entitled *The Joy of the Just*, which was dedicated to Sir Horace Vere, showing there was also awareness of what military action was being undertaken by Englishmen in support of International Protestantism.[144] Such concerns continued to be heard from pulpits into the reign of Charles I.[145]

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141 Salzman, *Reading 1621*, pp. 52–54.

142 Thomas Gataker, *A sparke tovvard the kindling of sorrow for Sion*, p. 32.

143 Samuel Buggs, *Dauids strait A sermon preached at Pauls-Crosse, Iuly 8. 1621. By Samuel Buggs Bachelor of Diuinitie, sometime Fellow of Sidney-Sussex Colledge in Cambridge: and now minister of the word of God in Couentrie* (London, 1622), p. 57; MacLure, *Paul's Cross sermons* p. 118.

144 Thomas Gataker, *The ioy of the iust vvith the signes of such. A discourse tending to the comfort of the deiected and afflicted; and to the triall of sinceritie. Being the enlargement of a sermon preached at Black-Friers London; on Psal. 95. 11. By Thomas Gataker B. of D. and pastor of Rotherhith* (London 1623), p. 1. Both of these were reprinted in 1637 on the eve of Civil war. Thomas Gataker, *Certaine sermons, first preached, and after published at severall times, by M. Thomas Gataker B. of D. and pastor at Rotherhith. And now gathered together into one volume: the severall texts and titles whereof are set downe in the leafe following* (London 1637).

145 For example, MacLure, *Paul's Cross sermons* p. 131 and 135.

One prominent sermon to be printed was originally preached at the funeral of the English lieutenant-colonel William Proud.[146] Proud had served under Francis Vere and rose through the ranks until his death at the siege of Maastricht in 1632. The funeral service, conducted by Francis Rogers, emphasised the religious significance of his decision to fight. The sermon opened with a verse from Samuel: "Know ye not that a Prince and a great man is fallen this day in Israel", illustrating the great significance of the fight in the Low Countries.[147] Proud's monument, which was constructed by his family, again shows the significance of piety to his actions:

> Stand Soldiers; ere you march (by way chardge)
> Take an Example here that may inlarge
> Your minds to noble Actions Here in Peace
> Rests one whose life was war, whose rich increase
> Of Fame and Honour from his Valour grew;
> Unbegg'd, unbought: For what he won he drew
> By just desert having in Service been
> A Soldier till near Sixty from Sixteen
> Years of his active life; continually
> Fearles of death yet, still prepar d to dye
> In his religious Thoughts: For midst all Harms
> He bore as much of Piety as of Arms
> Now Soldiers on and fear not to intrude
> The Gates of Death by Example of this Prude[148]

The wars in Europe clearly did not dominate every English sermon in the early seventeenth century; many preachers, such as those listened to by John Lister, did not mention European events at all.[149] Nevertheless, that the Thirty Years' War played a role in both pamphleteering and preaching needs to be

146 Francis Rogers, *A sermon preached on September the 20 1632 in the cathedrall church of Christ at Canterbury, at the funerall of William Proud, a lieutenant collonell, slaine at the last late siege of Mastricke. By Francis Rogers, Doctor in Diuinity* (London, 1633), p. 19. Proud had entered Dutch service during the siege of Ostend.

147 Ibid., pp. 2, [2 Samuel 3.38].

148 Canterbury, Canterbury Cathedral Archive, Images of the Tomb of Prud (d.1632) (1632).

149 Calderdale, West Yorkshire Archive Service: Calderdale, SH /3/S/1 Notes on sermons preached by Dr Preston, Reverend Edwards and Reverend Ramsden (mid 17th century); Calderdale, West Yorkshire Archive Service: Calderdale, SH /3/S/2 Notes on sermons preached by the Reverends Oliver Heywood, William Acte, Eli Bentley, Robert Brook (May 1653 onwards).

recognised to enable a more complete understanding of how both foreign and domestic events were understood in England by contemporaries.

5 Conclusion

This chapter has provided an overview of English attitudes towards the Palatinate, Bohemia and the broader Protestant cause. Such perceptions played an important role in the shaping of policy, particularly under Charles I.[150] No two people think the same and conclusions concerning motivation must inevitably be cautious. That said, the continued assumption throughout historiography that all British soldiers who fought abroad were mercenaries simply does not fit with the remaining evidence. The modern definition carries too many negative connotations to describe how these men behaved, and indeed were perceived, inside a very different social system to our own. English troops serving abroad formed a crucial part of English military power during the period and were used by the crown to pursue a series of Protestant objectives within Europe. As will be analysed in the subsequent chapters, these objectives were at times part of a broader Stuart vision which appeared contradictory, but this does not change the motivations of the individuals concerned. Understanding the English military diaspora, its functions, activities and the desires of its members is not only essential for understanding the English military but also important to the wider appreciation of early modern English history.[151] This chapter has also illustrated the significance of the Thirty Years' War to wider English society and public debate. Thomas Middleton and John Webster's play *Anything for a Quiet Life* contains a line where one character says to another in answering a question:[152]

> Supply a captain, sir; a friend of his went over to the Palatinate.[153]

The fact that no explanation is given and the presence of a friend serving in the Palatinate as simply a passing comment is an effective illustration that such a statement did not require any further discussion. This is far from the

150 R. Cust, 'Charles I and Popularity', in ed. T. Cogswell, R. Cust, and P. Lake, *Politics, religion, and popularity in early Stuart Britain: essays in honour of Conrad Russell* (Cambridge, 2002), pp. 235–258.

151 The numerous works on publications illustrate this, mainly Boys, *London's News Press*; Lawrence, *Complete Soldier*.

152 Salzman, *Reading 1621*, p. 89.

153 Anything for a Quiet Life (5.1.103–10).

only example; another reference to the Thirty Years' War can be found within Massinger's *The Maid of Honour* where a debate occurs which argued in favour of English solidarity with the international Protestant cause.[154] Pamphlets and sermons not only provide an insight into the public debate surrounding continental events but also served to heighten tensions and encourage pro-Protestant sentiments. The Thirty Years' War was far from a distant separate event to the residents of England, just as the English abroad were not a disconnected entity from their countrymen at home. Both played a key role in events within Britain throughout the 1620s and 1630s, long before public opinion turned against Charles which in turn occurred at least in part for his policies in the Thirty Years' War. Indeed, it is a testament to the strength of the image of the Protestant cause and Elizabeth Stuart's association with it that even those who fought against Charles in the 1640s broadly wished to continue to support Elizabeth's family thereafter.

154 Salzman, *Reading 1621*, p. 99.

CHAPTER 2

The Standing Army of England: The Anglo-Dutch Brigades

> Beloved countriemen: The cause we haue to maintaine (vi and armis) is the same in substance with that which the Israelites had: they, the defense and propogation of Religion in spite of the Canaanites: we, the mystical warre of these Provinces for the same ends, against the Papacie.[1]

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The conflict within the Low Countries during the late-sixteenth and early-seventeenth centuries fused with events in the German Lands to create a trans-European war that raged until 1648.[2] In the late Tudor period the Dutch Revolt was perceived as the vanguard in the defence against the resurgence of Catholicism, and from the 1570s onwards Englishmen served continually within the armies of the Dutch Republic supporting the cause of Dutch Protestantism.[3] By 1600, the siege of Nieuport was conducted under the overall command of an Englishman Sir Francis Vere.[4] The significance of the States General of the United Provinces to the Thirty Years' War should never be underestimated; it was after all, the only power to participate, albeit covertly, within the conflict throughout its entire duration and, unlike countries such as Sweden or France,

1 Samuel Bachiler, *Miles Christianus, or The campe royal set forth in briefe meditations on the words of the Prophet Moses, Deut. 23, 9, 14. here under following, preached in the armie as Dungen-Leager, profitable for all sorts of men to reade; and published for the generall good of all that will read, By Samuel Bachiler, Preacher to the English at Gorinchem* (Amsterdam, 1625), p. A2.

2 M.P. Gutmann, 'The Origins of the Thirty Years' War', *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, 18.4 (1988), pp. 749–751. Contemporaries too viewed them as linked: John Rushworth, *Historical collections*, p. 130. It could be argued the conflict lasted longer considering the ongoing Franco-Spanish war, see the introduction for a further discussion.

3 Breslow, *A mirror of England*, pp. 74–75; Fissel, *English warfare*, p. 154.

4 J.P. Puype, 'Victory at Nieuwpoort, 2 July 1600', in ed. M. Hoeven, *Exercise of arms: warfare in the Netherlands, 1568–1648* (Leiden, 1997), p. 99.

 | DOI:10.1163/9789004522695_004

it witnessed warfare conducted within its territorial boundaries.[5] Indeed, there are striking similarities between Stuart and Dutch policy in the period as both provided soldiers and financial aid for the German wars without formally declaring war on the Emperor.

The accession of James I in 1603 brought significant changes to the Anglo-Dutch brigades since overt war with Spain was ended in 1604. Despite this political shift, English military forces continued to fight on behalf of the Dutch against Spanish troops.[6] The signing of the twelve-year truce in 1609 marked a temporary suspension of hostilities, but the Dutch have tended to view the conflict as one continuous event. In 1627 Monsieur Joachimi, the States' ambassador emphasised the length of the conflict and continuity from the initial revolt by stating: "the States General, [have] suffered infinite ills in their 60 years' war against one of the greatest Kings of Europe."[7] The Dutch certainly maintained their armed forces throughout the truce and used the period to support Protestantism elsewhere, notably in the conflicts in Jülich-Cleves (1609–1614) and the Palatinate (1620–1623).[8] The first of these campaigns saw the first ever set of soldiers ordered into the field by a king of Great Britain and these were taken from Dutch service.[9] Unlike the later Danish campaigns (which are discussed in chapter four) the transfer of the English and Scottish soldiers into a British army seems to have been relatively smooth with the Dutch paying the soldiers

5 J.I. Israel, *The Dutch Republic: its rise, greatness and fall, 1477–1806* (Oxford 1995), p. 479. For an example of Dutch assistance to the Palatinate see: TNA, SP, 81/22 Troops going to the Palatinate (1621?), fol. 245.

6 See also Trim, 'Jacob's Wars', p. 185. The only change was that they swore a new oath of loyalty to their new King, hardly exceptional. S. Adams, 'Spain or Netherlands? the Dilemmas of Early Stuart Policy', in ed. H. Tomlinson, *Before the English Civil War: Essays on Early Stuart Government and Politics* (London, 1983), p. 226. This new status was similar to the Scots-Dutch Brigade which had existed since the sixteenth century despite Scotland's peace with Spain. The research of Cynthia Fry sheds light on Scotland's diplomatic relations during this period Fry, 'Diplomacy and Deception'. The history of the Scots-Dutch brigade is catalogued within James Ferguson's edited collection the Scots-Dutch Brigade.

7 Hatfield, Hatfield House, the Cecil Papers, CP 131/41 Speech of Monsieur Joachimi, the States' Ambassador, to the King (11/21 September 1627).

8 For a list of English soldiers within Dutch service in 1610 see TNA, SP, 84/98 List of troops (English and Scottish) in Dutch service. (1620?). Although this is catalogued as being from 1620 it seems more likely that the affixed note by Dr J Roelevink which argues it is from a decade earlier is correct. For further details of this levy see: S. Murdoch, 'James VI and the formation of a Scottish-British Military Identity', in ed. S. Murdoch and A. Mackillop, *Fighting for identity: Scottish military experience c. 1550–1900* (Leiden, 2002), pp. 11–15.

9 *Resolutiën Staten-Generaal Oude en Nieuwe Reeks 1576–1625*, eds. N. Japikse et al. ('s-Gravenhage, 1915–1994) RGP135, p. 44. See also Murdoch, 'Scottish-British Military Identity', pp. 12–15.

until the commencement of the campaign.[10] The soldiers trained within the Dutch army constituted the main supply of English military manpower, knowledge and expertise during the early part of the seventeenth century. Moreover, not only the Palatinate campaign, but also the Cadiz, Ile de Rhé and Danish operations were run either directly from the United Provinces or using troops who had served there. Moreover, the English troops who had served the Dutch also played a role in the attempts to improve the domestic militia systems within England's borders.[11]

In the Tudor period, Elizabeth I had a number of key Protestant allies including both the Dutch Republic and the French Huguenots for whom she encouraged a significant number of soldiers to fight. Recruitment came primarily from England's "godly community" and, at least for a period, her policy of military alliance allowed her to maintain concurrent diplomatic relations just as James VI and I would attempt to during the 1620s.[12] This commitment became overt in the 1580s, and from 1586 onwards there were at least three English regiments permanently stationed within the Republic.[13] English commitment to the Dutch Republic in the seventeenth century has received little investigation in comparison to the earlier campaigns of Elizabeth.[14] The most thorough assessment of English forces during this latter period can be found within David Trim's research which estimates that there were on average 3,000 English soldiers in service per year from 1562 to 1642.[15]

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10 Resolutiën Staten-Generaal, RGP135, p. 60.

11 London, The British Library, Additional Manuscripts 46188 Correspondence with Lord Essex as Lord Lieut. of co. Stafford (27 June 1626). See also Donagan, *War in England*, pp. 54–57.

12 D.J.B. Trim, 'The "secret war" of Elizabeth I: England and the Huguenots during the early Wars of Religion, 1562–1577', *Proceedings of the Huguenot Society of Great Britain and Ireland*, 27 (1999), pp. 193–193. It is also worth noting that Scots served in the Republic during the sixteenth century and then the seventeenth but in lower numbers than the English. For details of the English and Scots in the early period see Trim, 'Jacob's Wars', pp. 69–71 and 96–102.

13 Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway*, p. 187. The arrival of the earl of Leicester and his commission marked a serious escalation of military commitment: Den Haag, Nationaal Archief, 1.01.02 12270 Commissieboeken: Registers van akten van aanstelling van Generaliteitsdienaren onder het zegel en cachet van de Staat (1586–1625), fol. 1; Trim, 'Jacob's Wars', pp. 162–174.

14 For just two examples see: Hammer, *Elizabeth's wars*; Nolan, *Sir John Norreys*.

15 Trim, 'Calvinist Internationalism', p. 1025. For information on the funding see Trim, 'Jacob's Wars', pp. 199–223 and for a detailed analysis of troop numbers until 1610 see the extensive appendices of Trim's thesis. The only other work has been from a Scottish perspective, for example, Glozier, 'Scots in the French and Dutch armies', pp. 117–142.

The legal status of the troops within the Dutch Republic requires some consideration. This is important given that any discussion of them feeds directly into the questions discussed in the introduction surrounding the status of these men as either auxiliaries or mercenaries.[16] The standing of the soldiers actually varied significantly over the period: sometimes having English commissions and at other times holding Dutch ones.[17] The issuing of commissions by the States General was tied to the increasing level of financial responsibility that the Dutch had over the English regiments, and by 1610 most of these were being overseen by the Dutch state which allowed for deeper integration between the English and other Dutch regiments.[18] Trim has argued that until the 1620s many English soldiers retained mixed loyalties as they relied on both English and Dutch patronage, networks and commissions.[19] The changing authority behind the commissions is clearly significant but it was not the case that signing a Dutch commission confirmed an Englishman as a Dutch soldier indefinitely, nor that any sense of dual loyalty was incompatible with their continued service on behalf of the crown of England (or later Great Britain). Indeed, the nature of the settlement after the Union of the Crowns automatically created a sense of dual loyalty for English soldiers. This was illustrated throughout the 1610s and 1620s when soldiers fought not only on behalf of the Dutch, but also the House of Stuart when commanded to do so. Combining this dynastic loyalty with the religious allegiances most soldiers already held, this dual loyalty does not mean that these soldiers' position was in anyway contradictory. It merely highlights that the interests and prioritisation of these competing loyalties were largely pushing them towards the same goal that is the defence of the European Reformation and thus the securing of a Protestant England. The bonds between the English soldiers and their homeland continued throughout the period as they were instructed by the Crown to fight in the Palatinate, France and Denmark before returning to England in the late 1630s, to fight either for or against the Crown. Just one example is Baron Francis Willoughby of Parham who was commissioned by the States General in 1624 yet was recalled to England for service on the Ile de Rhé expedition in 1626.[20]

16 For a broader discussion of this see both the introduction and chapter 1 of this book.

17 Trim, 'Jacob's Wars', pp. 179–180 and 194–198.

18 Ibid., p. 191.

19 Ibid., p. 197. This became more complex from 1635 as discussed later in this chapter. See also: TNA, SP, 84/150 Memorial on change of condition of colonels in Holland (1635), fol. 195.

20 NA, 1.01.02 12270 Commissieboeken: Registers van akten van aanstelling van Generaliteitsdienaren onder het zegel en cachet van de Staat (1586–1625), fol. 388v recall; NA, 1.01.02 5889.214 List of Officers released to England from service of the States General for service under Charles I (21 November 1626).

Trim has argued that the high point of English influence within the period came under Francis Vere and it is certainly true that the scope and scale of his 1599 commission was never surpassed.[21] The lack of a direct replacement for him after his fall was unsurprising; not only did the Dutch have no desire for one Englishman to have such power again, but neither did the majority of English captains, not least because it invested patronage too tightly.[22] Horace Vere took over the English regiments using his close personal friendship with the Nassaus and the continued loyalty of many Englishmen to do so.[23] It is clear that under him the English made a particularly large contribution to Dutch service and as a statistical analysis actually reveals it increased from 1610 onwards before returning in the 1630s to the levels of the 1590s:



FIGURE 1 Percentage of English soldiers within the Dutch army[24]

21 Trim, 'Vere in Holland and the Rhineland', pp. 343–344; NA, 1.01.02 12270 Commissieboeken: Registers van akten van aanstelling van Generaliteitsdienaren onder het zegel en cachet van de Staat (1586–1625), fols. 169–170.

22 Trim, 'Jacob's Wars', p. 190.

23 Ibid.

24 The data within this is derived partially from Manning, *An apprenticeship in arms*, p. 54. This data has been modified to take into account additional sources, notably but not exclusively: London, The British Library, Additional Manuscripts 46188 Minutes. Copy (13 January 1621), fol. 11; London, The British Library, Additional Manuscripts 46188 Papers related to regiments raised to assist the Palatinate (1624), fol. 28; London, The British Library, Additional Manuscripts 46188 Papers related to regiments raised to assist the Palatinate (1624), fols. 29–31; BL, Additional Manuscripts 46188 Papers related to regiments raised to assist the Palatinate (1624), fols. 32–33; TNA, SP, 84/120 List of passage of the Dutch army by Geertruidenberg, and another copy (21 September/1 October 1624), fol. 111; London, The National Archives, Records of the Equity Side: Chancery Masters,

Despite a decline from 1586 levels when nearly 70 per cent of the Dutch army was English, England was still providing around 25 per cent of the force in 1632. Indeed, even in 1637, on the eve of the Civil Wars in Britain, around 23 per cent of the army was comprised of English soldiers which was at a level comparable with 1610 - a remarkable illustration of the consistently high proportion of English in service. Indeed, it is clear that the high number of soldiers proportionally in 1614 was at least in part linked to the Jülich-Cleves conflict, a campaign that was led by British military leadership.[25] Maurice of Nassau's notebook contains an order of battle for the campaign in which over 50 per cent of the army used was commanded by English or Scottish officers.[26] Since the Republic was in the midst of the twelve-year truce during the period this meant that the high percentage in 1614 is unsurprising as the only active military enterprise of the Dutch army was the Jülich-Cleves campaign. In 1615, just one year after this campaign, there were 94 British officers within the Republic, of these 70 per cent (66 men) were English. The English and Scots officers commanded some 9,046 common soldiers of which around 75 per cent were English.[27] This campaign was not the only activity of the English during the 1610s since a number of officers and soldiers remained in positions of authority within the Republic, such as John Ogle as the governor of Utrecht.[28] The significant spike in numbers in 1624 was due to the arrival of the levy organised by the earls of Essex, Oxford and Southampton which added to the companies

115/109/8774 Sir William Boswell from The Hague to Viscount Scudamore with a summary of the English companies currently on duty (1638); Trim, 'Jacob's Wars'; Dunthorne, *Britain and the Dutch revolt, 1560–1700*, p. 67.

25 Scots-Dutch Brigade, 1:222.

26 Den Haag, Koninklijke Bibliotheek, 14/3 Eenige quartiers en slagorders onder de Princen van Oranje (1622–1643), fol. 12. Notably Anderson, Cecil and Vere. Orders of battle such as this need to be treated with a degree of caution since they often contain errors. For one example of this see the analysis of the orders of battle for Wittstock (such as KRA, Sveriges Krig 3/208 Wittstock Ordres de bataille (1636).) can be found within S. Murdoch, K. Zickermann and A. Marks, 'The Battle of Wittstock 1636: Conflicting Reports on a Swedish Victory in Germany', *Northern Studies*, 43 (2012). It is also worth noting that Horace Vere also produced this order of battle: TNA, SP, 9/202/1/18 Compendium of the Discipline and Art of Warre under Sir Horace Vere, commander of English troops in Holland. English, French. (1625), fol. 24.

27 TNA, SP, 84/71 List of English and Scottish Captains (1615), fols. 312–313.

28 Dudley Carleton's correspondence provides a window into Ogle's activities in 1618. Den Haag, Nationaal Archief, 3.01.14 2972 Stuk, houdende een op 26 januari 1618 door Dudley Carleton, ambassadeur van Engeland, aan de Staten-Generaal gedane propositie, betreffende het zonder toestemming van generaal William Cecil door de Staten van Utrecht genomen besluit om één van de regimenten, die op hun repartitie stonden, onder het bevel van Johan Ogle te stellen, 1618; afschrift (begin 17e eeuw).

already in place after the Palatinate campaign.[29] At this point over 40 per cent of the Dutch army was comprised of English companies and when combined with the *c.*10 per cent that were Scots, the total Stuart contingent comprised around half the entire Dutch army. This was not to last long; on Charles's accession to the throne, some 2,000 soldiers were swiftly removed from the Republic and shipped to England for use in the Cadiz expedition.[30] Given the unsuccessful outcome and bad management of this expedition this also supports the thesis that poor leadership was the issue rather than poor soldiers.

Crucially, and even considering these fluctuations, the English contribution did not greatly diminish during this period. Indeed, historians argue that effectively after 1604 the Dutch Republic ceased to be a priority for England, or it at least became significantly less important.[31] However, the data presented here shows otherwise and proportionately the role of the English actually increased from 1604. In 1609 Sir Thomas Overbury commented specifically on the English role in the Dutch Republic: "most part of the great exploits that have beene done by the English, who were commonly the third part of the army being foure Regiments, besides eleven hundered in Flish and the Rakins and five hundred in Brill."[32] Such an extensive presence did not appear or disappear overnight. Men including John Ogle pursued successful careers and took part in some of the key sieges of the conflict, such as that of Ostend.[33] Accounts of these sieges became a part of a mindset which was reflected in poetry during the period some of which explicitly referred to the successes English soldiers had enjoyed in Dutch service.[34] It is also clear that the familial networks of men such as these allowed them to promote their own kin and their comrades from within the regiments.[35]

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29 TNA, SP 84/120 List of passage of the Dutch army by Geertruidenberg, and another copy (21 September/1 October 1624), fol. 111.

30 TNA, SP 84/127 Memorial for transporting 2,000 men to Plymouth (May 1625), fol. 142.

31 Hugh Dunthorne for instance argues that in 1604 James competed the withdrawal of England from all its continental commitments. Curiously he goes on to downplay the role of English soldiers to the Dutch Republic throughout the early seventeenth century despite acknowledging their role at various key events such as the siege of 's-Hertogenbosch. Dunthorne, *Britain and the Dutch revolt, 1560–1700*, p. 65.

32 Sir Thomas Overbury, *Sir Thomas Ouerbury his obseruations in his trauailes vpon the state of the Xvii. Prouinces as they stood anno Dom. 1609 The treatie of peace being then on foote* (London, 1626), p. 3.

33 Hatfield, Hatfield House, the Cecil Papers, CP 90/11 John Ogle to Sir Robert Cecil (19 December 1601).

34 A. Johnston and W.S. Duguid Geddes, *Musa Latina Aberdoniensis, vol. 1* (Aberdeen, 1892), p. 78. "We remember the exploits at Ostend, which was the grave of Europe, those at Nieuport, and the rout of Spain."

35 Such as Sir Thomas Fairfax promoting his son: Hatfield, Hatfield House, the Cecil Papers, CP 185/102 Sir Thomas Fairfax to Sir Robert Cecil (*c.* June 1602).

1 Diplomacy

The English military was just one aspect (albeit a significant one) of English engagement within Dutch society.[36] It rarely attracts attention that until 1626 the English ambassador remained a permanent member of the Dutch Council of State, a potent illustration of the bonds between the two countries.[37] This close bond was maintained for the entirety of James's English reign yet there has been little work undertaken upon the relationship in comparison to the numerous volumes written on Elizabeth I's Dutch foreign policy. The nature of diplomatic relations between the Stuart monarchy and the Dutch Republic was conducted primarily through English personnel, many of whom were part of the English community there.[38] These close links reflected a two way flow since many Dutchmen came to live in London while English congregations were found in the Republic.[39] The relationship itself was complex. Though many within the English state and society at large wholeheartedly supported the Dutch in their ongoing war with Spain, and these form the focus of this chapter, there was also significant economic rivalry between the two countries. One instance can be seen in 1618 when a copy of the East India Company's complaints about the "wronges and abuses latelie done by the Hollanders" was sent to Dudley Carleton in The Hague where it was subsequently translated into Dutch.[40] Indeed, this document is not unusual and concerns over trade, and the Indies in particular, were a key feature of the Anglo-Dutch relations.[41] These cases themselves pale with the indignant reception of news of Dutch actions against the English in Asia or by the Royal Navy against the

36 For a further discussion of this see: Trim, 'Jacob's Wars', pp. 192–194.

37 Den Haag, Nationaal Archief, 1.01.02 12576.35.40 Extract uit de resoluties van de Staten-Generaal waarbij wordt bepaald dat in het vervolg nieuwe Engelse ambassadeurs geen zitting zullen hebben in de Raad van State. (28 March 1626).

38 This chapter will not attempt a full breakdown of the diplomatic relations between the two as it has been done many times before.

39 One contemporary example of the Dutch in London is Anon, *The vvonders of this windie winter By terrible stormes and tempests, to the losse of liues and goods of many thousands of men, women and children. The like by sea and land, hath not beene seene, nor heard of in this age or the world* (London, 1613), pp. 14–15. For a detailed study see A. Pettegree, *Foreign Protestant communities in sixteenth-century London* (Oxford, 1986), p. 77 and 182.

40 Den Haag, Nationaal Archief, 1.01.02 5887.205 A humble declaration of your highness most dutiful subjects the Governor and Company of Merchants of London trading to the East Indies (Dutch Translation) (October 1618); Den Haag, Nationaal Archief, 1.01.02 5887.214 A humble declaration of your highness most dutiful subjects the Governor and Company of Merchants of London trading to the East Indies (October 1618).

41 Just one example of trade concerns includes the case of Bristol merchant Richard Holsworth and Robert Barlow. Den Haag, Nationaal Archief, 1.01.02 5888.84 Memoir on Richard Holsworth merchant of Bristol (23 December 1622). The Dutch also took interest

Dutch. The rumours and outraged pamphlet writers responses to events in 1623 in Amboyna serve to show the global nature of this relationship and illustrate how complicated the Anglo-Dutch alliance became at times.[42] As English troops were fighting on behalf of the United Provinces, the VOC and EIC were engaged in economic competition which sometimes crossed the line into violent rivalry in Asia. Conversely during the 'Dunkirker episodes' of 1623 there were allegations made that between 60 and 80 Dutchmen were killed by the Royal Navy.[43] With events such as these the continued level of cooperation between England and the Dutch Republic during the Thirty Years' War is all the more remarkable.[44] That relations were maintained in the face of these continual challenges is also a testament to the skill of the ambassadors involved. This bilateral diplomacy was important but did not stand alone from the rest of Stuart efforts. It must be emphasised that despite Sir Dudley Carleton being the ambassador to The Hague, a key part of his work involved co-ordinating with other British efforts, such as those of Sir Robert Anstruther in Denmark and Hamburg.[45] Along with Sir James Spens in Sweden, Anstruther would be instrumental in the eventual signing of the Treaty of the Hague in 1625.

Anglo-Dutch relations were further complicated since both countries had internal tensions. Although the United Provinces did not eventually break into civil war as occurred in England, during the 1650s there were tensions between the House of Orange and the state of Holland.[46] Even within the confines of English military assistance to the Protestant cause, it is clear that the Dutch did not always approve of Stuart policy.[47] This created tension between the two nations which Spain tried to exploit with the Spanish attempting to reduce the scale of Stuart engagement within the Dutch Republic. Pedro de Zúñiga in 1605 was instructed to attempt "to prevent any Englishman, Scot or Irishman from serving either directly or indirectly with the rebels in the war" by creating a proclamation of "recall and prohibition whereby no Englishman or Scot might

in Anglo-Spanish trade, see: Taylor, 'Trade, Neutrality, and the "English Road", 1630–1648', pp. 236–260.

42 For one example of Carleton's correspondence on this issue see Den Haag, Nationaal Archief, 1.01.02 5888.127 Letter from Dudley Carleton (30 April 1624).

43 CSPD, 12:46. For more information of the affair see: Murdoch, *The terror of the seas?*, pp. 158–163.

44 More information about this tension can be found in: Dunthorne, *Britain and the Dutch revolt, 1560–1700*, pp. 110–118.

45 Den Haag, Nationaal Archief, 1.01.02 5888.67 Missive from the King of England (30 April 1624). More details of the activities of Anstruther see: S. Murdoch, 'Anstruther, Sir Robert (1578–1644/5?)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, (2010).

46 Pincus, *Protestantism and patriotism*, pp. 115–148.

47 CSPV, 16:303.

go to serve the rebels, and those who are there are obliged to return, and the departure of pirates for the Indies and our seas is prohibited as well."[48] This aim was clearly seen to be worth considerable financial support since the ambassador was licensed to spend 10,000*l.* to help persuade the King and others at the Stuart Court. As this chapter demonstrates, this aim was clearly unfulfilled.

The close military and political co-operation between England and the Provinces was again illustrated when in 1613 the escort for Elizabeth Stuart's journey from England to the Palatinate was augmented by Count Maurice and his brother with a troop of horse.[49] The continued support given by James to the Dutch combined with his subsequent actions means that to describe his foreign policy as "pro-Spanish" as many have done is too simplistic.[50] Considering he aimed to have a Protestant and Catholic alliance simultaneously and he achieved the former but not the latter it is easier to argue that the Spanish Catholic alliance was considered to be less important. As with many of James's policies the reality was more complex than it initially appears which will become apparent in both this and subsequent chapters. Despite this, it is clear that the Dutch Republic and German affairs were always central to many Englishmen's strategic thoughts, particularly during events in the Palatinate. This was at least in part linked to the fact that the Republic was funding a significant proportion of the warfare taking place in Germany as well as that on its own borders.[51] During the Thirty Years' War the Anglo-Dutch alliance may have suffered under the helm of the Stuarts but it certainly survived these tensions. The ongoing commitment of English soldiers in the field, which was sanctioned and at times funded by the Stuart state, is the ultimate testament to this.

2 The 1624 Levy

Clearly the events of 1618 and the subsequent English attempts to defend the Palatinate detracted from their commitments to the Dutch armed forces but this was, as in the case of 1614, done with the consent and support of the States General. The English within the Dutch Republic became increasingly

48 'Spain and the Jacobean Catholics, vol. 1', in ed. A.J. Loomie, *Catholic Record Society* 641978), p. 48.

49 Letters of Henry Wotton, 2:31.

50 Manning, *An apprenticeship in arms*, p. 48.

51 Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, p. 479; J.V. Polišenský, *Tragic Triangle: the Netherlands, Spain and Bohemia, 1617–1621* (Prague, 1991), pp. 247–248.

involved with attempts to restore the Palatinate but these campaigns did not trigger a complete or permanent withdrawal of the Anglo-Dutch military establishment.[52] In Whitehall on 13th January 1620 the Council met to discuss the Palatinate issue and experienced veterans of the United Provinces played an active part.[53] In 1621 there were 9,520 English soldiers in the Dutch Republic and a further 3,590 Scots. This was a substantial force which James then used in the Palatinate campaigns.[54] Two of these soldiers, namely Sir Horace Vere and Sir Edward Cecil, became prospective candidates to lead the expedition. In the end Vere took command and led his troops to the Palatinate forming the focus of English military endeavour until the sequestration of Frankenthal in 1623.[55] Despite this expedition the Dutch Republic was not stripped of all its English support and garrisons. Most notably Gerard Herbert in Breda and Thomas Ogle in Bergen-op-Zoom remained within the Dutch Republic with their troops.[56] Ogle's forces, alongside the Scots company of Sir Walter Bruce and regiment of Sir James Henderson were garrisoned in Bergen-op-Zoom during the siege of 1622.[57] Dudley Carleton also continued to manage the supply of soldiers and in 1621 he purchased "2000 Corseletts, 2000 Pyckes, 2000 Swords" and "60 fyrelocks".[58] The defence of the Palatinate was not only an English but also a Dutch objective, as if the Rhine Palatinate could be held then it could be used to split the Spanish overland route back to the Iberian Peninsula.[59] At the very least whilst the Spanish soldiers of Spinola were engaged there, they could not be deployed against the United Provinces.[60]

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52 One example of this is Den Haag, Nationaal Archief, 1.01.02 12576.35.5 Brief van de Engelse ambassadeur Carleton aan prins Maurits over de bescherming van de Paltz. Kopie (21 October 1620). For more details see Chapter 3.

53 The King appointed "some persons of knowledge and experience in the wars" to advice the board on future activity. BL, Additional Manuscripts 46188 Minutes. Copy (13 January 1621).

54 TNA, SP, 84/104 List of English and Scottish regiments in Dutch Service (1621), fol. 189.

55 The scale of Vere's levy was initially reported to be a commission allowing for a total of 8000 infantry and 1600 cavalry. DRA, TKUA, 63-7 Robert Anstruther to Christian Friis (*c.* 1622), fol. 21.

56 Scots-Dutch Brigade, 1:321.

57 Ibid., 1:61. 258, 309, 321 and 343. It is worth noting that there were also English soldiers serving within the Spanish forces at this siege: TNA, SP, 77/16 Petition of Capt. Rbt. Huddleston to the Infanta (March 1623), fol. 113.

58 TNA, SP, 84/104 Note of arms bought by order of Sir D. Carleton (1621), fol. 233.

59 G. Parker, *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567–1659: the logistics of Spanish victory and defeat in the Low Countries' wars* (London, 1972), p. 54.

60 C.R. Markham, *"The fighting Veres." Lives of Sir Francis Vere, general of the queen's forces in the Low Countries, governor of the Brill and of Portsmouth, and of Sir Horace Vere, general*

In 1624 James I committed himself to raising four regiments each of 1,500 men (totalling 6,000) to be placed under the command of the earls of Essex, Oxford and Southampton. This levy significantly increased English military strength within the Dutch Republic.[61] These men came from across England and it appears that a proportion of them were pressed into service and then sailed from Dover.[62] In 1624 the States General produced a resolution for the payment of English troops within the Republic's service and it comments on the arrival of a number of new musters illustrating the steady stream of troops into the Dutch Republic.[63] Henry Wriothesley, earl of Southampton, also wrote commenting on the arrival of the regiments and the ongoing negotiations over pay that were taking place.[64] On arrival the earl of Southampton's regiments were placed in Zeeland, the earl of Essex's in Brabant and the earl of Oxford's in Utrecht.[65] Despite the justification that these regiments were raised for the assistance of the Palatinate, they went on to serve on Dutch campaigns, and at least some of the officers, namely the earl of Southampton, Lord Willoughby and John Borlase were issued with commissions from the States General.[66] There are also detailed lists provided of company commanders which name around fifty officers of the English regiments destined for the Palatinate.[67] These documents confirm that the regiments contained Englishmen throughout the officer ranks and not simply within their higher echelons. In total the lists indicate there were around 400 men under the earl of Essex and therefore it seems reasonable to assume that the English had around 2,000 men levied for

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of the English forces in the Low Countries, governor of the Brill, master-general of ordnance, and Baron Vere of Tilbury (London, 1888), pp. 410–411.

61 In total these regiments cost the crown 119l. and 2d. BL, Additional Manuscripts 46188 Papers related to regiments raised to assist the Palatinate (1624), fol. 28.

62 Gloucester, Gloucestershire Archives, GBR H/2/2 Impressment of men for service in the Palatinate (1624), fols. 23–27; Gloucester, Gloucestershire Archives, GBR H/2/2 Further instructions for sending impressed men to Dover (1624), fols. 29–30.

63 London, The British Library, Additional Manuscripts 46188 Resolution of the States General for the payment of English troops in Holland. English translation. (1624), fol. 25.

64 London, The British Library, Additional Manuscripts 46188 Letters to Henry Wriothesley, with Lord Essex (1624), fol. 26.

65 *Particuliere notulen van de vergaderingen der Staten van Holland 1620–1640*, eds. N. Stellingwerff and S. Schot ('s-Gravenhage, 1992–2005) RGP200, p. 315.

66 NA, 1.01.02 12270 Commissieboeken: Registers van akten van aanstelling van Generaliteitsdienaren onder het zegel en cachet van de Staat (1586–1625), fols. 387v, 388v and 394.

67 BL, Additional Manuscripts 46188 Papers related to regiments raised to assist the Palatinate (1624), fols. 29–31; BL, Additional Manuscripts 46188 Papers related to regiments raised to assist the Palatinate (1624), fols. 32–33.

service on behalf of the Palatinate in 1624.[68] This is complicated by the Mansfeld expedition which was being levied at a similar time and there appears to have been some crossover of personnel.[69] The activities of these regiments were closely followed by the English government and detailed reports, including the cost of clothing and arming them, were sent back to England.[70]

The earl of Southampton had a less than auspicious campaign: shortly after landing in Rosendael his son James died and after escorting his son's body to Bergen-op-Zoom he too passed away a short time after.[71] His presence was clearly sufficient to capture the imagination of the British people and an epitaph sent to Sir Thomas Lyttelton provides an indication of the esteem he was held in.[72] In October 1624 these levies were operating side by side within the other English forces in the Dutch Republic such as Vere's and Morgan's as part of the Prince of Orange's brigade.[73] In total there were 77 English companies and a further 16 Scottish companies out of a total of 176 within the Dutch army as it passed Geertruidenberg. This allows us to assess the composition of the Dutch army at one moment in time and the results are startling. In 1624 53 per cent of the army came from the Stuart Kingdoms, the vast majority of these (around 83 per cent of the British troops) from England. What is equally interesting is quite how few

68 BL, Additional Manuscripts 46188 Papers related to regiments raised to assist the Palatinate (1624), fols. 29–31. See also: TNA, SP, 84/118 List of garrisons of new troops (13 June 1624), fol. 172; TNA, SP, 84/121 List of English officers for troops in Dutch service (1624), fol. 255.

69 By December 1624, the levying of Mansfeld's soldiers was already well developed. BL, Additional Manuscripts 46188 Papers related to regiments raised to assist the Palatinate (December 1624), fols. 50–51.

70 TNA, SP, 84/121 Cost of clothing an English regiment (1624), fol. 258.

71 V. Stater, 'Vere, Henry de, eighteenth earl of Oxford (1593–1625)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, (2008); Anon, *Novem. 24 Num. 7. The weekely newes The surprising of tvvo tovvnes by the Prince of Oranges forces, and the manner of their taking, vvith the seuerall pasages of Spinolas armie lying before Breda, and our campe at Rosendale: as also the death of the Earl of Southampton and his sonne at Bergan-vp-Zomme. The taking of many places in the Grisons countrey by the French kings forces. Likewise the entertainment of many thousands of men by the State of Venice; vnder the command of Colonlel Ouentuant once one of Count Mansfields chiefe commanders. The Hollanders fortunately meeting with one of the King of Spaines plate ships comming from the West-Indies the which in a short time they ouercame and tooke: with a great victorie obtained by the Duke of Tuscans gallies, against the pirats of Argles. The disagreement which is like to happen betweene the emperour and Bethlem Gabor, and the Turke and the Emperour* (London, 1624), p. 20.

72 Leeds University Special Collections, MSLt /q/44 Collection of verse, much of it political and addressed to the Cecil family, and including many epitaphs; predominantly in a single hand (*c.* 1626).

73 TNA, SP 84/120 List of passage of the Dutch army by Geertruidenberg, and another copy (21 September/1 October 1624), fol. 111.

men from the Republic were in the army.[74] Only fourteen companies or 8 per cent of the total were Dutch, less than the number of Scots or French present, and far less than the number of English companies.[75] It is also clear that there were emerging problems at this time, not least as the lack of pay caused some of the officers to complain to the governor of Bergen-op-Zoom "that their soldiours did refuse to keepe watch, unlesse they were first contented of their wages."[76]

Such issues aside, the English remained committed. This was evident during the 1625 siege of Breda (which, after a prolonged period, resulted in a significant defeat for the Dutch). This was a siege in which, unsurprisingly, the English were deeply involved particularly in the 'Dutch' assault on Terhyde.[77] There are a number of English accounts of this action, including one by Sir Jacob Astley and another that is attributed to Sir Horace Vere.[78] The attack on Terhyde was conducted by a force of between 5000 and 6000 men during which "it fell by course to the English to have the vantguarde, the Frise and Scottish the battle and the French the reare."[79] The assault involved a night attack upon a series of trenches and redoubts each assault requiring "a greate deale of courage" before eventually the enemy was "lying at their mercy."[80] However, all was not well as they came to "the maine worke and endeavoured to scale that likewise, but they found it so high that without skalling ladders and a supply of fireworks (which they had none) it was a vayne thing to attempt it."[81] Whilst struggling at the wall the enemy began to encircle the English soldiers and without any reinforcement "the Prince of Orange not to think fitt to hazarde any further

74 Ibid.

75 Ibid.

76 TNA, SP, 84/131 Mem. to Charles I on the 4 regiments in the Low Countries (April 1626), fol. 156. It seems this problem was particularly associated with the four regiments that had been levied in 1624.

77 Markham, *The fighting Veres*, p. 427.

78 The report attributed to Vere is not signed and does not match his handwriting. TNA, SP, 84/127 Note on affairs at Terheyden, and another copy (May 1625), fol. 147; TNA, SP, 84/127 Sir Jacob Astley- sketch of work at Terheyden with list of officers engaged and losses, and another copy (5/15 May 1625), fol. 25; TNA, SP, 84/127 General Vere- Account of enterprise upon Terheyde (May 1625), fol. 151.

79 TNA, SP 84/127 Note on affairs at Terheyden, and another copy (May 1625), fols. 147–147v. The English force was divided into four under Horace Vere, Jacob Astley, Charles Morgan and John Vere.

80 Ibid., p. 148. The assault is also described by Henry Hexham Henry Hexham, *A true and briefe relation of the famous seige of Breda beseiged, and taken in vnder the able and victorious conduct of his Highnesse the Prince of Orange, captaine generall of the States armie, and admirall of the seas, &c. Composed by Henry Hexham quartermaster to the regiment of the honorable Coronell Goring* (Delft, 1637), p. intro4.

81 TNA, SP 84/127 Note on affairs at Terheyden, and another copy (May 1625), fol. 148.

troopes" commanded a withdrawal.[82] The report then describes the author's feelings about this retreat:

> I must give this testimony of the assurance of our nation, that they were very hardly drawne off; but very much discontented after the losse of diuerse of their counriemen to quitt what they had gotten; from whence I conclude that not withstanding the longe discontinuance of action our nation doth still retain its ancient courage and valour.[83]

The loss of Englishmen he referred to was clearly substantial. It included the death of seven officers and nine others wounded. These included captain John Cromwell, shot in the arm, and ensign Pursay who survived being shot in the head.[84] Philip Skippon, the future commander of the London trained bands, was also shot in this action.[85] Henry Vere was injured and subsequently died of his wounds before his body was shipped back to England on the instructions of his wife.[86] In total the English lost 62 men and suffered a further 110 casualties during the assault. The events serve to illustrate that despite their successes during the 1630s not all the English military activity within the Dutch Republic resulted in victory, though it seems clear that in this case defeat was not down to cowardice or a lack of skill, simply that they lacked suitable equipment to complete the assault.

3 The Mansfeld Levy (1625)

The Mansfeld levy conducted in late 1624 and early 1625, with the approval and financial support of the crown, was again officially levied for the Palatinate and went on to fight across the Empire, including within the subsequent Danish campaign.[87] The levy was part of James's attempts to continue providing covert support and initially was conducted alongside discussions with the French regarding an alliance.[88] As Chamberlain noted it was to comprise

82 Ibid.
83 Ibid., p. 148v.
84 Ibid., p. 150v.
85 Henry Hexham, *Seige of Breda* p. 5. of the introduction; TNA, SP 84/127 Note on affairs at Terheyden, and another copy (May 1625), fol. 150v.
86 Den Haag, Nationaal Archief, 1.01.02 5889.57 Letter from Dudley Carleton (16 July 1625); Stater, 'Vere, Henry de, eighteenth earl of Oxford'.
87 Manning, *An apprenticeship in arms*, p. 107.
88 P.D. Lockhart, *Denmark in the Thirty Years' War, 1618–1648: King Christian IV and the decline of the Oldenburg State* (Selinsgrove, 1996), p. 11.

8,000 Englishmen and 4,000 Scotsmen.[89] Mansfeld was no stranger to playing a role on behalf of both the Stuart and Orange dynasties as shown when, after the fall of the Palatinate in 1623 (which is discussed in the next chapter), the remnants of Mansfeld's army retreated into the United Provinces.[90] The levy was clearly associated with Dutch Republic and parts of the administration of the regiment were handled by Dudley Carleton in The Hague.[91] The levy to reinforce Mansfeld's army emerged out of the negotiations within the 1624 Parliament that has been studied in great detail by Thomas Cogswell.[92] The indentures for the levying of soldiers occurred that year, although it appears to have been 1625 before the force could be deployed.[93] The initial commission from James represented something of a diplomatic balancing act by emphasising that Mansfeld was not to act against any lawful possessions of the King of Spain but to focus his effort against the Duke of Bavaria.[94] King James continued to place emphasis on overt support of the Protestant cause across various national boundaries, notably through attempts for a formal alliance of Protestant princes.[95] After the death of his father, Charles saw through some of these aims supporting the Dutch Republic, Denmark-Norway and later supporting the Protestants at La Rochelle. Soon after the Treaty of the Hague was signed, in November 1625, a joint letter from the duke of Buckingham, earl of Holland and Dudley Carleton emphasised the four key points of Stuart policy:

1. The restitution of the King and Queen of Bohemia to their ancestral rights and dignities.
2. The return of peace to Germany.
3. Desire for peace within his [Charles I] neighbours and allies.
4. The treatment of the reformed religion.[96]

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89 Thompson and Rowse, eds., *The Chamberlain letters*, p. 333. See also Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway*, pp. 60–62.

90 Den Haag, Nationaal Archief, 1.01.02 5888.15 Missive from the King of England (22 November 1623).

91 Den Haag, Nationaal Archief, 1.01.19 1908 Miscellaneous documents on foreign troops in the States' pay (N.D.).

92 T. Cogswell, *The blessed revolution: English politics and the coming of war, 1621–1624* (Cambridge, 1989), pp. 228–250 and 311.

93 TNA, SP, 14/178 Count Mansfeldt's expedition to the Palatinate: indentures of delivery and lists of troops levied (1624).

94 John Rushworth, *Historical collections*, p. 158.

95 N. Akkerman, ed. *The correspondence of Elizabeth Stuart, Queen of Bohemia, vol.1, 1603–1631* (Oxford 2015), p. 455; Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway*, pp. 59–61; TNA, SP, 95/2 Instructions to James Spens (6 June 1624), fols. 86–88.

96 Den Haag, Nationaal Archief, 1.01.02 5889.335 Letter from the duke of Buckingham, earl of Holland and Dudley Carleton (21 November 1625).

The Mansfeld levy was designed to help further these goals and considerable resources were invested in it. Indeed, forty-one English officers made up 67 per cent of the British officers in Mansfeld's army.[97] Since Mansfeld's army contained twelve regiments in total, it is possible to see that the English officers made up around one third of the total force (the Scots accounting for a further 16 per cent).[98] This illustrates the continued significance of England's contribution to the British Crown's military policies in Holland and the Empire during the 1620s and also shows that that the contribution during the 1620s was more significant than Scotland's in outright numerical terms.

Assessing the nationality of the common soldiers is difficult in the majority of early modern armies.[99] Within a Dutch context it is clear from the instructions to levy (of which there have been numerous examples within the chapter) that the regiments with English officers, such as the Anglo-Dutch brigade, also contained English soldiers.[100] In 1625 this also appears to have been the case for the English regiments but those with Scottish officers, colonel Andrew Gray and colonel James Ramsay, were sometimes comprised of English troops.[101] The Privy Council contains a record of commissions for the levy of 12,700 soldiers from England and Wales and also allows a statistical analysis of where the soldiers came from. London was the largest provider giving 2000 men (just over 16 per cent of the total); the rest being relatively evenly distributed across the other counties selected ranging from 50 to 750 men.[102] Other estimates for the overall size are considerably smaller and it seems likely that all the commissions were not collected; however, they do provide a documentary source from which it is possible to gain a sense of which parts of the realm English soldiers were recruited from.[103] The fact that the regiments of Gray and Ramsey were English does not mean that all the Scottish regiments were. Dudley Carleton, whilst arranging shipping to Zeeland, referred to two

97 John Rushworth, *Historical collections*, pp. 157–158. It should be made clear that this is not to say that they constituted such a high proportion of the total of Mansfeld's army, just of the British officers present.

98 The size of Mansfeld's army is given here: ibid., p. 158.

99 This is possible in some notable exceptions such as the Swedish campaigns of the 1630s, see chapter 5.

100 This was not always the case and in 1615 it was noted that one of the English companies contained Dutch soldiers. O. van Nimwegen, *The Dutch army and the military revolutions, 1588–1688* (Woodbridge, 2010), p. 32.

101 APC, 39:385–386.

102 Ibid.

103 Chamberlain provides an estimate of 8000 English and 4000 Scots. Thompson and Rowse, eds., *The Chamberlain letters*, p. 333.

other Scottish regiments.[104] Finally, there appears to have been some degree of crossover between the levying of the 1624 and 1625 campaigns. Most notable among these was Sir Charles Rich, but it is difficult to ascertain whether there were significant numbers of common soldiers who served in both. This means that the figures are the number of soldiers nominally levied, not the number of actual soldiers in the field.

The levy was originally to depart from Dover and sail to France but what occurred next is an illustration of the failings of the upper echelons of Stuart military hierarchy. Despite the presence of experienced English and Scottish commanders within Mansfeld's army, the Duke of Buckingham as Lord Admiral, was ordered to provide shipping to transport the army to the continent. The ships sailed for Calais despite the incomplete negotiations with the French crown for their arrival and upon landing permission to disembark could not be secured forcing the fleet to sail on to Zeeland in the Dutch Republic. Since the town had been given no warning of the army's arrival and did not have the stockpile of supplies required for such an army the men were again kept within their ships. Inevitably disease broke out and only one third of the army managed to finally come ashore.[105] After the arrival of these soldiers the supply and support problems continued, particularly in securing the funding necessary from Charles I. In 1625 the colonels of the regiments present wrote to Charles I's Council of War "The necessity to have money for the troops beginning to set upon present service and the inability of the Captains to advance money to their company's forced the taking up of money in that kind from which your Majesty doe for hereafter forbid us."[106] The letter went on to discuss in detail the problems faced, in particular by withdrawing their credit in Delft since a restriction had been implemented to prevent them "returning any more bills of exchange upon you." It is clear that these problems compounded causing the number of soldiers who had become sick, died or deserted to rise high enough to merit the levying of a further 2,000 men in January 1625.[107] These failings should not detract from the overall scale of the British contribution in 1625 as can be seen when the Venetian ambassador wrote of the Lord Keeper's speech

104 NA, 1.01.02 5889.30 Letter from Dudley Carleton (1625).

105 John Rushworth, *Historical collections*, p. 158.

106 London, The British Library, Additional Manuscripts 46188 Letters from the Colonels of regiments in the Netherlands to the Council of War. Copies. (1625), fol. 54. Complaints like this were still being sent to Charles in 1627: TNA, SP, 81/34 Note for King on English regiments in Dutch service (June? 1627), fol. 205.

107 APC, 39:435. Chamberlain too noted in February 1625 that the troops were "half starved" Thompson and Rowse, eds., *The Chamberlain letters*, p. 341.

to Parliament putting significant emphasis on the scale of Stuart engagement within Europe:

> The chief reason why they were assembled were the great engagements in which His Majesty was involved for the recovery of the Palatinate, treaties of alliance and confederations, and the embassies necessary for these affairs; the King his father had charged him with this, of the King had rested it upon his father, or rather Parliament had laid it, with good grounds upon both. His majesty embraced the business in such fashion that he would rather go down to his grave than these designs should not go forward.[108]

As noted above, the dominance of the Palatinate to all of English foreign policy under James continued to be the same under Charles. The passage is also revealing since it gives a strong indication that the amount spent on Mansfeld in 1624 and early 1625 was clearly more than Parliament had granted in supply.[109] The role of Mansfeld within the Dutch Republic (and subsequently Danish service) continued to make a significant contribution to events within the Thirty Years' War. However, Mansfeld remained far from universally popular with members of Parliament who commented upon his failure and "the waste of Englishmen, with loss of money and reputation."[110] The strains on the limited available manpower in 1625 were compounded by not only Dutch and Danish commitments but also the Cadiz expedition which was undertaken as part of an Anglo-Dutch alliance. This meant of course that there was considerable co-ordination between the levies and concern over their impact on each other.[111] The Mansfeld levy should not be seen as simply providing soldiers for a military entrepreneur but rather as another facet of Stuart engagement in warfare during the 1620s. As analysed in the previous chapter the soldiers involved reported to the Stuart crown, not Mansfeld, and many of those raised later served the Protestant cause throughout the 1620s and 1630s thereafter.

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108 P.E. Razzell, ed. *The English Civil War: a contemporary account. Vol. 1 1625–1639* (London, 1996), p. 40.

109 APC, 39:435.

110 Razzell, ed. *The English Civil War, Vol. 1*, p. 43.

111 Den Haag, Nationaal Archief, 1.01.02 5889.30 Letter from the Duke of Buckingham, Earl of Holland and Dudley Carleton (13 February 1626).

4 The Impact of Cadiz, Kejserkrig and La Rochelle (1625–1629)

The temporary removal of English forces to assist the Danish campaigns between 1626 and 1629 clearly impacted on England's commitment to the Dutch Republic and the States General followed the events surrounding England's other campaigns.[112] Just months after Charles I came to the throne Dudley Carleton was ordered to arrange for the removal of 2,000 soldiers from Dutch service who were to be shipped to Plymouth.[113] Considering that the Cadiz expedition departed from Plymouth in October 1625 it seems reasonable to assume that these men were destined for an attack on Spain itself.[114] The loss of these 2,000 men would have been approved of by the Dutch since the Cadiz raid was part of the Stuart-Dutch alliance that existed at this point. However, it did clearly reduce the number of English soldiers within the Dutch Republic.[115] It is clear that at least in the short-term priority was given to the Danish campaigns. A warrant issued to the port of Gravesend on the 30 July 1627 prevented the transportation of any troops to the Dutch Republic until the levies required for Denmark were complete.[116] What is more significant about this is the revealing comments about the levying of troops, on a yearly basis, for service in the Dutch army: "Whereas we are given to understand that usually at this tyme of year the captains and officers in the States' pay doe come over to take up volountaries for supply of theire companies there and that there are this present divers of them here, who dayly take up men of that behalfe; forasmuch."[117] The reality is that a number of English troops in Dutch service were also sent to Denmark (four regiments) and this undoubtedly impacted on the total number of English soldiers available to the Dutch.[118] The poor state of the regiments on their return from their Stuart service in Denmark also incurred a cost to the Dutch since the officers petitioned the states for assistance on their re-entry to the Dutch army.[119] Yet the end of the Danish

112 Notulen van Holland, RGP206, pp. 452–453.

113 TNA, SP 84/127 Memorial for transporting 2,000 men to Plymouth (May 1625), fol. 142.

114 Plymouth, Plymouth and West Devon Record Office, 1/46 Plymouth Borough records: The Black Book (15th–18th century). These men were equipped in the Low Countries with "Corsletts, Pyckes and Swords" before their departure TNA, SP 84/130 List of arms for 2,000 men. (1625), fol. 231.

115 TNA, SP, 84/130 List of Officers who have left Dutch for English Service (1625), fol. 144. A number of officers also left.

116 APC, 42:182.

117 Ibid.

118 Hatfield, Hatfield House, the Cecil Papers, CP 131/2 The King to the Earl of Salisbury (9 February 1626/27).

119 TNA, SP, 84/138 English officers at Enkhuisen to Lords of the Council (1628), fol. 132.

Kejserkrig enabled the soldiers to return to Dutch service, a route that it seems many followed.[120]

The campaign in La Rochelle caused more experienced officers to be deployed outside the United Provinces. Charles, like his father, clearly understood the significance of the Anglo-Dutch brigades and used them to support his policies. In June 1626, he presented the Dutch Republic with a substantial list of forty English officers who were to be returned to England.[121]

TABLE 3 A list of English officers removed from the Dutch Republic for the La Rochelle campaigns[122]

Baron Willoughby	Captain Yorcke	Ensign Ogle
Viscount Wimbledon	Captain Thornax	Ensign Powell
Baron Horace Vere	Lieutenant Farrar	Lieutenant Alford
Edward Conway	Ensign Brett	Lieutenant Goring
Jean Burgh	(Gentlemen) Taylor	Lieutenant Hammond
Edward Hawby	Lieutenant Hackluit	Lieutenant Watkins
Jean Radtclif	Ensign Carleton	Lieutenant Jackson
Francois Willoughby	Lieutenant Slugborough	Lieutenant Abraham
Thomas Morton	Ensign Bowles	Lieutenant Sibthorpe
Jean Mannood	Lieutenant Bowles	Lieutenant Betts
Henry Carey	Lieutenant Friar	Lieutenant Guilpin
Thomas Durton	Lieutenant Richards	Lieutenant Pelham
Jean Wentworth	Lieutenant Standish	Ensign Country
Captain Sporey		

120 Fissel, *English warfare*, p. 256. Charles Morgan himself received a new commission into Dutch service: Den Haag, Nationaal Archief, 1.01.02 12271 Commissieboeken: Registers van akten van aanstelling van Generaliteitsdienaren onder het zegel en cachet van de Staat (1626–1639), fol. 62.

121 See appendix 3 of A. Marks, 'England, the English and the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648)' (PhD., St Andrews, 2012). This list of officers contains a number who had previous service experience not only in the Low Countries but also in the Palatinate (for example, John Borough).

122 It is unclear if this list is all the English officers removed or just one request of many. NA, 1.01.02 5889.214 List of Officers released to England from service of the States General for service under Charles I (21 November 1626). A more substantial list including Scottish officers is available: TNA, SP 84/130 List of Officers who have left Dutch for English Service (1625), fol. 144.

This pool of talent was something that the crown attempted to maintain, and on the return of the Cadiz and La Rochelle expeditions in 1627 proclamations were issued to prevent soldiers deserting the army on pain of death.[123] Those from Ile de Rhé were instructed to "lodge and be billeted in several counties and places close to the sea coastes, where with most convenience to the soldiers and least trouble to the countrey it might be best performed, until we should have opportunity to imploy them, or otherwise dispose of them".[124] It is worth noting that the Stuart ambassador to The Hague also received a copy of these orders, illustrating the ongoing interest the Dutch had in the English military.[125]

The end of *Kejserkrig* marked a change in Stuart policy as the focus of military aid switched to Sweden. The English military was much more closely aligned with the Dutch than the Swedes since in the north a Scottish military community became the most significant source of British aid during the 1630s. However, these Dutch links enabled the English within the Dutch Republic to continue to make a major military contribution to the United Provinces while at the same time allowing the English state to continue to support them. The commitments elsewhere ultimately damaged the English regiments in the States General but as will be shown they did not destroy them, nor did they cause the complete withdrawal of the English from the Republic between 1625 and 1630. What is clear from this is that Charles had been attempting to do too much with too little. Whereas, in the short term, James had effectively used the Dutch brigades to support the Palatinate, Charles thought they could be used for all his military desires. The failure to hold the Palatinate due to a lack of assistance demonstrates that a policy of spreading England's military talent even thinner was clearly flawed: something revealed in the failure of Charles's campaigns. The return of the English troops from the Danish army coincided with yet another major action for them within the Dutch Republic. However, from this moment on the English within the United Provinces continued to operate but with less interference from London.

123 Two proclamations of identical name were issued (STC-8851 and STC-8873): Charles I, *By the King. A proclamation that all captaines, lieutenants, and other officers shall repayre to their companies, and that all souldiers shall repayre to their colours* (London 1627).

124 Ibid.

125 Den Haag, Nationaal Archief, 1.01.02 5890.186 A proclamation that all captaines, lieutenants, and other officers shall repayre to their companies, and that all souldiers shall repayre to their colours (1627).

5 The Siege of s'Hertogenbosch (1629)

Despite the retrospective assertion that England enjoyed a period of 'halcyon days' during the 1630s, many Englishmen continued to fight and die in Low Countries.[126] Sir Edward Vere wrote to Sir Abraham Williams from before the walls of s'Hertogenbosch on 8th August 1629. He described the return of Charles Morgan's company to Dutch service, and also his assessment that "the Town is in such a condition that I do not think it will hold out longer that a month at most."[127] Edward Vere's service would be curtailed as a report from Utrecht just a few days later noted: "Sir Edward Vere Lieutenant Colonel [was] shot in the under part of the head but is not yet dead though nor is there any hope of life, he was esteemed the best soldier in the whole army, and there is great lamentation for him amongst his soldiers."[128] The fighting was particularly intense during this period and this letter from the siege reported English, Dutch and Scottish casualties.[129] A contemporary printed report noted the presence of Lord Vere (colonel general of the English), Sir Edward Cecil, Viscount Wimbledon and Edward Howard and a total of 68 companies of foot plus horse.[130] Officers and soldiers fought together in the trenches as an anonymous commentator recorded:

> Captain Allcocke a Reformado Captaine, who trailes a Pike in Sir Edward Harwoods colonels company, who being upon Duty in the trenches, a halfe cannon shott from the towne, pierced through the upper part of the Rampier and fell downe upone his arme, without any farther hurt, but bruising of the flesh.[131]

126 Carlton, *This seat of Mars*, pp. 86–88.

127 London, The British Library, Additional Manuscripts 46189 Extract of a letter from Sir Edward Vere to Sir Abraham Williams from the Army before Bosh [s-Hertogenbosch] (8 August 1629), fol. 22.

128 London, The British Library, Additional Manuscripts 46189 Letter from the Prince of Orange's quarter at Utrecht (10 August 1629), fol. 24.

129 Ibid.

130 Anon, *A True relation of this present siege of Shertoken-Busse or Boisleduc which was beleguered by the army of the States Generall, vnder the conduct of the Right Excellent the Prince of Orenge on the first of May, 1629: the particulars of it receiued from a very good hand, who was present in the action, are these following: a description of the circumvallation which runnes round about the towne extending it selfe 20 miles in compasse, the seuerall quarters of the seuerall commanders, the names of the chiefest forts and sconces belonging as well to the towne as to the princes leaguer, a relation of the three sallyes made by the enemy and their successe, a list of the names of the chiefest commanders* (London 1629), pp. 7–8.

131 Ibid., pp. 14–15.

Indeed, Sir Philip Pagenham, Viscount Wimbledon's and Morgan's company all saw further action with the enemy soon after when there was an attempt to "impeach our working."[132] On 13th June a second attempt was made upon the trenches and the enemy found just two Englishmen who held them back until they could be:

> bravely repulsed by the English, who kept the next Worke and were to be their seconds upon occasion. The Captain although the wound were veri dangerous, and though at first to be mortall, is likelwise recovered, but with the losse of his eye.[133]

The English and the French were to form the main part of the assault:

> General Vere, who was chosen spoakes-man for all the rest, delivered this resolution to the Prince, and the States Generall: withal he intimated the braveries and willingnesse of their men, who were ready to lay down their lives in so honourable a cause[134]

Indeed, it is clear that the English regiments formed a crucial part of the force at the siege with some 60 officers from the rank of captain upwards being present.

Englishmen also served as part of the guard for the Prince of Orange's quarter, illustrating their continued high standing within the Dutch army.[135] News concerning this siege was eagerly devoured in England and in June 1629 Sir Thomas Barrington wrote "The Buss [s'Hertogenbosch] is sayed and hoped will be taken" and though it took a few months longer, the city did indeed fall.[136] Thereafter, as if to renew the Anglo-Dutch bond, the Prince of Orange entered the Order of the Garter in 1630.[137]

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132 Ibid., p. 15.

133 Ibid., p. 16.

134 Ibid., p. 17.

135 TNA, SP, 84/139 Account of siege of Bois le Duc (July 1629), fol. 279.

136 'Barrington family letters 1628–1632', in ed. A. Searle, *Camden Society Fourth Series* 28 (London, 1983), p. 70.

137 Hatfield, Hatfield House, the Cecil Papers, CP 131/191 Warrant for payment of fees to the Heralds and Pursuivants of Arms (After May 1630).

TABLE 4 A list of English officers at s'Hertogenbosch (1629)[138]

Colonel Vere	Captain Cotton	Captain Manhood
Colonel Cecil	Captain Cobes	Captain Morgan
Colonel Harwood	Captain Cromwell	Captain Mutos
Lieutenant Colonel Edward Vere	Captain Crombe	Captain Norwood
Lieutenant Colonel Jacob Ashley	Captain Cary	Captain Nelson
Lieutenant Colonel Philip Pagenham	Captain Dobbes	Captain Norton
Lieutenant Colonel Henry Herbert	Captain Darrel	Captain Lord Oxford
Captain Abriall	Captain Englby	Captain Ogle
Captain Amie	Captain Fludd	Captain Prichard
Captain Berington	Captain Fryer	Captain Prowde
Captain Butler	Captain Gibson	Captain Rood
Captain Browne	Captain Goldwell	Captain Rockwood
Captain Brookes	Captain Hollis	Captain Roper
Captain Brone	Captain Haman	Captain Saunders
Captain Boyse	Captain Hickman	Captain Schipam
Captain Clarke	Captain Harcotte	Captain Trearey
Captain Culpeper	Captain Huntley	Captain Veare
	Captain Heydon	Captain Willamson
	Captain Holcraft	Captain White
	Captain Iacson	Captain Wilde
	Captain Knightley	Captain Woodhouse
	Captain Mattly	Captain Walker

6 The Siege of Maastricht (1632)

The siege of Maastricht, some three years after s'Hertogenbosch, was arguably one of the most dramatic and important sieges of the entire conflict. Maastricht was of significance not just symbolically but also strategically as it lay on the lines of communication between Brussels (the capital of the Spanish

138 Anon., *A True relation of this present siege of Shertoken-Busse or Boisleduc which was beleguered by the army of the States Generall, vnder the conduct of the Right Excellent the Prince of Orenge on the first of May, 1629: the particulars of it receiued from a very good hand, who was present in the action, are these following: a description of the circumvallation which runnes round about the towne extending it selfe 20 miles in compasse, the seuerall quarters of the seuerall commanders, the names of the chiefest forts and sconces belonging as well to the towne as to the princes leaguer, a relation of the three sallyes made by the enemy and their successe, a list of the names of the chiefest commanders* (London 1629), pp. 15–16 and D-D3.

Netherlands) and the Catholic forces in Westphalia.[139] The English soldiers again fought and many died in this action: in total 19 English and 6 Scottish officers died with a further 28 English casualties.[140] A report on the English, Scottish, French, Dutch and Walloon casualties records that just under half of all the officers either killed or wounded were English.[141]



FIGURE 2 Officer casualties at Maastricht by nationality (1632)[142]

139 Parker, '1630–1632: The intervention of Sweden', p. 116. An account of the siege can be found in Henry Hexham, Hendrik Hondius and Christopher Lloyd, *A iournall, of the taking in of Venlo, Roermont, Strale, the memorable seige of Mastricht, the towne & castle of Limburch vnder the able, and wise conduct of his Excie: the Prince of Orange, anno 1632 VVith an exact card drawne first by Charles Floyd* (*nowe ensigne*) *and since lessened and cutt by Henricus and Willihelmus Hondius dwelling by the Gevangen Port in the Hagh. Compiled together by Capt. Henry Hexham quartermaster to the regiment of the Lord Generall Vere. As also a list of the officers, voluntiers, gentlemen, and souldiers slayne, and hurt in this seige. With the articles of composition* (Delph, 1633).

140 TNA, SP, 84/144 List of casualties at the siege of Maastricht, and another copy and note on same (15/25 August 1632), fol. 233v.

141 48 per cent, this is remarkably high but is difficult to verify from other sources.

142 TNA, SP 84/144 List of casualties at the siege of Maastricht, and another copy and note on same (15/25 August 1632), fol. 233v.

Even more remarkably combining the English casualties with the Scottish means that 68 per cent of the officers killed or injured were British. The common soldiers fared little better as 47 per cent of all those who died were English and when including the Scots, 59 per cent were British:



FIGURE 3 Common soldiers slain at Maastricht by nationality (1632)[143]

The scale of casualties was due to the ferocity of the fighting in the trenches before Maastricht. These casualties were reported within corantos as news filtered back to England.[144] Elizabeth of Bohemia also followed events as she

143 Henry Hexham, Hendrik Hondius and Christopher Lloyd, *Hendrik Hondius and Christopher Lloyd, A iournall*, pp. 35–40. An Anonymous account of the siege was also published but it is clearly similar to Hexham's Anon, *A iournall of all the principall passages of that late famous siege and taking of the citie of Mastricht by the Prince of Orange Wherein you shall meete with many very remarkable passages, both on the part of the besiegers and besieged. Written by a gentleman of qualitie: and an actor in most of the proceedings. Vnto which is added a list of all the principall commaunders, and other officers, which were either slaine or hurt of all nations in time of the siege* (London, 1632).

144 Anon, *The continvation of ovr weekely avisoes, since the 19. of this present. Certaine late and very remarkable passages twixt the Pope, and the embassadours of the Emperour and King of Spaine, concerning the excommunication of the King of Sweden and his adherents. A resolute and very religious speach of the King of Sweden, vpon occasion of a danger escaped. The last and certainest passages of Maestricht, in manner of a diurnall, by which you may guest*

received a number of letters related to the siege. On 8 August 1632 she was informed that Banér was under the impression that Maastricht would soon be taken and that 'count' Livingstone (a Scot) and colonel Morgan had been wounded.[145] A series of mines and counter mines were constructed and exploded. On the 27th July the besieged garrison managed to explode a mine beneath the English lines and two more under the French approaches causing damage to the English mine.[146] Horace Vere played an important role in these events, taking command of the English lines every night to ensure that the attack proceeded as intended.[147] The 17th August was a particularly violent evening as around 400 enemy soldiers attacked the English lines:

> Our men made the best resistance they could, and were at push a pike with them a long tyme: the Enemy gave fire exceedingly from the wall with their ordnance & small shott, and with their firelocks slew many of our men in the Colon Worke.[148]

The construction of the English mines continued and actually progressed too far since they dug into the middle of the town allowing "that a man might put his head in at the hole thereof and se into the towne."[149] With the mine ready the following day Horace Vere commanded the assault (since the Prince of Orange was not present but in his tent) calling all the English companies forward.[150] The explosion of the mine "having such a vent, and such a huge wall of earth and stone to cast up, it made not so great breach as otherwise that would have done" but through a push of pike the English managed to scale the 80 foot wall.[151] The assault continued until Saturday 21st August when a parley was agreed to remove the dead from the breach, a clear indication of

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of the event of that siedge. The names of certain English and French commanders lately hurt and slaine before Maestricht. A proclamation of the King of Spaine against Count Henry of Vandenberg, one of the revolted lords of that state. Conditions proffered by the Emperour to draw the Duke of Saxonto his side: ineffective. Besides divers other particulars of note (London, 1632), pp. 6–7.

145 N. Akkerman, ed. *The correspondence of Elizabeth Stuart, Queen of Bohemia, vol. 2, 1632–1642* (Oxford 2011), p. 119.

146 Henry Hexham, Hendrik Hondius and Christopher Lloyd, *Hendrik Hondius and Christopher Lloyd, A iournall*, pp. 18–19.

147 Ibid., p. 24.

148 Ibid., p. 25.

149 Ibid., p. 29.

150 Ibid.

151 Ibid., pp. 30–31.

the scale of casualties being suffered by both sides.[152] However, upon the sight of the English preparing a renewed assault to be commenced after the parley expired, the garrison requested terms. On 23rd August after their surrender the garrison was permitted to march out of the town with their colours and some ordnance.[153] The account reveals the pivotal role the English played in this siege. The victory was secured by an English assault that was constructed through the creation of a series of English built trenches and a mine. The French and Scots also played an important part, but the dominant troops were the force under Vere. The taking of Maastricht marks a crucial contribution of the English to the Thirty Years' War (and Eighty Years' War) since it finally split Westphalia and the capital of the Spanish Netherlands in Brussels. However, this important victory came at a high price for the English as 47 officers and 423 common soldiers were dead.[154]

One of the Englishmen who died at Maastricht was lieutenant-colonel William Proud, of colonel Packenham's regiment, whose funeral service was held in Canterbury Cathedral.[155] Proud died on 22nd July in the approach trenches after the mine had been blown beneath the city's walls; he was shot in the head.[156] He had been a veteran of service in Ireland during the reign of Elizabeth before entering Dutch service under the command of Francis Vere at the siege of Ostend (1601–1604).[157] Due to the rate of his promotion it seems likely he remained in Dutch service throughout the early seventeenth century and certainly he was present at s'Hertogenbosch in 1629.[158] His death provides an insight into the links between the conflict and individual English counties rather than the nation as a whole since the printed sermon is dedicated to those "who the cheifest charge of military discipline for our East Parts of Kent is committed."[159] Though it is not possible to identify all of these men it is clear that they were closely involved in the recruitment of men into armed

152 Ibid., p. 32.

153 Ibid.

154 TNA, SP 84/144 List of casualties at the siege of Maastricht, and another copy and note on same (15/25 August 1632), fol. 233v; Henry Hexham, Hendrik Hondius and Christopher Lloyd, *Hendrik Hondius and Christopher Lloyd, A iournall*, pp. 35–40.

155 Canterbury Cathedral Archive Images of the Tomb of Prud (d.1632) (1632); TNA, SP 84/144 List of casualties at the siege of Maastricht, and another copy and note on same (15/25 August 1632), fol. 233.

156 Henry Hexham, Hendrik Hondius and Christopher Lloyd, *Hendrik Hondius and Christopher Lloyd, A iournall*, p. 17.

157 Francis Rogers, *A sermon preached*, p. D.

158 Anon, *A True relation of this present siege of Shertoken-Busse*, p. D2.

159 Francis Rogers, *A sermon preached*, p. A2v.

service within Kent.[160] For example, Sir Peter Heyman served as an MP where he was noted for his pro-Palatine policies and also served as a recruiter for the Mansfeld expedition.[161] If he had entirely retired from this role it would be remarkable that he was such a prominent figure at a veteran's funeral.

The casualties suffered by the English regiment resulted in the States attempting to secure the levy of replacements for the dead and wounded.[162] In August the levy of 500 men for each English regiment (i.e. 2,000 English soldiers) was approved to replenish the English force.[163] This seems to have formed part of a wider policy after the siege of Maastricht to maintain four regiments at a relatively consistent level.[164] Despite this objective, there were complications in securing the levying of English soldiers. These primarily revolved around the diversion of these men into the armies of the Dutch East and West India companies. Englishmen serving in these were not uncommon, for example, in June 1635 midshipman John Beeton appointed his cousin William to be his heir upon his departure to the West Indies.[165] There were also soldiers present and in 1635 an Englishman sought employment within the English East India Company after thirteen years of service within the Dutch West India Company.[166] The diplomatic tensions surrounding such men grew steadily throughout the period culminating in January 1637 when Charles I formally requested that the practice of Englishmen serving in these commercial companies should cease.[167] This request appears to have been ignored by the Dutch, since in September 1637 there were still cases of English soldiers sailing with the West India Company.[168] This growing tension was capitalised on by the Swedes who through George Fleetwood, the English representative of the Swedish government, managed

160 Sir William Monins, Sir Peter Heyman, Sir Thomas Palmer, Sir John Wild, Sir Thomas Wilford, Sir Christopher Harfleit, Sir James Oxenden, Sir Edward Masters. Ibid., p. A2.

161 A. Thrush, 'Heyman, Sir Peter (1580–1641)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, (2004).

162 Scots-Dutch Brigade, 1:408–409.

163 TNA, SP, 84/148 Memorial concerning transport of levies (1634), fol. 321; TNA, SP, 84/148 Order for sending recruits to the Low Countries (1634), fol. 319; TNA, SP, 84/148 Warrant for transporting soldiers to the Low Countries (1634), fol. 312; Scots-Dutch Brigade, 1:416–417.

164 TNA, SP, 84/148 List of the English regiments serving the States (11 March 1634), fol. 68.

165 Rotterdam, Gemeentearchief Rotterdam, 119/365 Testament of John Beeton, Engelsman (15 June 1635).

166 E.B. Sainsbury, ed. *A calendar of the Court Minutes, etc., of the East India Company, 1635–1639* (Oxford, 1907), pp. 80–81. In 1643 Thomas Arendel was also a soldier in the Dutch East India company: Rotterdam, Gemeentearchief Rotterdam, 149/206 Schuldbekentenis of Tomas Arendel, Engelsman (14 December 1643).

167 Scots-Dutch Brigade, 1:425.

168 Rotterdam, Gemeentearchief Rotterdam, 111/189 Schuldbekentenis of Leijnel Deijnel, Engelsman (23 September 1637).

to secure a levy in 1636 whilst these disagreements continued.[169] The financial problems of the States continued to accumulate during this period, and in January 1637 there were internal arguments within the States General concerning whether it was possible to continue paying the army.[170] The return of Horace Vere to England followed by his death in 1635 had marked a change in another sense as the overall figurehead of the English regiments was lost. The Dutch used this moment to re-order some of the conditions on which English service was based, something that the English colonels complained about: in particular, the system for the nomination of officers and a shift in overall command structures.[171] Specifically, this came back to an issue of loyalty to England where the colonels argued that they could be made to take an obligation which subverted their loyalty to their king.[172] Despite these difficulties the war continued and the English continued to play an important role within it.

7 The Siege of Breda (1637)

Considering the significance of the capture of Breda in 1625 by the Spanish its recapture by the Dutch should not be underestimated.[173] The Dutch army commenced siege work in July 1637 and these events were described by William Boswell (the Stuart Ambassador to The Hague).[174] The account provided in Boswell's correspondence to Viscount Scudamore and the published account of Henry Hexham, who fought at the siege as the quartermaster with colonel Goring's English regiments, are both significant.[175] This body of evidence provides a window into the activities of the English which allows a small case study to be better understood. Significant parts of these accounts are worth reproducing since they illustrate not only the horrors of trench-based siege warfare but also provide an account of both English officers and common soldiers. Sunday 16th August saw the commencement of the major activity of the

169 See chapter 5 for more details.

170 London, The National Archives, Records of the Equity Side: Chancery Masters, 115/109/8742 Sir William Boswell from The Hague to Viscount Scudamore concerning new companies entering Dutch service (6/26 January 1637).

171 TNA, SP 84/150 Memorial on change of condition of colonels in Holland (1635), fol. 195.

172 Ibid., p. 195v.

173 Wilson, *Europe's tragedy*, pp. 659–661.

174 London, The National Archives, Records of the Equity Side: Chancery Masters, 115/109/8747 Sir William Boswell from The Hague to Viscount Scudamore with news of the beginning of the siege of Breda (20/30 July 1637).

175 Henry Hexham, *Seige of Breda* p. title page.

English as 300 men began constructing a redoubt to attack the entrance to the town at Ginneken, the assault of which would be the focus of their activities until the end of the siege.[176]

> the French [came] from the right corner of the same, the English from the left, in these Collonel [Thomas] Morgan did command, in the other Monsieur Hautelzie, each with tenne companies of their owne nation. The English workmen (80 of every Regiment) being once gotten into the ground gained that night 72 Roddes or 864 foote towards the Ginneken Port and the hornework, making a corpse de garde large enough to hold 200 men the end of their Trench. Yet the enemie gave Collonel Morgan two or three Alarms, the same night and three of foure of his men were slaine, himself shott in the thigh but lightly the bullet having passed though one of soldiers ere it came to him. …
>
> … On Thursday night Colonel Herbert having the aproaches advanced 16 paces nearer the horneworke and branches out 360 foote on the left hand towards the Ginneken poort. Where they make also another Corp de Garde. If new Batterye within a stones castoff the Enemies workers. Captain Stanton and Leiutenant Baxter garding of the workmen were shot during this service, but neither of them with danger of their life.[177]

The account continues to comment on the actions of the English colonels Goring and Culpeper before commenting that five days after his injury colonel Morgan was back in the approach trenches commanding the English troops.[178] The Cardinal Infante (Ferdinand of Austria) attempted to relieve Breda but was driven back and subsequently chased by twenty-two companies of foot including four English companies under the command of Sir Simon Harcourt.[179] Sir James Sanderlinge and William Quarter subsequently played an important role

176 London, The National Archives, Records of the Equity Side: Chancery Masters, 115/109/8749 Sir William Boswell from The Hague to Viscount Scudamore with news of the English and French assault on Breda and the actions of Simon Harcourt (10/20 August 1637).

177 London, The National Archives, Records of the Equity Side: Chancery Masters, 115/109/8750 Sir William Boswell from The Hague to Viscount Scudamore with news of the actions of Colonel Morgan and Colonel Herbert (21/31 August 1637). The injuries of Stanton and Baxter are also discussed here Henry Hexham, *Seige of Breda* p. 14.

178 TNA, C 115/109/8750 Sir William Boswell from The Hague to Viscount Scudamore with news of the actions of Colonel Morgan and Colonel Herbert (21/31 August 1637).

179 TNA, C 115/109/8749 Sir William Boswell from The Hague to Viscount Scudamore with news of the English and French assault on Breda and the actions of Simon Harcourt (10/20 August 1637).

moving cannon towards the defences during which Sanderlinge was shot in the wrist.[180] The assault on the Ginneken port of Breda was clearly difficult and costly with the loss of nineteen men (officers and common men) and a further twenty to thirty injured.[181] Simultaneously Count Williams had been building a mine which was then blown and the "Scots resolutely entering the breach, were twice repulsed thence, about 100 of them were slayne" before they finally occupied the position.[182] The siege continued and resulted in further English, Scottish and French casualties, notably colonel Goring lost his leg and the French ambassador, who was also a colonel was shot in the head.[183] Lieutenant-colonel Hollace then took over and during the following day captured and then held a further position from Spanish assault: "Captain Munke and ensigne Willis with about 10 or 12 pikes and some muskateers".[184] The following morning the final stages of the siege were played out, when the English and French mines were blown. The next assault was commanded by "lieutenant cornill Hollace, with a resolute company of English cavaliers, officers and souldiours first entered the worke and fill pell mell upon the enemy (who were about 400 strong, most Burgundians and Spaniardes)."[185] It is Hexham who provides the best account of the assault of captain Monk stating that: "The English mine then being sprung, and takeing good effect, Captaine Monke, ere the smoake was vanished, hastens vp to the breach."[186] The end result of these attacks by the English and the French was the capture of Breda for the Dutch.

The siege became a gathering place for English soldiers, both Prince Maurice and Prince Rupert brought "A great traine of English Noblemen, and

180 TNA, C 115/109/8750 Sir William Boswell from The Hague to Viscount Scudamore with news of the actions of Colonel Morgan and Colonel Herbert (21/31 August 1637).

181 London, The National Archives, Records of the Equity Side: Chancery Masters, 115/109/8752 Sir William Boswell from The Hague to Viscount Scudamore with news of a Scots assualt on the breech (4/14 September 1637).

182 Ibid. This included Mr Henderson (who had previously served as a lieutenant-colonel in Swedish service) captain Williamson, ensign Hamilton.

183 London, The National Archives, Records of the Equity Side: Chancery Masters, 115/109/8753 Sir William Boswell from The Hague to Viscount Scudamore with news of Colonel Goring and the English troops at Breda (7 September 1637).

184 London, The National Archives, Records of the Equity Side: Chancery Masters, 115/109/8754 Sir William Boswell from The Hague to Viscount Scudamore with news of Colonel Goring and Lieutenant Colonel Hollise (1/10 September 1637).

185 Ibid.

186 Henry Hexham, *The principles of the art militarie practised in the vvarres of the Vnited Netherlands. Represented by figure, the vvord of command, and demonstration. Composed by Henry Hexham quarter-master to the regiment of the Honourable Coronell Goring* (London, 1637), p. 29.

Gentlemen."[187] In fact, as this list shows, there are 76 officers identifiable by name.[188]

TABLE 5 A list of the identifiable Englishmen present at the siege of Breda (1637)[189]

Lieutenant Colonel Holles	Lieutenant Moyle*	Mr. Grissin Mr. Hamptden
Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Essex	Lieutenant Roberts*	Mr. Hankinson*
Abraham Gunly*	Lieutenant Treymaine*	Mr. Karr
Captain Abrahall	Lieutenant Woodhouse*	Mr. Neuill/Oneall
Captain Croft	Ensign Kirk*	Mr. Walter Vane*
Captain Meteren*	Ensign Pagett	Robert Rich second earl of Warwick
Captain Philip Skippon*	Ensign Simon Harcourt*	Sergeant Adams*
Captain Reads*	Ensign Squib*	Sergeant Bagnall*
Captain Roockwood*	Ensign Throghmorton*	Sergeant Goddard
Captain Scrubbingers *	Ensign Willis*	Sergeant Raymond*
Captain Stanton*	Ensign Rommeler*	Sergeant Raymond*
Captain Sydenham*	Ensign Washiugton*	Sergeant Sheldrake
Captain Watkins*	Cornet Lucas	Sir Charles Slingsby*
Captain Crofts	Master Bladwell*	Sir James Sanderlinge*
Captain Roussell	Master Henningham*	Sir Robart Stone
Colonel Balford*	Master Preston*	Sir Thomas Billingsley
Colonel Herbert*	Mr Parsons*	Sir William Howard
Colonel Morgan*	Mr. Apsley*	Spencer Crompton second earl of Northampton*
Major Duick*	Mr. Bradly*	Third earl of Essex*
George Monk*	Mr. Brankard*	Thomas Culpeper*
Henry Hexham (Quartermaster)*	Mr. Campian*	William Villiers first viscount Grandison *
Jacob Astley*	Mr. Daniell	William first earl of Craven
Lieutenant Aires*	Mr. Dauis*	
Lieutenant Baxter*	Mr. Eldrington*	
Lieutenant Broome	Mr. Fanchy*	
	Mr. Fothersby*	
	Mr. Georg	

187 Henry Hexham, *Seige of Breda* p. 8.

188 See appendix 5 of Marks, 'England and the Thirty Years' War'.

189 The list is primarily of Englishmen but it does contain a number of men who could be Irish or Scottish. Those marked with a * definitely took part in combat, the others were present but may have simply been part of the Elector-Palatine's entourage. Sources: TNA, C 115/109/8749 Sir William Boswell from The Hague to Viscount Scudamore with news of the English and French assault on Breda and the actions of Simon Harcourt (10/20 August 1637); TNA, C 115/109/8754 Sir William Boswell from The Hague to Viscount Scudamore

The number present is a strong indicator that even on the eve of Civil War within Britain the commitment of the English to the Dutch Republic remained. In June 1638 there were fifty companies of English soldiers under colonels Morgan, Goring, Herbert and Culpeper, a significant force.[190] The soldiers were also still coming and between 1637 and 1638 45 per cent of the passengers who sailed from Great Yarmouth (339 in total) stated they intended to enter the armies of the United Provinces, a further indication that the scale of military aid was not in marked decline.[191]

8 Conclusion

The relationship between England and the Dutch Republic was of great importance to not just these two nations, but also to the course of wider European events across the seventeenth century from the early period all the way through the events of the 1690s. Individually the Dutch Republic represents a significant sphere of interest for English military and diplomatic history during the early seventeenth century and despite being tacitly acknowledged by some historians, few have begun to fully explain the role English soldiers played.[192] The English made important contributions to the defence of Breda in 1625 and the campaign to retake it twelve years later and it was also Englishmen that led the assault on s'Hertogenbosch in 1629. The scale of English casualties at Maastricht, representing around fifty percent of all the Dutch army's losses, which in combination with the command of Horace Vere and corroborating contemporary accounts, indicates that the siege was in essence an English victory. Since a further fifteen percent of the Dutch casualties were Scottish it was certainly a largely British event which is rarely commented on in historiography. Indeed, it is usually described as a Dutch victory which, although technically true since it was a 'Dutch' army, fails to acknowledge the central role of the

with news of Colonel Goring and Lieutenant Colonel Hollise (1/10 September 1637); TNA, C 115/109/8750 Sir William Boswell from The Hague to Viscount Scudamore with news of the actions of Colonel Morgan and Colonel Herbert (21/31 August 1637); Henry Hexham, *Seige of Breda* pp. title, 4, 8, 15, 23, 27, 29, 32, 33, 36, 41, 44, 45 and English Tercio Casualties list; R.B. Manning, *Swordsmen: the martial ethos in the three kingdoms* (Oxford, 2003), p. 128.

190 TNA, C 115/109/8774 Sir William Boswell from The Hague to Viscount Scudamore with a summary of the English companies currently on duty (1638).

191 Parker, 'Foreword', p. xi.

192 S. Murdoch, 'Nicrina ad Heroas Anglos. An overview of the British and the Thirty Years' War', in ed. S. Jones, *'Britain Turned Germany': The Thirty Years' War and its Impact on the British Isles 1638–1660: Proceedings of the 2018 Helion and Company 'Century of the Soldier' Conference* (Warwick, 2019), pp. 15–36.

English, French and Scots present.[193] Maastricht was, after all, a crucial point in the Dutch conflict and the capture of the town was important strategically as it allowed communications to be cut between various Imperial territories.[194]

Such an important contribution is worthy of significant study in its own right, but the Anglo-Dutch brigades become even more important when their wider uses are analysed. They also illustrate effectively the nature of James's and then subsequently Charles's foreign policy. As with English involvement in Sweden the continued operation of the English military in the States General allowed Charles to sustain Stuart support of the Protestant cause during the 1630s when state finances were significantly curtailed and yet again, without a formal declaration of war. Under James too, the provision of significant military assistance to the States General is an often-overlooked aspect of his reign. This support was of crucial importance to both events in the Low Countries and maintaining English military capabilities during the early seventeenth century. This military capacity was reliant on the Dutch regiments as they were used during the Palatinate campaigns, the Mansfeld levies and the Danish campaigns, as well as the Cadiz and La Rochelle expeditions.[195] With the possible exception of the Scottish armies in Sweden during the 1630s and 1640s none of the Stuart military endeavours of the Thirty Years' War could have been organised without the use of English military networks in the Republic.[196]

These events were all bound together, and the subsequent chapters will illustrate the interconnectedness of the English intervention in the Thirty Years' War and the role of the 'Dutch' experience in enabling them. For example, the siege of Breda in 1637 had an impact on those Scottish and English soldiers within the Swedish army as the victory of the Dutch army relieved the pressure of the Swedish-French alliance within the Empire. The assistance provided to the Dutch by James and Charles was therefore part of a wider policy of supporting their allies whilst continuing the search for a diplomatic solution

193 For example Olaf van Nimwegen fails to mention the role of the English at either Maastricht or Breda: van Nimwegen, *The Dutch army*, pp. 231–234 and 253–255.

194 Parker, 'The intervention of Sweden', p. 116. An account of the siege can be found in Henry Hexham, Hendrik Hondius and Christopher Lloyd, *Hendrik Hondius and Christopher Lloyd, A iournall*.

195 There are countless examples of Anglo-Dutch mercantile activity, just one is: *Bedrijfsleven Bedrijfsleven en Gildweren van Amsterdam*, 3 vols (S-Gravenhage, 1929–1974) 2:344.

196 Sweden relied on a separate and more Scottish military community but it should be noted that even within the iconic army of the military revolution during the Thirty Years' War many of its commanders, such as Alexander Leslie were veterans of Dutch service. A. Grosjean and S. Murdoch, Scotland, Scandinavia and Northern Europe, 1580–1707 Aberdeen and St Andrews, 1995 onwards. Available from http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/history/ssne/ Accessed November 2008 onwards.

to the Thirty Years' War.[197] The officers who served in the Anglo-Dutch brigade usually did so for a significant period of time, gaining experience and professionalism which meant they were often placed in the centre of any action. This had significant consequences for the Wars of the Three Kingdoms that occurred during the 1630s and 1640s when men such as Thomas Fairfax and Philip Skippon who had served in the States General fought in the Civil Wars. Even during this latter period the English regiments within the Dutch Republic continued to fight; in 1643 colonels Goring, Herbert, Grave and Cromwell all still commanded Englishmen in the State General.[198] This chapter has only scratched the surface of the lives these men lead. A more detailed study of their integration into Dutch society and their lives beyond the battlefield would clearly yield interesting results.[199] It is only from an understanding of the Anglo-Dutch brigades that the actions of the Stuart Crown and the English more generally need to be considered. Having assessed this context, it is now possible to analyse the other campaigns of the 1620s which occurred outside the Netherlands, albeit frequently with Anglo-Dutch veterans providing the backbone of the expeditions.

197 This has also been emphasised by Scott: Scott, *England's troubles*, pp. 16 and 474–496.

198 Scots-Dutch Brigade, 1:328.

199 Murdoch, 'Nicrina ad Heroas Anglos', p. 36.

CHAPTER 3

The Palatinate: War to Defend Religion and Family

> …by your [Elizabeth of Bohemia's] intercession obtain for us from your father, the King of Great Britain, much grace and favour, we do in like manner beseech your Majesty, for the advancement of the weal and preservation of the religion of the gospel, to be instant with the King, your father, to afford us his assistance either of money or men, and so doing to aid jointly with our Lord [Frederick V], your husband, graciously to take care of this our Kingdom.[1]

On 8 November 1620 the forces of Frederick V, Elector Palatine, and his allies faced the 25,000 strong army of the Catholic League.[2,3] At the battle of White Mountain the Elector was outnumbered and outgunned forcing both him and his wife into flight from Bohemia and back into the Palatinate. Despite the lack of a significant English presence at White Mountain, some Englishmen were in attendance, for example, William Waller and Ralph Hopton who escorted Elizabeth from the battlefield as part of her personal guard.[4] One eyewitness wrote of the confidence expressed in the Bohemian court on the eve of battle and how it soon disappeared as the King's forces were defeated at "the foot of this ill-defended hill."[5] From the early stages of this conflict Frederick looked

1 Hatfield, Hatfield House, the Cecil Papers, CP 129/155 The Directors and Councillors ordained by the three Protestant Estates of Bohemia assembled in Prague to the Electress Palatine (7 September 1619).

2 I have specifically contrasted the two Stuart marriage alliances with the Palatinate and Denmark in this article: A. Marks, 'Recognising Friends from Foes: Stuart Politics, English military networks and their alliances with Denmark and the Palatinate', in ed. S.J. Wolfson and V. Caldari, *Marriage Diplomacy: Early Stuart Dynastic Politics in their European Context, c. 1604–1630* (Woodbridge, 2018), pp. 173–185.

3 D. Eggenberger, *A Dictionary of Battles* (London, 1967), p. 4.

4 J.E. Adair, *Roundhead General: a military biography of Sir William Waller* (London, 1969), p. 7; Trim, 'English Military Émigrés', p. 244.

5 London, The British Library, Harley 389 A Relation of the manner of the loss of Prague by an English Gentlemen there and then present (November 1620), fol. 1.

 | DOI:10.1163/9789004522695_005

for external aid and England was one of the first countries he approached.[6] This was unsurprising considering the dynastic, religious and cultural ties that linked the Palatinate, Bohemia and England.[7] The Palatinate connections with Britain were used immediately after Frederick's acceptance of the Bohemian throne to try to gain leverage over James I. The directors and councillors ordained by the three Protestant Estates of Bohemia wrote to Elizabeth for military and diplomatic support requesting that she intervene through her father to help protect both their kingdom and their "religion of the gospel."[8] Wolrad von Plessen (Councillor to the Elector Palatine) wrote to James in 1619 requesting he intercede with the Emperor to attempt to secure the Protestant privileges for those in Bohemia and the Upper Palatinate, a territory which he reminded James was directly next to Bohemia.[9] John Ogle emphasised that many in the Empire looked to Britain for leadership arguing that: "the world stands at gaze to see what you in that great Island will do in this important affair of Christendom."[10] These men were clearly aware of what was likely to befall them as they emphasised the need for immediate help and requested that Elizabeth 'be instant' in her actions.[11]

It is within the Palatine campaigns that followed the events of 1618 that some of the best examples of direct English military involvement can be found; easily dispelling myths that England was not involved. It is also paradoxical that this is often held up by historians as the period in which James failed to support military intervention.[12] It has been asserted that the coalition combining the Dutch, French and British offered only moral support.[13] Indeed even Lord Digby, within the House of Commons, in 1621 commented on how after the

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6 P. Limm, *The Thirty Years' War* (London, 1984), p. 8; Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway*, pp. 44–64.

7 See chapter 1.

8 Hatfield, CP 129/155 The Directors and Councillors ordained by the three Protestant Estates of Bohemia assembled in Prague to the Electress Palatine (7 September 1619).

9 London, Lambeth Palace, MS 941/169 Memorandum for James I [by Wolrad von Plessen, Councillor to the Elector Palatine] concerning his intervention in the Palatinate (1619).

10 Hatfield, Hatfield House, the Cecil Papers, CP 130/18 Sir John Ogle to the Earl of Salisbury (13/23 November 1620).

11 Hatfield, CP 129/155 The Directors and Councillors ordained by the three Protestant Estates of Bohemia assembled in Prague to the Electress Palatine (7 September 1619).

12 S. Adams and G. Parker, 'Europe and the Palatine War', in ed. G. Parker, *The Thirty Years' War* (London, 1997), p. 57; G. Mortimer, *Wallenstein: the enigma of the Thirty Years War* (Houndmills, 2010), p. 28.

13 Limm, *The Thirty Years' War*, p. 21. Thea Linquist's on Anglo-Imperial relations also asserts this is the case (her work on the 1630s and John Taylor in particular is much stronger). T. Lindquist, 'The politics of diplomacy: The Palatinate and Anglo-Imperial relations in the Thirty Years' War' (PhD., University of Wisconsin (Madison), 2001), pp. 154–190.

overthrow of Prague "his majesty, instantly, considered what was to be done, and resolved that the best was, to keep the Princes of the Union in Arms; and to continue their Army, his Majesty send them 30,000*l.* with Albert Morton."[14] Certainly, some of this confusion surrounding Jacobean policy stems from applying ideas concerning covert and overt actions and the increasingly large grey area that was appearing during this period of the seventeenth century. James maintained diplomatic relations with Spain and the Palatinate and never overtly declared war but this does not mean he did not intervene. Archduke Leopold clearly saw the troops of Horace Vere as an English levy and so the Imperial nobility at least was under no illusions as to the status of this British contribution.[15] The continued diplomatic relationship was also far from foolish since, as many historians have noted, the support of Spain was important if James was to petition the Holy Roman Emperor.[16] Indeed, both James and the States-General clearly attempted to avoid war with both the Emperor and Spain, something that is apparent from their actions throughout the Palatinate crisis of 1621 to 1623.

To understand how this set of circumstances developed it is important to look briefly at some of the diplomatic correspondence of the Stuart state in the period immediately after the outbreak of hostilities in the German lands.[17] From the very beginning, the Elector Palatine emphasised his great concern over not only the Imperial, but also the Spanish response to events. In early 1619, he wrote of the possibility of Spanish troops coming directly into the conflict by crossing the Adriatic, emphasising the key role Venice would play in deciding whether this might occur.[18] However, the first crucial diplomatic

14 *The Parliamentary or Constitutional History of England, being a faithful account of all the most remarkable transactions in Parliament from the earliest times* (*to the dissolution of the convention Parliament that restored king Charles II., together with an appendix*). *By several hands.* (*General Index.*), 24 vols (London, 1751) 5:481.

15 Letters of Henry Wotton, 2:186.

16 R. Lockyer, *Buckingham: the life and political career of George Villiers, first Duke of Buckingham 1592–1628* (London, 1981), p. 126.

17 Some of the documents used in this section have been printed within: 'Letters and other documents illustrating the relations between England and Germany at the commencement of the Thirty Years' War. Volume 2: From the Election of the Emperor Ferdinand II to the close of the Conference at Muhlhausen. Edited by S.R. Gardiner', in ed. S.R. Gardiner, *Camden Society New Series* 98 (London, 1868); 'Letters and other documents illustrating the relations between England and Germany at the commencement of the Thirty Years' War. Volume 1: From the outbreak of the Revolution in Bohemia to the Election of the Emperor Ferdinand II', in ed. S.R. Gardiner, *Camden Society New Series* 90 (London, 1865). For the sake of accuracy the originals have been used where possible. The Scottish contribution to this diplomacy has been analysed: Murdoch, 'Scottish Ambassadors', pp. 27–50.

18 TNA, SP, 81/16 Elector Palatine to James I (26 January/5 February 1619), fol. 8.

move by James was the transfer of Sir Henry Wotton from Venice to the role of extraordinary ambassador to the German states.[19] The mission was broad and gave Wotton a degree of flexibility, but effectively was designed to allow Wotton to serve as an intermediary between the Emperor and the Bohemians, something the ambassador himself acknowledged.[20] Despite the desires of some within the Palatinate to attempt to make Frederick a new Emperor, James was far more realistic in his endeavours. Sir John Finet discussed such notions pointing out that they were 'ludicrous' and that there was little desire to encourage them in the Empire as they seemed likely to cause "continuall trouble and opposition, perhaps for many ages."[21]

1 The Andrew Gray Levy of 'True Borne Britaines'

The first British troops in the Empire were the Scottish regiment of Colonel John Seton, who in 1620 joined Frederick V's army and was then followed by the larger levy of Andrew Gray.[22] The Gray levy is significant as it is one of the earliest examples of a home-grown British military enterprise. In February 1620 Gray arrived in London and by March was actively recruiting. The terms of the levy were very specific; he was to recruit an equal number of Scots and English. The levy finally comprised of 1,000 English and 1,500 Scottish troops and towards the end of May they departed from England and Scotland.[23] The arrival of these troops in Lusatia was noted by an anonymous commentator, who remarked not only that they were Britons but also commented on the scale of the levy and their good discipline.[24] John Taylor was also clearly aware of their mixed composition and behaviour as he described the levy:

19 TNA, SP, 81/16 Instructions for Sir H. Wotton (1 March 1619), fol. 10v. These included the Prince Elector Palatine, Brandenburg, Wittenberg, Hesse, the Prince Christianus of Anhalt, Anspach, Baden, Norimberg, Ulme and Strasbourg.

20 "Documents illustrating the relations between England and Germany, Vol. 1', p. 51.

21 TNA, SP, 81/16 Sir John Finet to Sir Geo. Calvert (11 April 1619), fol. 32v.

22 Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway*, p. 50. The Seton regiment was sent directly from Dutch service.

23 Ibid., pp. 49–50.

24 Anon, *A most true relation of the late proceedings in Bohemia, Germany, and Hungaria Dated the 1. the 10. and 13. of Iuly, this present yeere 1620. As also of the happie arriuall of Sir Andrew Gray into Lusatia. Together with the articles of peace betweene the Catholikes, and the princes of the reformed religion, in the citie of Vlme, the third of Iuly last. ... Faithfully translated out of the high Dutch* (Dort, London?, 1620), p. 10.

> And true borne Britaines, worthy countrymen,
> Resume your ancient honors once agen.[25]

What makes the levy interesting is not only that they are an example of direct military aid being sent to the Palatinate from Britain but also the very British nature of the regiment (not only on paper but also in perception). What the Germans made of the arrival of three groups of troops from one king, under the St George's Cross, Saltire and Union flag is an equally interesting question, but one which unfortunately does not seem to have been recorded. Steve Murdoch has previously undertaken extensive research into the Scottish dimension of this levy, however, this should not overshadow the fact that in 1620 1,000 English troops entered the Thirty Years' War in the most direct way imaginable.[26]

The levy arrived in Prague, where it camped alongside the forces of count Mansfeld before taking heavy losses during the fall of Bohemia.[27] During this period one English observer commented that Gray's regiment was still actively fighting the enemy despite being reduced to just 300 men.[28] It was claimed that the remaining men Gray commanded were English (other references give the figure at around 400) and were being besieged by the Imperial army.[29] They repulsed three attacks before being relieved by the army of count Mansfeld who, it appears, they subsequently joined forces with.[30] The remnants of the

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25 John Taylor, *An English-mans loue to Bohemia with a friendly farewell to all the noble souldiers that goe from great Britaine to that honorable expedition. As also, the names of the most part of the kings, princes, dukes, marquisses, earles, bishops, and other friendly confederates, that are combined with the Bohemian part. By Iohn Taylor* (Dort, i.e. London, 1620), p. 2.

26 Murdoch, 'Scottish-British Military Identity', pp. 19–22.

27 John Taylor, *Taylor his trauels: from the citty of London in England, to the citty of Prague in Bohemia The manner of his abode there three weekes, his obseruations there, and his returne from thence: how he past 600 miles downe the riuer of Elue, through Bohemia, Saxony, Anhalt, the bishoprick of Madeberge, Brandenberge, Hamburgh, and so to England. With many relations worthy of note. By Iohn Taylor* (London, 1620), p. Dv.

28 Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway*, p. 51; I. B., *Certaine letters declaring in part the passage of affaires in the Palatinate, from September to this present moneth of April Together, with the articles of agreement betweene the princes of the Vnion and the Lord Marquis Spinola* (Amsterdam [i.e. London?], 1621), p. B4; Anon, *More nevves from the Palatinate; and more comfort to euery true Christian, that either fauoureth the cause of religion, or wisheth well to the King of Bohemia's proceedings. / According to faithfull and honest letters, sent ouer since the beginning of March, and now published for the satisfaction of euery true English heart*, 1622), p. 18.

29 It seems likely the that survivors would have been a mix of English and Scots. BL, Harley 389 Joseph Meade to Sir M Stuteville (26 February 1621), fol. 25v.

30 Ibid.; Anon, *More nevves from the Palatinate; and more comfort to euery true Christian*, p. 18.

Gray levy eventually combined with the English forces ensconced within the Palatinate in Frankenthal by then under the command of Horace Vere.

2 Earls of Essex, Oxford, Southampton and Sir Horace Vere (1620–1624)

In 1620, Count Dohna, the Palatine envoy, was also granted permission to levy troops in England for the Palatinate. This choice was made since it gave James a degree of diplomatic flexibility. As a consequence, Dohna also chose the general of the expedition. Sir Horace Vere was appointed over Sir Edward Cecil, the king's favourite, despite not even actively seeking the position. The competition between the followers of Vere and Cecil had been fierce.[31] Perhaps unsurprisingly there were some problems during the early phases of the levy, involving both pay and transport, but despite such issues a remarkable degree of success was achieved by this body of men.[32] The activities of the English commanders and their troops successfully displace any concept that England was not involved in the conflict and show instead that the crown, whilst undoubtedly still pursuing diplomatic connections with Spain, simultaneously supported the cause of Frederick V with military force.

The earl of Essex departed for the Netherlands already by November 1620 and then subsequently returned to England alongside the earl of Oxford in an attempt to secure the levying of more soldiers.[33] It is possible these soldiers formed part of the 3,500 English soldiers that were reported to have passed through Hamburg in June 1620 though it is impossible to tell.[34] Certainly, on 22 July 1620 the expedition departed from England with 2,200 volunteers before it passed through Rotterdam where one commentator stated there were only 2,000 men.[35] Here on 7th August, William Fairfax wrote to his brother commenting on the movement of both Protestant troops and those of Spinola who

31 Manning, *Swordsmen*, pp. 211–212.

32 Hatfield, CP 130/6 Achatius Bourgrave et Baron de Dona to the Earl of Salisbury (22 July 1620).

33 CSPV, 16:486 and 499; V.F. Snow, *Essex the rebel: The life of Robert Devereux, the Third Earl of Essex, 1591–1646* (Lincoln, 1970), p. 98.

34 Schleswig, Landesarchiv Schleswig, Abteilung 7 Nr. 3347 Von Gottes gnaden Friederich Erbe zu Norwegen, Herzog zu Schleswigh, Holstein (1 June 1620).

35 Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway*, p. 50; John Taylor, *Taylor his trauels*, p. Dv. They landed at Brill and also passed through Dort, Waal Emmerich and Rees: CSPV, 16:314 and 402–403.

was positioning his army in an attempt to prevent their passage.[36] Nineteen days later John Taylor described the English soldiers in Rotterdam as not only discussing the "heroick and magnanimous" nature of their mission but also describing how, by this point, the expedition had left the city "in martiall equipage."[37] It seems that at least a portion of the levy was equipped in the Dutch Republic on landing, not in England, and that Vere himself met with the Dutch government during the journey to the Palatinate.[38] Fairfax then wrote: "I am now going with my company from my ould garrison in Rotterdam to Rees the place appointed for our rendezvous where the prince of Orange is to furnish us with a sufficient convoy of horse for our further transport to the Pallatinate."[39] It seems that there were also high numbers of 'Dutch' (probably German) infantry present alongside the cavalry which brought the total force to around 6,200 foot plus cavalry.[40] Indeed, it is clear from contemporary descriptions that the Dutch and English leadership worked together and had a great deal more faith in the English infantry than the German:

> Count Henrie and Generall Vere as loth to ouergage their horse too farre, and distrustfull of the foote, being most High Dutch, and vnexperienced, though well disabled… The opinion is, that except the Prince foote bee reinforced by more English, of whom they haue a great opinion, the Princes will hardly give battell to the enemies, and consequently the poore people be eaten vp as well of their friends as enemies.[41]

The cavalry detachment, being only an escort, subsequently returned to the Republic.[42] Cavalry was not a necessity for the siege warfare that Vere and his commanders immediately embarked upon so their departure was understandable.[43] Nonetheless, Manning is highly critical of the force's capabilities because of their lack of horse belying a lack of understanding of garrison warfare and the unnecessary additional expense horse regiments would

36 London, The British Library, Additional Manuscripts 30305 Letter to Charles Fairfax (1620/1621), fols. 29–29v.

37 John Taylor, *Taylor his trauels*, p. B3v.

38 CSPV, 16:322, 345 and 361; Manning, *An apprenticeship in arms*, p. 100; Adams, 'Spain or Netherlands?', p. 85.

39 BL, Additional Manuscripts 30305 Letter to Charles Fairfax (1620/1621), fol. 29. more details of this can be found within I. B., *Certaine letters declaring in part the passage of affaires in the Palatinate*, pp. A2–A3.

40 I. B., *Certaine letters declaring in part the passage of affaires in the Palatinate*, p. A3v.

41 Ibid.

42 The Prince of Orange himself returned to the Netherlands in February 1621: ibid., p. B4.

43 Manning, *An apprenticeship in arms*, p. 101.

have brought. On 16th and 17th September the force crossed the Rhine and was then harassed by the "diligence" of Spinola.[44] The forces rested in Hohenheim until 3rd October before heading to Altzen (Alten).[45] The English army then entered into the Palatinate on Easter's eve with "thirteen colours displayed, and drums beating;" it was at this point that Vere was promoted to command the whole troop of horse and foot belonging to the King of Bohemia.[46] Until then it seems that Spinola was operating largely unchallenged within sections of the Palatinate and was capturing towns with ease. These were towns of "no strength" and they "yielded without a stroke."[47] With the arrival of the English army, this dramatically changed.

The financial strain of maintaining these forces can be found within the records of the English exchequer. These detailed accounts record the costs of maintaining the companies despatched to the aid of the Palatinate and catalogue the scale and expense of each company.[48] For example, on 27 July 1620, there were thirteen English companies within the Palatinate varying in size from 150 to 250 men bringing the English levy to around 2,100 men.[49] The costs of maintaining these men should not be underestimated and it seems that there was an effective financial structure in place with each of the companies receiving pay on a monthly basis.[50] From July 1620 to January 1621, when there were twenty-two principal officers, the cost was 427,380fl.[51] Based on a rough conversion of 10 Florins to the pound this means the troops were costing around 90,000*l.* per year. These exchequer documents utterly discredit the idea that there was no Stuart response to the Palatinate crisis or that these men were either mercenaries or even serving for foreign pay. They were fighting on the direct orders and at the direct expense of the Stuart crown. Even when this has been acknowledged to a limited degree they are still often described as voluntaries which carries the implication they were operating beyond the realms of official policy, something which was clearly not the case.[52] This is further supported by the fact that contemporaries described it as an "English

44 I. B., *Certaine letters declaring in part the passage of affaires in the Palatinate*, p. A2.

45 Ibid., pp. A3–A3v.

46 G.W. Johnson, ed. *The Fairfax Correspondence: Memoirs of the Reign of Charles The First, vol. 1* (London, 1848), p. XLI and XLII.

47 I. B., *Certaine letters declaring in part the passage of affaires in the Palatinate*, pp. A4–A4v.

48 London, The National Archives, Exchequer Records, 101/612/73 Accounts of pay issued to troops serving for the defence of the Palatinate (1622–1624).

49 Ibid.; Johnson, ed. *Fairfax Correspondence, vol. 1*, p. XLI and XLII.

50 TNA, E 101/612/73 Accounts of pay issued to troops serving for the defence of the Palatinate (1622–1624).

51 TNA, SP 81/23 General account of the cost of forces in the Palatinate (17 January 1622), fols. 19–22.

52 Fissel, *English warfare*, p. 180.

army" within their correspondence and clearly did not see the troops as anything else.[53] The origins of this money were revealed by the Lord Treasurer in a subsequent speech to Parliament:

> That the Business, now in Hand, required a great speedy Supply, wherein his Majesty had taken some Course out of his own; and his Lordship doubted not but that the Commons would add thereunto, and perform what they had so nobly promised in their Manifesto; the Disposing whereof they need not to doubt of, but that his Majesty intended the same to be wholly employed for the Recovery of the Palatinate.[54]

Considering the crown was paying for this from a combination of voluntary donations, financial reserves and limited Parliamentary subsidy, the sums spent were impressive.[55] The Venetian ambassador emphasised that this money derived from "the nobles and all the people of the provinces continue to subscribe to give so much a year even if the war should last fifty years."[56] The distribution of this money went through a network of paymasters; notably the Calandrini family who were still securing pay for garrison in Frankenthal in 1623.[57] Despite such bold claims the reality was that as the army spent longer in the field financial problems did arise as can be seen when John Fairfax reported from Frankenthal in September 1621 that:

> For these wars, if I may so call them, no man can judge of the continuance, but every of its poverty, an officer's means being scarce sufficient to find them clothes, much less private soldiers. Moneys are here exceeding scarce. The captains having received six months' pay, were forced to pay their whole companies for three weeks together, besides many weeks more to make up full means, receiving short of the weekly pay, so that in the end they were constrained to borrow, and when they shall be repaid is not yet known.[58]

53 Johnson, ed. *Fairfax Correspondence, vol. 1*, p. XLI.

54 Parliamentary History of England, 5:485.

55 The details of securing funding from the voluntary levies were discussed in chapter 1 and the Crown's volatile relationship with Parliament will be discussed later in this chapter.

56 CSPV, 16:307.

57 TNA, SP, 81/28 Sir J. Burgh to Lords of the Council (24/14 April 1623), fol. 205. For wider information on these networks see: Grell, *Brethren in Christ: a Calvinist network in Reformation Europe*, pp. 65–177.

58 Johnson, ed. *Fairfax Correspondence, vol. 1*, p. XLII.

Such complaints clearly illustrate the problems of maintaining an army so far from England, and also show the effects of the domestic crisis that was developing in Parliament throughout 1621. At this point, it is worth attempting to put the scale of the English army into some sort of statistical context. If the figure of around 18,600 foot within the Palatine army (excluding the English foot) is accurate then if the English force is included they made up between 10 per cent and 15 per cent of the total Palatine army (depending on troop loss during the journey).[59] These figures need to be treated with some caution as there are a number of estimates for the size of the English and other British levies as well as the total size of the Palatine/Bohemian army. The figures used to produce this are conservative and derived from a variety of sources (such as the correspondence of the Venetian ambassadors) but could be higher since even within one coherent source there are discrepancies.[60]



FIGURE 4 The army of the Palatinate in 1620[61]

59 BL, Additional Manuscripts 30305 Letter to Charles Fairfax (1620/1621), fol. 29v. Fairfax's correspondence places the Bohemian army at 18,600 i.e. including the English, Scottish and British troops *c.* 24,700.

60 For example, the Venetian ambassador reckoned that the figure would rise to as high as 8,000 men- "a very considerable number" and more than the 6,200 that I can account for. CSPV, 16:307.

61 These figures are derived from a variety of archival and primary sources all of which are used throughout this chapter.

When the Scottish and other specifically British units (Andrew Gray's levy) in the field are included this raises the total Stuart contribution to around one quarter of the foot within that army. Considering that the majority of Frederick's forces were in Bohemia this means that within the Rhine Palatinate the Protestants would still have been outnumbered by Spinola's force.[62] Though these figures do give a sense of scale estimates of the total size of the Bohemian army fluctuated in scale considerably throughout the period. For example, in 1619 Sir Isaac Wake (the ambassador to Savoy) wrote from Heidelberg that the total Bohemian army comprised 30,000 foot.[63] It is clearly possible considering subsequent losses at the Battle of White Mountain that the army could have reduced in numbers to 18,000 by 1621 but a degree of caution should be used with all of these reports. If reports that there was no organised resistance within the Palatinate until the English arrival are accurate, then the coming of the English troops could have been even more significant since without their arrival the Spanish could have swiftly occupied the territory.[64]

3 The 1621 Parliament

While English soldiers entered the field of combat domestic politics struggled to keep up. The Parliament of 1621 has attracted some attention as a year of significance in understanding the relationship between the crown and English popular opinion towards the conflict.[65] However, it is important to fully scrutinise Parliament within a foreign policy context, since it undoubtedly had a significant impact on Stuart policy due to controlling a large financial resource: English taxation. However, it was not the only financial resource of the crown

62 BL, Additional Manuscripts 30305 Letter to Charles Fairfax (1620/1621), fol. 29v. Fairfax correspondence places the army of Spinola 24,390 foot which is similar to the entirety of the Protestant forces including all the Stuart levies. However, considering these were to be split across Bohemia, the upper and Rhine Palatinate it is safe to assume Spinola would have enjoyed a considerable numerical advantage.

63 London, The British Library, Eggerton 2592 William Trumbull, agent at Brussels, to the Duke of Buckingham (24 May 1619), fol. 67.

64 I. B., *Certaine letters declaring in part the passage of affaires in the Palatinate*, pp. A4–A4v. Such statements imply that the majority of Frederick's forces were in Bohemia and the Upper Palatinate (alongside Andrew Gray's British levy and John Seton's Scottish soldiers).

65 Paul Salzman has written on the development of literary culture during 1621 and although he admits that the choice of year was 'to some degree arbitrary' he also emphasises the significance of the political debates that were taking place. Salzman, *Reading 1621*, pp. XVIII and 146–150.

and using innovative policies the crown could conduct business by other means.[66] It is clear that focusing just on Parliament can result in considerable oversight, for example, Breslow's account of England's Palatine endeavours.[67] The reason a detailed analysis of the debates within the 1621 Parliament are more relevant here is because they took place against a backdrop of English troops in the field hoping for relief, as opposed to subsequent Parliaments which took place without such a pressure. Understanding the actions of the English Parliament during this period is problematic, not least as its behaviour is more oblique than the actions of the Stuart crown.

Parliament in 1621 had not met for the previous seven years, the longest gap between sittings since 1515, and so there was significant pressure on both the King and Parliament to reach agreement.[68] Hopes like this were expressed by John Taylor in 1621 in his poem entitled *The Subjects joy for Parliament.*[69] In the poem Taylor expressed his delight that Parliament had been recalled before culminating in his hope that England would provide further assistance for the Palatinate:

> The Prince and Princesse Palatines high Grace,
> With all the Royall and the hopefull Race:
> Defend them Against all that them oppose,
> And fight their Battels still against their Foes.
> Grant that of this Seed we may ne're want one,
> To magnifie thy Name in Britaines Throne:
> Vntill our Sauiour, and thy onely Sonne,
> Shall come in Iudgement, and the world be done.[70]

66 Examples of this are allowing other nations to levy within England's borders, such as Sweden during the 1630s, and requesting voluntary contributions: Gloucestershire Archives, GBR H/2/2 Voluntary contributions requested by the Crown for war in Germany (1622), fol. 14; Gloucester, Gloucestershire Archives, GBR H/2/2 Licence to Captain Tirwitt of Marquis of Hamilton's regiment to raise volunteers in Glos. Similar licence to Capt. Archibald Douglas of Sir James Ramsey's regiment (1631), fols. 171–173.

67 Breslow, *A mirror of England*, pp. 22–37.

68 J.P. Croft, *King James* (Basingstoke, 2003), p. 111; Salzman, *Reading 1621*, p. 45. For more details of the 1614 Parliament see chapter 1 and Jansson, ed. *Proceedings in Parliament 1614*. News concerning the sitting of Parliament was received across England, for example: Hull, Hull History Centre, C/BR/L168 John Lister to the Mayor and Alderman (25 January 1620/1621).

69 For a comparison of George Wither and John Taylor's works see: Salzman, *Reading 1621*, pp. 123–129.

70 John Taylor, *The subjects joy for the Parliament* (London, 1621).

The polemicist Thomas Scott also wrote a pamphlet encouraging further military intervention framed as a speech to the House of Commons delivered by Edward Cecil.[71] Although it is unlikely Cecil would disagree with the sentiments in the speech there are no formal records that he ever actually made it.[72] Nevertheless, the speech provoked reaction from the populace, and people commented on it as though it had been presented. Joseph Meade in May 1621 commented that Cecil had spoken "concerning the want of warlike provision in the Kingdome and the means to redress it."[73] The meeting of Parliament also coincided with a period of "aristocratic activism and assertion of ancient privileges" which added to the tension across the realm and distracted from the crisis which had caused its recall.[74]

The idea prevalent amongst many historians of England is that the House of Commons wished to enter the conflict when James did not.[75] As Cogswell has already pointed out the reality is far more complicated since as will be demonstrated James certainly did wish to intervene but on his terms and in his own way.[76] Ironically, it seems the House of Commons felt the same and seems to have hindered Stuart intervention within the Palatinate as they wished to increase their control rather than oppose the end goal. Gondomar, the Spanish ambassador, wrote in December 1621 of "the sedition and wickedness that was occurring in this Parliament" a clear indication that he feared what the Commons might approve.[77] It is certainly worth contextualising the actions of Parliament within

71 Thomas Scott, *A speech made in the lovver house of Parliament, anno. 1621. By Sir Edward Cicill, Colonell* (London, 1621).

72 Salzman, *Reading 1621*, p. 150.

73 BL, Harley 389 Joseph Meade to Sir M Stuteville (28 April 1621), fol. 59. It is clear this is the same body of text referred to as the complete speech is given in: London, The British Library, Harley 389 A Speech made by Sir Edward Cecil to the Lower House of Parliament (1621), fols. 71–71v.

74 R.C. McCoy, 'Old English honour in an evil time: aristocratic principle in the 1620s', in ed. R.M. Smuts, *The Stuart court and Europe: essays in politics and political culture* (Cambridge, 1996), p. 140.

75 Just one example of this is: Adams and Parker, 'Europe and the Palatine War', p. 57. Paul Salzman has argued that James was only seeking to secure funding from the House of Commons so he could convince Spain that he "might go to war on Frederick's behalf" whereas the Commons were looking for direct action: Salzman, *Reading 1621*, pp. 45–46. Cogswell also agreed that the primary difference between the House of Commons and the King was related to strategy rather than objective. Cogswell, *The blessed revolution*, pp. 3–5 and 72.

76 Cogswell, 'Phaeton's Chariot', pp. 25–26.

77 B.C. Pursell, 'War or Peace? Jacobean Politics and the Parliament of 1621', in ed. C.R. Kyle, *Camden Society fifth series, Parliament, politics and elections, 1604–1648* 17 (Cambridge, 2001), p. 173.

the Thirty Years' War framework and providing an alternative explanation to some of the actions of the Commons and Lords to those usually espoused.[78]

On 13th January 1620 "a council of war for the affairs of the Palatinate" met in Whitehall to discuss England's future military options. The principal document to emerge from this is quite remarkable. It contains a full and complete list of everything required to mount a lasting military intervention in Germany. All the men and materials that would be required to hold the Palatinate were detailed meticulously, and each entry came with the associated costs.[79] The significance of the document has barely been commented on and only becomes apparent when the signatories are closely scrutinised. These include men such as the earls of Essex, Oxford and John Bingham who were not military neophytes – something which is revealed in the detail of the proposals.[80] Indeed, Sir Horace Vere and Sir Edward Conway were to join the committee if they returned from the Palatinate.[81] These proposals were eventually put before Parliament when it was recalled in 1621.

As Cogswell has argued, a significant number of the members of the House of Commons had relatives in the garrisons of the Palatinate and the remarkable speed with which Parliament provided supply was a further indication that they did intend to support the garrisons there.[82] Indeed, as he has effectively argued, this initial speed created a different set of problems.[83] These aside, the significance of this document was clearly understood by seventeenth century historians such as John Rushworth (who later became secretary of the New Modelled Army under Fairfax) since in his 1659 *Historical Collections* an edited version of the document was reproduced.[84] Yet again it should be noted that these men were tasked with the recovery of the Palatinate to his "Majesties

78 C. Russell, *Parliaments and English politics, 1621–1629* (Oxford, 1979); Croft, *King James*, pp. 110–116.

79 YAS, DD 56/L3 Militia records, Order in council appointing a council of war for the affairs of the Palatinate (11 February 1621).

80 Both of whom had previously served. For Bingham see: BL, Additional Manuscripts 46188 Minutes. Copy (13 January 1621).

81 YAS, DD 56/L3 Militia records, Order in council appointing a council of war for the affairs of the Palatinate (11 February 1621).

82 Cogswell, 'Phaeton's Chariot', p. 29.

83 Ibid., pp. 32–33.

84 John Rushworth, *Historical collections*, p. 17. For details of Rushworth's life see: J. Raymond, 'Rushworth, John (*c.* 1612–1690)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, (2004). The significance is also revealed by the fact that more than one copy still exists, making it all the more remarkable that there has not been any significant comment upon it by historians. The primary copy used during this section is located within the archives of Yorkshire Archaeology Society: YAS, DD 56/L3 Militia records, Order in council appointing a council of war for the affairs of the Palatinate (11 February 1621). At least one other copy exists within the Cecil Papers of Hatfield House: Hatfield, Hatfield House, the Cecil

sonne-in-lawe" and they were ordered to provide horse, foot, munitions, shipping and "treasure".[85] It is also worth emphasising that the proposal is described as a "Royal Army." This is further evidence that these were not Englishmen operating within a foreign nation's military structure with the tacit approval of the Crown but rather intended to be composed of men directly serving the English army inside the very heart of the Empire. The original scale of this proposed army was considerable, consisting of 144 companies each comprising of 150 common soldiers, totalling around 25,000 infantry and a further 5,000 horse. Equally, the list reveals the considerable military knowledge and experience possessed by those on the council.

TABLE 6 Principal items in the order in council appointing a 'council of war' for the affairs of the Palatinate[86]

Raising 25,000 foot and equipping them with apparel and weapons, viz, 20,000 pikes and muskets and 5,000 calivers.	77,836*l.* 8s
Raising 5,000 horse, viz, 3,500 'cuiraseeres' and 1,500 'carbins'.	126,900*l.*
Transporting the foot to the river of Maisrssed.	5,000*l.*
Transporting the horse to the same place.	4,500*l.*
20 pieces of battery and field ordnance, with mortar pieces, and implements to serve them (details in schedule annexed to the report)	4,455*l.* 17s
Shot and powder.	26,200*l.*
Match.	5,022*l.*
Round shot for the battery ordnance.	2,478*l.* 10s
Bullets for muskets and calivers.	2,208*l.*
Transport of ordnance and munition overseas.	869*l.*
Horse transport for ordnance and munition:	
horses estimated necessary;	10,412
if bought they will cost,	93,708*l.*
if hired they will cost daily,	77,836*l.* 8s
Permanent pool of horses for use of ordnance.	126,900*l.*

Papers, CP 253/7 The Palatinate (13 January–11 February 1620/21). The other historian to have mentioned the document is Cogswell, 'Phaeton's Chariot', p. 29.

85 YAS, DD 56/L3 Militia records, Order in council appointing a council of war for the affairs of the Palatinate (11 February 1621).

86 Both copies of the document were used to construct this table. Ibid.; Hatfield, CP 253/7 The Palatinate (13 January–11 February 1620/21).

This document lists provisions for the purchase of carbines, artillery and powder as expected but in considerable detail. In particular, the twenty pieces of artillery are priced at 4,455*l.* and the various types of powder and shot are listed individually with justifications for the amounts chosen.[87] This points towards the confusion within the Stuart government since despite the desire for these provisions, there does not seem to have been any spending by the ordnance office on heavy guns. This was clearly not as previously concluded by Richard Stewart who stated that the expedition had "determined that small arms would be needed, but not any great quantity of new heavy, ordinance."[88] The council clearly recommended the use of artillery which means that either sufficient stock already existed within England or that the required spending was never authorised and therefore the guns were never ordered. This level of detail is revealed beyond the artillery, itemising the costs of paying infantry and the costs of other necessities. Complementing the expenditure on the artillery battery objects, such as wheelbarrows, were itemised to be purchased within the States General.[89] Indeed, a number of other items were designated to be purchased abroad which again shows the importance of the logistical connections between the Dutch Republic and the English military.

This proposal represents the culmination of what the English Parliament would have had to purchase if it wished to mount a serious attempt to hold the Palatinate. It is the source for the 250,000*l.* plus further costs totalling around 900,000*l.* that is often cited by scholars discussing military expenditure.[90] James subsequently went to Parliament asking for 500,000*l.* as James hoped to raise the remainder form other means but even this failed to emerge.[91] However, what this document demonstrates is that the vast expenditure sought by King James was not simply dreamt up by the crown. Rather, it was based on a detailed understanding of the resources required to fight the Empire as laid out by qualified English veterans. Despite this, the council of war's proposal were never fully realised. When they did go on to create an English army for service in the Palatinate it only consisted of around 2,500 men, approximately

87 YAS, DD 56/L3 Militia records, Order in council appointing a council of war for the affairs of the Palatinate (11 February 1621).

88 Stewart, *The English Ordnance Office*, p. 78.

89 YAS, DD 56/L3 Militia records, Order in council appointing a council of war for the affairs of the Palatinate (11 February 1621).

90 For example in, Snow, *Essex the rebel*, p. 100.

91 D.H. Willson, *King James VI and I* (London, 1956), p. 417.

a tenth of the size originally proposed.[92] The reasons behind the disagreements between the Crown and Parliament are complex. However, a desire to help the Palatinate was not the cause of such disagreement, but rather how this help should be managed and financed. It is clear that some in Parliament were afraid of the escalating costs and proposed alternatives to supporting the Palatinate as proposed by the Crown. Nevertheless, these other options were all still designed to secure the Palatinate in other ways, albeit these were less realistic.[93] A speech given in Parliament by Lord Digby also emphasised the ongoing role of English troops within the conflict:

> I observed how bravely Sir Horace Vere and Captain Borough had behaved themselves of late in the Palatinate; and that, by the Wisdom and Valour of Sir Horace, Heidelbergh was kept from the Enemy, being a Place of small Strength; Mainheim, a very strong Town; Frankendale, which had endured a Months Siege, and Worms; which is the present State of the Palatinate.[94]

Digby went on to recommend that more money would be required to provide an "Army of our own" within the Palatinate which would not only strengthen Frederick's territories, but also encourage the Princes of the Union to further action.[95] This speech is important in not only emphasising the need for further financial aid for the Palatinate but also because it successfully illustrates Stuart policy at this point included serious military options.[96] Conrad Russell suggests that it does not clarify whether this would involve a general declaration of war "perhaps because he himself did not know the answer" but instead Digby simply attempts to increase Parliamentary supply.[97] The reality is that

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92 YAS, DD 56/L3 Militia records, Order in council appointing a council of war for the affairs of the Palatinate (11 February 1621); TNA, E 101/612/73 Accounts of pay issued to troops serving for the defence of the Palatinate.

93 Cogswell, *The blessed revolution*, p. 72.

94 Parliamentary History of England, 5:485. It seems Digby was mistaken regarding the strength of Heidleberg's defences since they had been upgraded since 1600. Wilson, *Europe's tragedy*, p. 143.

95 Parliamentary History of England, 5:485.

96 It is also worth noting that despite his Pro-Palatine efforts Digby was Catholic, illustrating the complicated nature of individual motivations. He did in fact donate money towards the Protestant cause. 'Stuart dynastic policy and religious politics, 1621–1625', in ed. M.C. Questier, *Camden Society fifth series* 34 (Cambridge, 2009), p. 23.

97 Russell, *Parliaments and English politics*, p. 126.

James almost certainly intended to continue his previous policy of diplomatic negotiations alongside discreet military support for the Protestant cause.

At this point it is worth referring to the famous letter from James commenting that the House of Commons should not "presume to treat of matters concerning government (or mysteries of state), namely, not to deal with the match of our dear son with the daughter of Spain [infanta María]."[98] This letter does not, as has sometimes been assumed, condemn the Commons for discussing the Palatinate issue, or the soldiers serving there, but contains itself to emphasising that the Crown felt that it alone was responsible for deciding its marriage policy for the Royal progeny. Indeed, as Russell has correctly emphasised, James actually instructed Parliament to discuss foreign affairs.[99] It is clear that to James the two policies were not separate, or contradictory, but complementary. The use of discreet military power to support the aims of Protestantism and his dynasty alongside an allegiance with Spain would further these aims.[100]

Many of those involved were aware that the situation was becoming increasingly difficult for the English garrisons that were already in the Palatinate. In November 1621, Prince Charles wrote of his desire to put Edward Cecil in command of any defence of the Palatinate due to his wish "not [to] have Sir Horace Vere (who has endured so much misery; and so good service there) either to be discouraged or disgraced."[101] By this stage Charles realised that the proposals that were being passed did not match the needs put forward from those with military experience and wished to protect Vere's name from any resulting consequences. Sir John Ogle also wrote of the dangerous nature of the situation from The Hague:

> We speak and preach the wars here, and make preparations accordingly; yet if his Majesty compound the business of the Palatinate (whereof depends that of the rest of Germany, and who else are like enough to compound for themselves), we shall have but a hard bargain of it; for either we must undertake a defensive war, and bear the burden on our own shoulders and that alone, or else (his Majesty not sticking by us) must receive dishonourable and disadvantageous conditions, which this

98 G.P.V. Akrigg, ed. *Letters of King James VI & I* (Berkeley, 1984), p. 378.
99 Russell, *Parliaments and English politics*, pp. 125–126.
100 Akrigg, ed. *Letters of James VI & I*, pp. 385–389 and 395.
101 Petrie, ed. *The Letters of Charles I*, pp. 6–7.

> State will never do; they will sink first, and then others must see (say they) to their own swimming.[102]

After the failure of Parliament to provide the requested funding, payments did not stop to the earls of Oxford and Essex, Sir John Borlase, Captain Borough and Captain Fairfax. However, all must have known that they could not hold the territory indefinitely.[103] Parliament did provide two limited subsidies totalling 199,581*l*.[104] This was not sufficient for James's ambitions and in May 1622 after the failure of Parliament to provide "a liberall and speedy supply" James appealed directly to the people of England to meet the funding gap.[105] This was only one of a number of attempts to secure voluntary donations which enabled payments to directly enter the English exchequer.[106] Such actions formed a key part in enabling James to continue his policies without the complete support of Parliament and it seems that between 1622 and 1624 he raised 90,000*l*.[107]

Over the period of July 1621 to February 1622 the exchequer paid a total of between 52,266 and 63,001fl. per month to English forces in the Palatinate, a far from inconsiderable sum.[108] Payments continued through 1622 and in March 1623 there were further payments made to troops, for example on 14th March 4,440fl. to Sir Charles Rich.[109] Ultimately, despite the fact the council of war only supported 2,500 men, approximately a tenth of the size requested, they still held the Palatinate for a year.[110] Some of this money was given to count Mansfeld though this did not mean that it was not helping the

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102 Hatfield, CP 130/36 Sir John Ogle to the Earl of Salisbury (25 March 1621).

103 TNA, E 101/612/73 Accounts of pay issued to troops serving for the defence of the Palatinate (1622–1624).

104 Cogswell, 'Phaeton's Chariot', p. 28.

105 Gloucestershire Archives, GBR H/2/2 Voluntary contributions requested by the Crown for war in Germany (1622), fol. 14.

106 Hull C/BRL/181 The Lords of the Council to the Mayor Sherrif and Aldermen (31 March 1622); Hull C/BR/L182 Albert Morton to the Mayor (June 1622).

107 Cogswell, 'Phaeton's Chariot', p. 28. This was discussed in more detail in chapter 1.

108 TNA, E 101/612/73 Accounts of pay issued to troops serving for the defence of the Palatinate (1622–1624).

109 TNA, SP 81/23 General account of the cost of forces in the Palatinate (17 January 1622), fol. 19; TNA, SP, 81/28 Note of money delivered to Sir Chas. Rich and other captains for employment in the Palatinate (14 March 1623), fols. 118–120.

110 YAS, DD 56/L3 Militia records, Order in council appointing a council of war for the affairs of the Palatinate (11 February 1621); TNA, E 101/612/73 Accounts of pay issued to troops serving for the defence of the Palatinate (1622–1624).

English troops since 1,000 of those within that levy were English.[111] The costs of the war increased until in 1623 the House of Commons was presented with a list of expenditure:

TABLE 7 A Declaration in the lower house of the Kinges receipts, payments, etc, by the Chancelour of the Exchequer, and in the higher house by the Lord Treasurer[112]

Monies issued out in Palatinate and others and abroade.	145,763*l.*
For the defence of the Palatinate.	172,888*l.*
To Burlemacke [Burlamachi] upon the account of the Palatinate.	18,590*l.*
For the men of Frankendale.	7,918*l.*
In contributions of the Lords and others for the Palatinate.	34,618*l.* 6*s.* 8*d.*
In subsidies from the layetie and Cleargie for the Palatinate.	88,699*l.*

The analysis above is important as it forces a reassessment of the dynamics of English politics during the early 1620s. The idea of either the King demanding war and Parliament refusing to pay or Parliament demanding a "religious crusade" or the King declining to participate is far too simplistic.[113] Contemporaries were clearly aware of this and though much of the nation's frustrations were pointed towards the crown some attacked Parliament as well.[114] However, it is certainly fair to conclude that a coherent Parliamentary war strategy failed to materialise.[115] The 'Spanish Match' strategy went alongside ongoing military endeavours, and the restitution of Frederick and Elizabeth to their respective positions within the Palatinate continued to be a crucial part of the negotiations with Spain throughout 1623.[116] The reality is that both sides in England wished to invest in a continental war, but could not agree the terms on which this war should be conducted. Certain members of the Houses of Parliament, namely Sir Peter Hayman, Viscount Sale and Sir Jerome Horsey were imprisoned for their resistance to providing the King with aid.[117] This combined with the increasing mistrust of some of the King's advisers by Parliament contributed to yet another failed attempt to gain the supply he desired.

111 Murdoch, 'Introduction', p. 19.
112 Hatfield, Hatfield House, the Cecil Papers, CP 130/86 The Palatinate (1623).
113 Sharpe, *The Personal Rule*, p. 6.
114 Salzman, *Reading 1621*, p. 121.
115 Reeve, *Charles I*, p. 79.
116 Akrigg, ed. *Letters of James VI & I*, p. 427 and 429.
117 C. Russell, *Unrevolutionary England, 1603–1642* (London, 1990), p. 81.

4 The Siege of Frankenthal (1621–1623)

In January 1621 the Emperor issued an Imperial ban against Frederick V which was printed and widely distributed across Europe.[118] This action was the political preparation for the, by now inevitable, Habsburg invasion of the Palatinate itself, and it attracted considerable attention within England.[119] Throughout 1621 the two parts of the Palatinate came under increasing military pressure from the Imperial forces of both general Tilly and Spain. Having secured the English army within the Palatinate, Vere continued to train his soldiers on a daily basis (with the exception of Sundays), a practice which no doubt became useful over the months that followed.[120] The siege of Frankenthal that had begun in March 1621 went on for far longer than expected and became a significant event in English domestic and military affairs. Vere had divided his forces to hold the three most important towns across the Lower Palatinate: Mannheim, Heidelberg, and Frankenthal.[121] Heidelberg, as the home of the Palatine government, was symbolically important.[122] Frankenthal also had the added emotional significance that it was part of Elizabeth Stuart's dower lands.[123] Manheim was placed under the command of Gerard Herbert, Heidelberg under Vere himself and Frankenthal under Sir John Borough. It should be made clear that none of these towns were outdated in their fortifications; indeed Frankenthal and Heidelberg had been upgraded in terms of defences since the turn of the century whilst Mannheim was the site of a new seven bastion fortress.[124] Borough was supported by captains Essex and Vane, whilst Vere had six companies of foot. Sir Herbert was supported in Mannheim by an engineer named captain Dexter, a useful individual in a siege campaign.[125] The siege of Frankenthal perhaps marks the most significant English engagement in the conflict up to this point and it is perhaps unsurprising that large

118 TNA, SP, 81/20 Imperial ban against Elector Palatine (printed) (12/22 January 1621), fol. 52.

119 Anon, *A briefe description of the reasons that make the declaration of the ban made against the King of Bohemia, as being Elector Palatine, dated the 22. of Ianuarie last past, of no value nor worth, and therefore not to be respected* (London, 1621).

120 Johnson, ed. *Fairfax Correspondence, vol. 1*, p. XLII.

121 B.C. Pursell, *The Winter King: Frederick V of the Palatinate and the coming of the Thirty Years' War* (Aldershot, 2003), p. 23.

122 Akkerman, ed. *Correspondence of Elizabeth Stuart. vol. 2*, p. 7.

123 Ibid., p. 162; Ross, *The winter queen*, pp. 92–93.

124 Wilson, *Europe's tragedy*, p. 143. The defences of Frankenthal consisted of a number of fortifications not simply a single wall: TNA, SP, 77/16 Articles of sequestration of Frankenthal (19 March 1623), fol. 85.

125 Anon, *More nevves from the Palatinate; and more comfort to euery true Christian*, p. 18.

numbers of men associated with Dutch service were involved.[126] They were hopelessly under-resourced, yet Borough did not surrender to the besieging forces until 14 April 1623, long after the other towns of the Palatinate had fallen. In contrast, Mansfeld had been discussing leaving since May 1622.[127] Therefore, the English troops were the last force supporting Frederick to leave the Palatinate. Borough wrote to one of the lords of the council on the day of departure from Frankenthal and offered a "last farewell of this town" saving his detailed report until he could appear before the council himself.[128]

The handover of Frankenthal and Manheim to the Spanish was both a military and political decision, and this was known by both sides. The Imperial side was clearly aware that reinforcements could not relieve the English garrison.[129] The fact that the English troops were the last out of the Palatinate and had successfully held so much of the Lower Palatinate for so long was a significant military achievement. Alongside the English role at other sieges such as Maastricht (1632), these accomplishments are all too often ignored in favour of discussing the English military failures of Cadiz and La Rochelle by those studying English warfare under the Stuart kings.[130] Dr Burges was the minister to the English within Frankenthal and remained inside the city until September 1621.[131] In the newsletter of Joseph Meade, Burges stated that the 2,000 English troops were "much better disciplined and ordered than they were before".[132] Despite his claim the siege was not without problems for the English garrison, as in June 1621 John Fairfax wrote that some men were deserting due to the pressure of the siege.[133] That conditions were deteriorating is supported by a contemporary printed account which remarks on the poor discipline of some of the soldiers which had resulted in them developing a reputation for looting.[134] The news from another Englishman present gives a sense of the siege itself and the fear that existed within the garrison due to the overwhelming odds mounting against them:

126 Amongst their number was Philip Skippon, a man who went on to command the London militia during the opening blows of Civil War in England. I.J. Gentles, 'Skippon, Philip, appointed Lord Skippon under the protectorate (d. 1660)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, (2008).

127 Letters of Henry Wotton, 2:238.

128 TNA, SP 81/28 Sir J. Burgh to Lords of the Council (24/14 April 1623), fol. 205.

129 John Rushworth, *Historical collections*, p. 74.

130 For example: Carlton, *Going to the wars*, pp. 17–20.

131 Johnson, ed. *Fairfax Correspondence, vol. 1*, p. XLIII.

132 BL, Harley 389 Joseph Meade to Sir M Stuteville (26 February 1621), fol. 24.

133 London, The British Library, Additional Manuscripts 30305 John Fairfax to Sir Thomas Fairfax, Frankenthall (17 July 1621), fol. 31.

134 I. B., *Certaine letters declaring in part the passage of affaires in the Palatinate*, pp. B2v–B3.

> Since we came to garrison at Frankendale we have scarce been quiet for alarms. Marques Spinola hath attempted much since our coming and effected little: our small troops [English] have been ready to confront him upon all occasions which has so won the hearts of this poor oppressed people that they to repose as some say more, all say as much confidence in us as in their own countrymen.[135]

Meade's letters also contain an account of a surprise attack launched by a force of Spinola that had marched all night to attack an English force in a village outside of town. The smaller English company managed to hold out until the enemy's munitions were depleted and after killing fifty men forced their retreat.[136] It is clear that events like this contributed to building the reputation of the English troops within the Palatinate, in particular it appears that Horace Vere was very highly thought of.[137] As has already been stated the English were not just defending Frankenthal, but also Mannheim, Heidelberg and outlying positions.[138] Indeed, it is clear from the correspondence of John Fairfax that the defence of these towns were closely linked:

> This country lyes now more open that heretofore may be assaulted with lesse difficulty by the enemy, by reason of a stronge castle h'is possessed of lyinge upon the Rhine whereto he hath drawen his bridge. The governor of Manheim had it in keeping and though we dare not yet think by treachery it was given up.[139]

Clearly the loss of the bridge near Manheim was a blow to the English army and allowed the Imperialists free access to the country around Frankenthal. Its loss actually resulted in an initial impasse between the two sides. Considering the proximity of the three English garrisons to the Rhine and its tributary the Neckar, the control of bridges was crucial to projecting power over the local area. Fairfax went on to explain how a stalemate developed around the bridge at Mannheim.

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135 BL, Harley 389 Joseph Meade to Sir M Stuteville (26 February 1621), fol. 25.

136 Ibid.

137 BL, Harley 389 Joseph Meade to Sir M Stuteville (11 May 1621), fol. 72v.

138 Eggenberger, *A Dictionary of Battles*, p. 4.

139 BL, Additional Manuscripts 30305 John Fairfax to Sir Thomas Fairfax, Frankenthall (10 September 1621), fol. 33.

> our army lyes encamped within 3 English miles of ther new placed bridge but neither able either to take the castle or remove the bridge, we were drawn once from before it but I thinke 5 tymes our strength could doe no good on it.[140]

Shortly following this, in November 1621, the town was relieved by Protestant forces creating a window for the resupply of the town.[141] Horace Vere and Mansfeld brought further reinforcements in 1622. These soldiers were to march on the enemy who were encamped in 'Krelckaw' and upon the mountain and in the vineyards of 'Wisloch' but this seems to have only delayed the inevitable rather than decisively turning events around.[142] The force comprised 8,000 foot and a further 2,000 horse which in the short term expanded the range of options that the English had in the Palatinate.[143] As the correspondence of Robert Anstruther makes clear this was a force under the command of Horace Vere, not Mansfeld as often is assumed, a distinction that makes it all the more clear that this was a English military force, under the command of the crown and with an English commander.[144] Despite this and the ability of the many Englishmen on the ground, the position of the garrison became increasingly untenable. Indeed, from the very beginning of the siege many soldiers appear to have been aware of this.[145] By 1623 these options had become even more limited as the Spanish began to exert their numerical superiority. Mr Heape who was in Frankenthal wrote:

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140 Ibid.

141 Johnson, ed. *Fairfax Correspondence, vol. 1*, p. XLV.

142 Wisloch refers to Wiesloch, some 13 Kilometers south of Heidelberg. Krelckaw' is not identified yet, but probably refers to Kirrlach, a town on a hill to the south west of Weisloch. See Anon, *A true relation of all such battailes as haue beene fought in the Palatinate, since the Kings arriuall there, vntill this present the 24. of May As also an abstract of a letter sent from the King of Bohemia to the Prince of Orange, concerning both the defeat of the yonger Duke of Wirtenbourghs forces, by Gonzales, generall of the Spaniards, with the recouery of the said dukes forces by the Marquesse of Baden, who at the same time set vpon Gonzales forces, put them to flight, and made a great slaughter. Likewise the notable victory woone by Christian Duke of Brunswicke against the Bauarians, and some of Graue Henrick Varberghes forces, in his way going towards the Palatinate, and his burning of the great towne of Giesken. With the famous victorie obtained by the King of Bohemia against Leopoldus, before Hagenaw, wherein he was besieged: how he raised the siege, and drawe the Bauarians out of the field. Lastly, the victory of the graue Henrick Van Nassaw in Brabant, whence he brought great store of treasure and many prisoners* (London 1622), pp. 3–4.

143 London, Lambeth Palace, MS 936/263 Report on affairs in the Palatinate shortly after the raising of the siege of Frankenthal by Count Ernst Mansfeld and Sir Horace Vere (October 1621).

144 DRA, TKUA, 63-7 Robert Anstruther to Christian Friis (*c.* 1622), fol. 21.

145 Anon, *A true relation of all such battailes as haue beene fought in the Palatinate*, pp. 2–3.

> We can conceive small hopes out of England though we hear of great matters… Our help standeth in the God of Hoasts whose cause we will maintain for his honour alone which now doth stand so much engaged: and I persuade myself there is few amongst us but would rather by then fly or yield to the enemy.[146]

The garrison was increasingly exposed and apparently uncertain about the unfolding political events around them for which they had ultimately risked their lives. Even in the early stages of the conflict Fairfax wrote that there was "no certain news of the King of Bohemia."[147] At the same time others were increasingly concerned by the behaviour of their German allies who "pretend they cannot hold out and some intend to make peace with Spinola for their companies and so to leave us here in the lurch."[148]

As other towns fell one by one across the Palatinate, the position of these English garrisons became increasingly difficult. On 16 September 1622 Heidelberg was successfully taken by Imperial forces. At this point, the relative importance of Heidelberg was revealed since an offer was made to exchange both the remaining towns for Heidelberg which was turned down by the Imperial armies.[149] Heidelberg had been suffering since June 1621 when the town was "exhausted" of corn and wine.[150] On 6th September 1622 the town was still held but with twenty-four cannon against the city which were 'fiercely' exchanging fire with the garrison.[151] However, the garrison was still active even at this late stage, since a sally was made against the besieging forces resulting in eighteen men being taken prisoner.[152] Small victories like these did not win the campaign; Vere now realised the increased futility of the situation

146 BL, Harley 389 Joseph Meade to Sir M Stuteville (26 February 1621), fol. 25v.

147 BL, Additional Manuscripts 30305 John Fairfax to Sir Thomas Fairfax, Frankenthall (10 September 1621), fol. 33.

148 BL, Harley 389 Joseph Meade to Sir M Stuteville (26 February 1621), fol. 25.

149 'Stuart dynastic policy and religious politics', p. 179.

150 BL, Harley 389 Joseph Meade to Sir M Stuteville (22 June 1621), fol. 96v.

151 Anon, *The 25. of September. Nevves from most parts of christendome. Especially from Rome, Italy, Spaine, France, the Palatinate, the Low Countries, and diuers other places. VVherein is contained a full and certaine relation, of the last battle fought at Bergen vp-Zome, and the great ouerthrow which Spinolaes forces receiued from those of the towne. With the lamentable losse of the city of Heidlebergh, after many braue repulses given to the enemie: and the names of some principall leaders, as were slaine in defence of the towne. And diuers other speciall matters, coninued from the last printed newes of the twentieth, to this present* (London, 1622), p. 2.

152 Ibid.

and just two weeks later surrendered Manheim.[153] By the end of 1622 the only remaining town held by the Palatinate was Frankenthal.[154]

The terms which eventually ended Frankenthal's siege are interesting since the town did not have to negotiate with the Emperor, simply the besieging Spanish army. It is clear that this distinction was important to James and that he had used the strength of the English garrison to justify this:

> The Spanish ambassador and Boiscot from the Archduchess are now agreed with me for the depositing of Frankenthal in the King of Spain's and Archduchess's hands for eighteen months (without mention of my treating with the Emperor, for that cannot now be done with honour, he having thrice broken flatly his promises unto me).[155]

Indeed when the siege had come to an end the Venetian ambassador reported that if the "King of England had not withdrawn his supporting hand from the garrison, it might have held out for a long time."[156] Many of the terms given were unsurprising, for example, insisting on the handing over of any artillery within the town, but some of the other requirements including the fact that this transfer of command was only for eighteen months are more interesting.[157] Crucially, the handover of Frankenthal to the Spanish was not a surrender but a sequestration and only for a limited period of time.[158] The English could then resume control if they were in a position to do so.[159] Despite this clause appearing a formality, before the Spanish took full control of the town the terms of this were honoured as John Rushworth described:

> On the day that Frankendal was to be redelivered [to the English], Spinola with his Forces marcheth out of the Town; and finding none of the King of Great Britains Forces ready to enter it, instantly re-enters and takes

153 D.J.B. Trim, 'Vere, Horace, Baron Vere of Tilbury (1565–1635)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, (2008).

154 Letters of Henry Wotton, 2:246. It must be emphasised that Wotton was slightly behind events since he also believed Manheim was still being defended.

155 Akrigg, ed. *Letters of James VI & I*, p. 395.

156 CSPV, 18:3.

157 TNA, SP 77/16 Articles of sequestration of Frankenthal (19 March 1623), fol. 85. There are also details of the negotiations within CSPD, 10:502–567.

158 TNA, SP 77/16 Articles of sequestration of Frankenthal (19 March 1623), fol. 85. This has been acknowledged by Redworth: G. Redworth, *The prince and the Infanta: the cultural politics of the Spanish match* (London, 2003), p. 73.

159 CSPD, 10:536.

> possession, pulls down the King of England's Arms, and sets up the King of Spain's.[160]

The ceremony is interesting since it clearly illustrates the terms on which Frankenthal was sequestered, terms which were far from unconditional and representative of the strength of the English garrison. The King actually negotiated with the Spanish to allow him to pay the garrison as they departed, a remarkable feat.[161] Furthermore there also seems to have been an attempt to secure religious tolerance within the town since it was proposed to hand the keys of the town over to the citizens of the city, rather than to the Spanish. It seems this request was initially agreed to by the Spanish, but later they reneged on their promise which caused concern within the population who were mostly "refugees from Spanish dominions".[162]

The main reason for the significance of these events, apart from reflecting on the strength of the garrison, was that Frankenthal had become entwined with James's negotiations to marry Prince Charles to the Infanta María. The Spanish eventually claimed the town earlier than the eighteen months promised because of the breakdown of these negotiations. Understanding how Frankenthal was tied into the marriage negotiations is a significant but often unrecognised feature of the Spanish Match and explains why the town was handed over before the garrison became so weak it had to surrender. The King, enquired about the state of the town and was moved to declare that he would "not abandon his son-in-law in recovering the Palatinate, but no ruffling words to be used to the Ambassadors, till there come newes out of Spaine".[163] The two items being referred to within the same context is an excellent indication of their being part of the same deliberations by the Stuart monarchy.

In a further interesting consideration the terms of the sequestration handed the town not to the Spanish crown (as would be expected) but to the Infanta Isabella Clara Eugina, the sovereign prince of the Southern Netherlands.[164] This is significant on a number of levels: firstly, it meant James did not have to

160 John Rushworth, *Historical collections*, p. 155.

161 APC, 38:446; CSPD, 10:532. This money was brought to the garrison by Calandrini: TNA, SP 81/28 Sir J. Burgh to Lords of the Council (24/14 April 1623), fol. 205. It appears that some of this was to pay the citizens of Frankenthal who had been paying the English garrison CSPD, 10:527.

162 CSPD, 10:536; CSPV, 18:7.

163 CSPD, 10:516.

164 TNA, SP, 81/28 Articles for delivery of Frankenthal (24/14 April 1623), fol. 203; CSPD, 10:550; 'The Parliamentary Papers of Nicholas Ferrar 1624', in ed. D.R. Ransome, *Camden Society fifth series, Camden Miscellany XXXIII* 7 (Cambridge, 1996), p. 25.

deal with the Austrian Habsburgs who were occupying Bohemia and the upper Palatinate; secondly, it was a diplomatic sidestep to avoid any formal acknowledgement England and Spain had been fighting in the Rhine Palatinate, thus allowing 'peaceful' formal relations to continue; thirdly the sequestered town could be used as a political tool to allow for the long term security of the territory through the marriage of Charles to the Infanta María. In many ways this provides the missing link between two apparently contradictory sides to the King's policies. James's apparent concern for events within the Palatinate, such as the transfer of the Electorate, can be understood in the context of the role of the English garrison at Frankenthal.[165] Indeed this was explained at the time by Nicholas Ferrar in 1623:

> For the Garrisons that wee kept in Heldeberge & [PFrankenthal] were not that wee did rely any thinge uppon their strength butt onely to keepe a footinge till by Compos[it]ion an Honorable end might be made and a rcdelivery of the wholl.[166]

Here Ferrar recognises that even if the two individual towns could have been held longer they could not have been held indefinitely without further assistance. This was acknowledged by those involved but he points out that by holding the town as long as they did, a conclusion was brought about that would enable the political future of the Palatinate to be secured. James too thanked God for the continued resistance of his soldiers.[167] Glyn Redworth's recent account of the Spanish Match has placed some of the events in the German lands within this narrative, but concludes that the submission of Frankenthal to the Archduchess Isabel was a "fate only imperceptibly better than falling to the duke of Bavaria's armies".[168] This seems to miss the subtlety of James's policy and does not recognise the strength of the garrison, the remarkable terms of this sequestration, nor how close to success James's policies came. David Lawrence has praised the actions of the English garrisons but has not realised the broader impact of events in Frankenthal and the other garrison towns.[169] Indeed, a number of contemporary criticisms are often cited to have come from sources with a vested interest in doing so, such as Edward Cecil, who was

165 CSPD, 10:519.
166 'The Parliamentary Papers of Nicholas Ferrar', p. 25.
167 Pursell, 'War or Peace? Jacobean Politics and the Parliament of 1621', p. 162.
168 Redworth, *The prince and the Infanta*, p. 73.
169 Lawrence, *Complete Soldier*, pp. 81–83.

unhappy he had not been placed in command of the expedition. The Venetian ambassador commented that there were a number of other "manufactured inventions to discredit and prevent any good results from the levy [operating in the Palatinate]."[170]

Ultimately, this two-pronged policy was unsuccessful, but this should not take away from how close James's policy came to success. If the Spanish Match had proceeded, the Stuarts would have had a strong position to negotiate a lasting Palatine settlement. This incident is also striking since little of the combat, or indeed negotiations, involved Imperial territories. The battle for the Palatinate was a largely Anglo-Spanish conflict, supported by Mansfeld but under the overall command of Horace Vere. The army Mansfeld and Vere fought against was that of the Ambrogio Spinola, Marquess of Balbases, who was to remain Vere's adversary throughout the remainder of the 1620s and 1630s in the Spanish Netherlands. The sequestration of Frankenthal to the leader of the Spanish Netherlands actually makes sense within this conflict, particularly when combined with James's diplomacy elsewhere. These two sides clearly have to be analysed together for the complete picture to emerge. In December 1623, Frederick wrote to James asking him for assistance because the duke of Bavaria was about to be recognised as an elector of the Empire. However, without the support of the Spanish that would have been achieved by the marriage of Charles and the Infanta, there was little James could do.[171] Nevertheless, this Jacobean diplomacy maintained a legacy even into the 1630s; when in 1632 the Swedish army advanced into the Empire the Infanta wished Charles I to know that:

> she had no desire to give up Frankenthal by force, as a result of which all would be lost, and that she believes that it is by her hand that it should be expected to come, and that she would never relinquish Frankenthal unless it were to restore it to the hands of the King of England.[172]

Unfortunately for the Infanta the successes of the Swedish army ironically supported by Scottish and English soldiers, gave her little choice.

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170 CSPV, 16:314 and 340.

171 Hampshire, Hampshire Archives and Local Studies, 44M69 /G2/499 Copy of the King of Bohemia's letter to the King and other parliamentary papers (30 December 1623).

172 Akkerman, ed. *Correspondence of Elizabeth Stuart. vol. 2*, pp. 18–19.

5 The Impact and Legacy of Frankenthal

The Fairfax brothers, John and William, were just two of the Englishmen to die during the siege of Frankenthal. John had in fact been previously injured, at least once, before finally being killed in action. Although wider casualty statistics remain obscure, these two men's actions give an insight into the most obvious impact of war; the loss of family members. John had written "it pleased God" that he was hit by so "favourable a shot through my arms and made noe entrance into my side but only bruised a ribb that in three weeks was well recovoured."[173] The Fairfax brothers are of particular interest since a memorial within the Dutch church of Frankenthal was constructed for them. When this was unveiled "a great assembly of the people, soldiery, magistrates and burgers" gathered to hear a commemorative sermon delivered by Mr French, William's chaplain."[174] The inscription on the memorial read:

> To the most happy memory of Sir William Fairfax, an Anglo-Briton, son of the highly honoured knight bachelor Sir Thomas Fairfax of Denton in the county of Yorkshire, distinguished leader of the English troops, who, aged about 26, according to very many published testimonies of his completely unconquered spirit, died with his younger brother John during the siege of Frankenthal. John was snatched away after a break-out had been made; William, after being struck by a cannonball.[175]

The respect that the Spanish army which had besieged the town maintained for the English garrison meant that even after they occupied Frankenthal in 1623 the monument was left intact.[176]

The accounts of their deaths are also interesting since they reveal the nature of the siege before the impending relief that would come under

173 BL, Additional Manuscripts 30305 John Fairfax to Sir Thomas Fairfax, Frankenthall (10 September 1621), fol. 33.

174 Johnson, ed. *Fairfax Correspondence, vol. 1*, p. XLIX.

175 Many thanks to Peter Maxwell-Stuart for his assistance in translating this. The original Latin inscription read: In beatissimam memoriam Dom. Generosi Gulielmi Fairfax Anglo-Britanni, Honoratissimi Domini Thomae Fairfax de Denton in Com. Ebor. Equitis Aurati filii, Cohortis Anglicani Ducis insignis; Qui annis natus circiter XXVI. post animi plurima [F] edita testimonia invictissimi, unà cum Joanne fratre suo juniore, in obsidione Francovalenti, hic factâ eruptione arreptus, ille ictu bombardae percussus, occubuere. Anno M.DC.XXI. John Rushworth, *Historical collections*, pp. 155–156.

176 Ibid. See also: Johnson, ed. *Fairfax Correspondence, vol. 1*, pp. XLIX–L.

Vere and Mansfeld.[177] On 5th November just a quarter of an hour before the shutting of the gates for the evening John Fairfax and forty men were in an outwork of Frankenthal when the enemy attacked putting the entire company to the sword except for eight prisoners.[178] Borough himself intervened but was too late to help the company and William Fairfax, having heard of his brother's death, advanced on the enemy's pike formations.[179] At this time he received a blow to his body and after one week, in an attempt to show that he was fit for duty, he returned to the parapets of the town to fire pieces of ordnance. During this he was struck by an enemy shot and the following morning died of his wounds.[180] This account of events came from Borough in a letter written to the men's father but is corroborated by Henry Clifford's account to Thomas Fairfax, the third and surviving brother.[181] This praised him not only for being a "brave captain" but also for being a good and Christian commander.

The impact of the siege on England came through more than just the casualties suffered during its course; it also left a legacy of military pride that was cited throughout the 1620s and 1630s. This legacy aspect clearly informed one part of a wider English military print market which developed a response to the campaigns of the English forces within the Palatinate.[182] The siege was written about by John and William's father, Sir Thomas Fairfax in his 'Highway to Heidelberg' which has been assessed in detail by Philip Major.[183] Whilst the text does not go into details of the death of his sons, as Major notes, it does show how 'early modern military elites sought to influence contemporary affairs.'[184] Within printed newsletters and correspondence Joseph Meade quoted a number of eyewitnesses in a series of newsletters that he wrote to Sir Stuteville, which serve as a further illustration of this.[185] As has become apparent, there are in fact a host of printed pamphlets which relate directly

177 The co-ordination of the two armies is mentioned within: Anon, *A true relation of all such battailes as haue beene fought in the Palatinate*, pp. 2–3.

178 Johnson, ed. *Fairfax Correspondence, vol. 1*.

179 Ibid., p. XLVII.

180 Ibid.

181 Ibid., p. XLIX.

182 Anon, *Gallants to Bohemia, or, L[e]t vs t[o] the warres againe shewing the forwardnesse of our English souldiers, both in times past, and at this present: to a pleasing new warlike tune* (London, 1620?).

183 P. Major, 'Thomas First Lord Fairfax and the Highway to Heidelberg', in ed. M. Woodcock and C. O'Mahony, *Early Modern Military Identities, 1560–1639: Reality and Representation* (Cambridge, 2019), pp. 100–118.

184 Ibid., p. 118.

185 Just one example of many letters is BL, Harley 389 Joseph Meade to Sir M Stuteville (21 February 1621), fol. 21.

or indirectly to the events taking place within Frankenthal.[186] The actions of the English within the Palatinate provoked the production of a body of poetry. One of the earliest was produced by the Scot, Arthur Johnston and was entitled "The Nymph of the Neckar to the Heroes of England."[187] Johnston wrote that the routes to the 'city of the Neckar' [Heidelberg] were "blocked by troops under the Imperial Eagles." In many ways the poem captures the two sides of English involvement in the Palatinate and Frankenthal. Firstly, pride in the actions of those soldiers present:

> There shines the star of Vere, of Oxford also, and not far off the gleam of Essex[188]

Secondly, the hope that these men would be reinforced by further English (or other British) soldiers to liberate the Palatinate from the Spanish army:

> Expectation waits breathless: every sail that comes, our eldest boy cries out "a British sail" and, lo! it is but from our own Palatinate. The season favours. The foe will sullenly break up on the advent of the shadow of Vere. We remember the exploits at Ostend, which was the grave of Europe, those at Nieuport, and the rout of Spain. The name of Essex will strike terror. But, O Heroes! speed is all in all, if ye mean to act and save.[189]

This poem emphasised the importance of having English colonels who were "Worne out their time to reape experience."[190] Since many of the soldiers were levied domestically and then had extra-veterans incorporated this poem

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186 One of the ten published in 1622 alone was: Anon, *The ninth of September. 1622. Count Mansfields proceedings since the last battaile with the great misfortune which hath lately hapned to the Duke of Brunswicke VVith the great victory obtained by the Protestants in France, by those of the Towne of Mompeliers against the Kings forces, who fought to take the towne by treachery, but were most of them put to the sword. Also relating another skirmish, which happened betweene Count Mansfield and Don Cordua in the prouince of Henego, with the great sea fight betweene some of the Hollanders bound for the West Indies meeting with the Spaniards. Likewise a new and great slaughter made vpon Spinola his forces before* [*sic*] *Bergen vp Zome, by those of the towne: with the comming downe of Bethlem Gabors brother, and the Marquis of Iagersdorp into Silesia, to inuade the country. Lastly, the taking in of the citty of Spiers by the Bauarians, with their blocking vp of Heidelburgh, Frankendale, and Mainhem, in the Palatinate* (London, 1622).

187 Johnston and Duguid Geddes, *Musa Latina Aberdoniensis, vol. 1*, p. 77.

188 Ibid., p. 78.

189 Ibid.

190 Captain Robert Markham, *The description, of... Sir Iohn Burgh*, p. 19.

correctly emphasises the highlights of experienced colonels such as John Borough:

> I will not speake of thee in Frankendell,
> When thou wert there a Gouernour, for feare,
> Fame, by whose Charter she is bound to swell,
> Her cheekes with praises of thy vallour there;
> Should take it ill, and infamous because,
> My pen would rob her trumpet of applause.[191]

Another example is from a plate commemorating William Fairfax which also highlights Borough's roll:

> To Frankenthal when a siege Cordoua layde
> Soe was our Britishe King – craft ouerkhauld
> By Gondomer as in it Martir – in ade
> This Cadet; and soe stau'd
> Of all recreuts that Burroughs there commander
> Our glorious Burroughs was compell'd to render[192]

Borough himself would go on to fight in Mansfeld's levy (1624/5) and then in the ill-conceived expedition to La Rochelle (1627 onwards) where he lost his life. The awareness was not limited to an English audience as at least one German print from 1621 illustrated an Englishmen shooting at an Imperial eagle yet despite these images the significance of the role of Borough and others at the siege is only now being fully understood.[193]

Subsequent events, such as the Parliament of 1624 have been viewed as more significant by many historians after the 'debacle' of the 1621 sitting.[194] However, it should be made clear that 1624 developed the engagement of the English Parliament within the Thirty Years' War, but it was 1621 that provided the origins of many of the ideas discussed in the later session.[195] Even the 1624 sitting

191 Ibid., p. 11.

192 Leeds, Leeds University Special Collections, MSLt /q/22 William Fairfax, Autograph notebook (*c.* 1620), fol. 1.

193 Austin (Texas), University of Texas, Harry Ransom Centre Box 6, Item 229 Wachender Adler (1621). This image is reprouduced in J.R. Paas, ed. *The German political broadsheet 1600–1700* 10 vols (Wiesbaden, 1985 onwards), p. 3:413.

194 Cogswell, *The blessed revolution*, p. 310.

195 Cogswell acknowledges this by referring to 1621 throughout his monograph on the period of 1621–1624: ibid.

did not provide enough supply to fully cover the costs of a continental war on the scale put before the Parliament of 1621.[196] 1621 was also more significant because there were already English troops in the field when Parliament sat, whereas by 1624 the Commons was debating re-engagement rather than providing assistance for an existing military cause. From the supply given in 1624 James I committed himself to raising four regiments each of 1,500 men (totalling 6,000) to be placed under the command of the earls of Essex, Oxford and Southampton. As noted previously, on the surface the purpose of these levies was the defence of the Palatinate, and indeed all the official documentation describes them in such terms.[197] The reality is they marked a return to a Dutch focus by boosting English military strength within the Low Countries rather than fighting to recapture the Palatinate.[198]

Although Vere's forces had the greatest impact there were other English soldiers associated with various levies to aid them. In July 1621 Mansfeld had a force of around 20,000 men in the field and soon looked to improve this with support from Britain.[199] As has already been discussed earlier in this chapter, this army was under the command of Horace Vere and closely involved in supporting the English garrisons in both 1621 and 1622 and received money and men from the Stuart crown. Its role in assisting the garrisons was initially important but by January 1623 a deputy of Mansfeld expressed, in a letter, that despite a desire to once again relieve the siege of Frankenthal, he lamented that at present the army was not strong enough to do so.[200] Even before official support began it is clear that some English troops transferred into his command as Fairfax complained in July 1621 that "men dayly are taken us for Count Mansfield both hourse and foote."[201] The latter 1624/1625 Mansfeld levy saw a further 8000 to 9000 Englishmen join and fight under the command of Sir Charles Rich, Sir John Borough and Lord Cromwell.[202] Moreover, English engagement in The Dutch Republic, the Palatinate, Denmark-Norway

196 Ibid., p. 311.

197 BL, Additional Manuscripts 46188 Papers related to regiments raised to assist the Palatinate (1624), fols. 28–33.

198 See the data in this chapter 2.

199 Hatfield, Hatfield House, the Cecil Papers, CP 130/41 Sir George Calvert to [the Earl of Salisbury] (26 July 1621).

200 TNA, SP, 9/201/8 Intercepted letters: Proposition of Captain Ferenty, deputy of Count Mansfeld. The Hague. Copy of letter from Father Jacinto, a Capuchin, to Count Mansfeld (15/25 January 1622).

201 BL, Additional Manuscripts 30305 John Fairfax to Sir Thomas Fairfax, Frankenthall (17 July 1621), fol. 31.

202 Murdoch, 'Introduction', p. 19.

and elsewhere were not standalone episodes, but require an holistic overview across several chapters.

6 Conclusion

It is remarkable that so many histories have either condemned or overlooked events in the Palatinate without appreciation of their wider significance to either the English military or the Spanish Match. Despite the clear financial and political problems, the English military distinguished itself well in the Palatinate and in turn this demonstrably impacted on European diplomacy. The defence of Mannheim and Frankenthal were impressive military feats and even they were defeats they do deserve more praise than they attract. Manning for example, after spending a page criticising the activities of the English soldiers, comments on their successes in just a couple of sentences.[203] These events fit within the conflict across the Empire, such as the movements of Tilly and the attempted defence by Palatine forces of Wimpfen in May 1622.[204] Though this chapter has not provided a detailed military account of these other actions which contributed towards the defence of the Palatinate it is clear that the English soldiers made a significant contribution. The most obvious indication of this is that Vere was appointed to overall command of the entire campaign and it was English forces that defended the most important locations, such as Heidelberg and Frankenthal.

Before assessing Charles's actions in the following chapters, it is clear that a few words must be said on the concluding months of James I's reign. As has been made clear it does not seem to be the case that James was a peacemaker at the expense of having a successful foreign policy.[205] It seems that to understand James I it must be remembered that he was not a new and untested King when he acquired the English throne and his previous actions in Scotland continued to influence his decision making.[206] He was perfectly capable of commanding armies, yet he is often portrayed as being either cowardly or a

203 Manning, *An apprenticeship in arms*, pp. 101–102.

204 Eggenberger, *A Dictionary of Battles*.

205 Cogswell stated "Englishmen soon discovered that in 1603–4 James was responding not so much to particular events as to a general aversion to war." Cogswell, *The blessed revolution*, p. 13.

206 J. Wormald, 'James VI and I: Two Kings or One?', *History*, 68.223 (1983), p. 192. An example of a recent biography that combines these is: Croft, *King James*.

peacemaker.[207] Certainly, Murdoch has effectively argued that James was not a coward and it is difficult to connect the peace-making side with the King who put troops in the field during the Jülich-Cleves crisis, the Kalmar War and then the Thirty Years' War with little hesitation. It is certainly unconvincing to state that he was a pacifist as a reaction to his violent Scottish background.[208] He was not a 'warrior king' in the mediaeval sense and clearly desired to restore Christendom to peace but he was not willing to do so at the expense of either his dynasty or his faith. The existence of letters to the Papacy hoping to fix the rift that had developed within Christendom does not counteract the commitments he made to the war that took place across Europe.[209] Indeed, his use of discreet military power seems more understandable within the context of his diplomatic attempts to balance Britain's European allegiances. It is therefore important to emphasise that although James may have found peace intellectually attractive this as many historians have pointed out, did not stop him engaging in war where necessary.[210] Bruce Lenman emphasised that James was "European by education and almost totally European in outlook" and this is important to understanding his desire to create peace there.[211] The title of *rex pacficus* does not, therefore, mean James did not engage with the Thirty Years' War but that he wished to end the conflict though crucially not at any cost and if necessary he would field troops where required.

James was not the first monarch of England to utilise peace as a strategy to achieve his objectives. Almost exactly a century before, Henry VIII and Wolsey had created the Treaty of London as an international peace treaty and used it to push forward England's agenda.[212] James was obviously intellectually committed to universal peace in a way that Henry was not but the comparison does serve as a reminder to use such titles with caution. Elizabeth I's support of the

207 For a discussion of his military career see: Murdoch, 'Scottish-British Military Identity', p. 8. White discusses Jacobean 'pacifism': White, 'Your Grievances are Ours', p. 15 and 276. A host of historians describe James as 'pacific'; just one is: Pursell, *The Winter King*, p. 7 and 169.

208 Reeve, *Charles I*, p. 9. Christof Ginzel has argued that James had 'no enthusiasm' for the Palatinate and opposed Frederick's actions: C. Ginzel, *Poetry, politics and promises of Empire: prophetic rhetoric in the English and neo-Latin epithalamia on the occasion of the Palatine Marriage in 1613* (Göttingen, 2009), p. 322.

209 Akrigg, ed. *Letters of James VI & I*, pp. 383–385.

210 For an analysis of James's attraction to concepts of universal peace see: Cogswell, *The blessed revolution*, p. 13; W.B. Patterson, *King James VI and I and the reunion of Christendom* (Cambridge, 1997).

211 B. Lenman, *England's colonial wars 1550–1688: conflicts, empire and national identity* (Harlow, 2001), p. 285.

212 J.A. Guy, *Tudor England* (Oxford, 1988), pp. 105–106.

Dutch and French Protestants can be seen not as a radical break but as Trim has argued part of securing the rights of Protestantism.[213] Although Elizabeth overtly entered war with Spain there are again similarities between her and James's desire to use diplomacy if possible. In the end James took this policy further by continuing diplomatic negotiations after entering the war on the continent.[214] This was most starkly illustrated at Frankenthal where the two sides of his policy, military and diplomatic, combined as he used an English garrison to attempt to protect the long term security of the Palatinate through marriage. Indeed, if James had supported his previous public condemnation of Frederick and Elizabeth for accepting the throne of Bohemia he would not have allowed his ambassadors and courtly servants to describe them as King and Queen of Bohemia.[215] Since war was considered to be the normal way of settling international disputes throughout this period, James's relatively enlightened position deserves a degree of praise that it has not always attracted.[216]

This chapter has sought to illustrate the nature of English (and to a lesser extent wider British) intervention in the Palatinate and Bohemia. The Stuart monarchy discreetly provided military assistance to help the dynasty and Protestantism within the German lands. As Murdoch has pointed out James actually committed *c.* 25,500 British soldiers between 1620 and March 1625, which was around 4,000 soldiers more than Christian IV of Denmark-Norway and Gustav II Adolf of Sweden combined offered to the cause.[217] It is, therefore, remarkable that both of these nations are well established within the canon of Thirty Years' War historiography, yet England is not. Ultimately, the discreet nature of this intervention became a sticking point with the English Parliament and further support was not forthcoming, but this did not mean no assistance was sent, or that England was not a part of the opening blows of the

213 For more details see: Trim, 'The "secret war" of Elizabeth', pp. 189–199; Trim, 'Seeking a Protestant Alliance and Liberty of Conscience on the Continent, 1558–1585', pp. 139–177.

214 The following letter clearly illustrates James's ongoing negotiations throughout 1619 as he was preparing to send troops to the Palatinate. London, The British Library, Eggerton 2592 Minute of a letter of Lord Digby to Cottingham (20 August 1619), fols. 262–262v.

215 Just two examples are A. Duncan, ed. *The Diplomatic Correspondence of Sir James Spens of Wormiston* (Uppsala University Library, E379d Unpublished Manuscript ND), p. 179; TNA, SP, 84/108 Lord Cranfield to Sir Dudley Carleton (1 August 1622), fol. 4.

216 Manning states that this was the case until 1914. Manning, *Swordsmen*, p. 1.

217 Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway*, pp. 62–62. Upon his death there were negotiations in place to commit a further 12,000 foot and 1,000 horse for "the service of the Palatinate" and 100 ships of war. Hampshire, Hampshire Archives and Local Studies, 44M69 /G2/509 Note by Sir Thomas Jervoise of the treaty or league between England, France, Venice and Savoy for the defence of the Palatinate (1625).

Thirty Years' War. British troops comprised around one quarter of the Palatine army and combined with the performance of the English garrisons they were far from being the "token force" that many have asserted them to be.[218]

Some contemporaries were aware of James's policies, though the covert nature of them appears to have resulted more commonly in confusion and anger (as was revealed by the reaction of Parliament). Thomas Gataker criticised any form of a middle way in English policy and demanded overt war.[219] In June 1625 the Venetian ambassador described Horace Vere's levy stating: "His Majesty encourages and *covertly* assists this levy."[220] One month later he wrote that James hoped that by blending a "desire for peace" with "rigour and resolution" a solution could be found.[221] By 1624/1625 James was pursuing a range of policies across Europe with negotiations taking place from the Scandinavian powers of the North to Transylvania.[222] Such breadth and scope was complex and certainly not a policy that was easy to sell to English public opinion which was clearly turning on James by the time of his death. Ultimately it is important that history does not just focus on successful foreign policy, and the apparent failure of these policies on the death of James should not diminish from their significance. On his succession Charles I attempted to continue some of these policies whilst overtly entering the conflict in ways he saw as appropriate, but which were ultimately inefficient and unsuccessful. The reality was that foreign policy had become such an intricate web of overlapping and apparently contradictory strategies that without James guiding them it soon past from complex but complementary to outright overreach.

218 Miller, *Sir Richard Grenville*, p. 10.

219 Thomas Gataker, *A sparke tovvard the kindling of sorrow for Sion*, p. 10; Salzman, *Reading 1621*, p. 53.

220 CSPV, 16:291. (my italics).

221 Ibid., p. 16:309.

222 Eperjesi, *English-Transylvanian contacts in the 17th century*, p. 26 and 51. These had been ongoing since Thomas Roe's arrival in Constantinople in 1621 but appear to have developed towards a policy of joint war on the Habsburgs from 1623 onwards. Charles also developed relations with Bethlen and was still encouraging a Swedish-Transylvanian alliance in 1629.

CHAPTER 4

Kejserkrig: The Northern Family Enters the Fray (1625–1629)

> …above all others our deare vncle the most illustrious Kinge, the Kinge of Denmark, who hath in his owne person embarqued himself in the sayd quarrell, whom in honor and reason of State we may not discarde, but by the advise of our Coimcell are resolued to assist him presentlye with men and monye, we evidently foreseinge the otherwise our comon enemye, will in an instant become Master of all Germanye.[1]

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Denmark's role in the Thirty Years' War has a controversial historiography.[2] The characterisation of this period as an operatic 'intermezzo' that occurred between the dramatic opening of the Thirty Years' War and the spectacular arrival of the Swedes during the early 1630s hides the period's true importance within the conflict.[3] Indeed, Danish historians refer to the period as *kejserkrig*, as have some Scottish historians, which seems to be a more neutral term and therefore one that will be used in this chapter.[4] Christian IV was not only a Danish King but also a German prince. His German interests inside the Holy Roman Empire were dominated by his desire to increase his political prestige within the Empire at the expense of the Hanse towns.[5] First and foremost it must be remembered that during Christian's reign his

1 Hull C/BR/B3 Minutes of the formal Meetings of the Mayor and Alderman, Bench Book vol. 5 (1609–1650), fol. 157.

2 For a comparison of the Danish *Kejserkrig* with the Palatinate campaigns see: Marks, 'Recognising Friends from Foes', pp. 173–185.

3 P.H. Wilson, 'The Causes of the Thirty Years War 1618–48', *English Historical Review*, CXXIII.502 (2008), p. 558; E.L. Petersen, 'The Danish intermezzo', in ed. G. Parker, *The Thirty Years' War* (London, 1997), pp. 64–74.

4 Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway*, p. 202.

5 P.D. Lockhart, 'Denmark and the Empire: A Reassessment of Danish Foreign Policy under King Christian IV', *Scandinavian Studies*, 64.3 (1992), p. 392 and 402.

 | DOI:10.1163/9789004522695_006

dominant concern was not German affairs but the growth of Swedish power and many of his policies reflected this.[6] This does not mean that he viewed the Empire as a side issue, but it does place into context the actions of Denmark and Sweden since neither wished to be placed in a vulnerable position vis-à-vis each other and hence always viewed the German lands through a Scandinavian prism. Due to this, during the early seventeenth century, the cries of international Protestantism had less attraction to Christian than would be assumed. However, increased Jesuit activity within his territories, contributed to his growing interest in Protestant intervention to curb growing Catholic power.[7]

The aims of the Stuart monarchy itself have been discussed elsewhere within this monograph but it is important to remember here that James had always hoped to include Denmark-Norway and Sweden within any broad alliance.[8] Such a policy was clearly ambitious considering the ongoing tensions between the two countries. Christian's actions were constrained because he required the approval of the Council of the Realm to engage in war and they constantly refused in 1625 to support any plans that he submitted.[9] When he finally entered the Thirty Years' War he did so as part of a coalition and participated as a German prince not King of Denmark, forcing his nobles into reluctant action.[10] It is, of course, important to note that in the same year Charles I signed the Treaty of Southampton with the Dutch underlining Britain's ongoing commitment to the security of the Republic. This treaty from the perspective of Charles did not reduce his commitment to his Danish uncle, however, the reality of trying to support multiple campaigns increasingly became an issue as time progressed.[11] The English dimension of the Danish campaign has received some limited scholarly attention but this has not engaged adequately with the actual levies nor has it appreciated either the wider English context in the Dutch Republic or the wider British context exemplified by figures such as Sir Robert Anstruther.[12]

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6 Ibid., p. 390.

7 Ibid., p. 406.

8 Mortimer, *Wallenstein*, pp. 74–75. In 1625 both Denmark and Sweden were still being discussed: Den Haag, Nationaal Archief, 1.01.02 5889.264 Letter for the Deputies of the States General (1625).

9 Lockhart, 'Denmark and the Empire', p. 408.

10 Petersen, 'The Danish intermezzo', p. 67.

11 This point has also been made in: Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway*, p. 66.

12 One example of such work is M. Strachan, *Sir Thomas Roe, 1581–1644: a life* (Salisbury, 1989).

The origins of the historical analysis of these events are found within the work of E. A. Beller in the early twentieth century.[13] Though Beller's work undoubtedly has some importance, it also has significant failings within the context of the wider British commitments to the continent and within the details of the levying of Morgan's army (which this chapter will address). Notably, Beller stated that Charles Morgan's English expedition was "the only military assistance given by Charles to Christian of Denmark."[14] The work by Steve Murdoch, in particular, on Stuart-Oldenburg relations has gone some way to redressing this by providing an in-depth analysis of the Scottish soldiers deployed into Christian's armies.[15] This chapter will build upon this work, adding significantly to it by re-assessing the detail of England's role within this alliance since Murdoch's work was focused, correctly, on addressing much larger historiographical failures.

The role of British troops in the Danish army was of great significance.[16] These men were given the title of 'hjælpetropper' or helptroops rather than hired troops illustrating the importance of the alliance between these nations and the difference between them and the soldiers levied from other nations.[17] Boris Porshnev and Paul Dukes have gone further, arguing that the entire 'Danish period' of the Thirty Years' War would not have been possible without the assistance of Britain.[18] Since the Union of Crowns, England had played an increasingly important role in Stuart-Oldenburg relations. In 1612 there was an active recruitment drive to persuade Englishmen to enter Danish service which resulted in the levying of 4,000 to 6,000 men under Lords Willoughby and Dingwall.[19] This culminated in the Kalmar War (1611–1613) when English

13 E.A. Beller, 'The Military Expedition of Sir Charles Morgan to Germany, 1627–9', *English Historical Review*, 53 (1928), p. 531.

14 Ibid., p. 539.

15 S. Murdoch, 'Scotland, Denmark-Norway and the House of Stuart, 1603–1660: a Diplomatic and Military Analysis' (PhD., University of Aberdeen, 1998); Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway*; Murdoch, 'Scotsmen on the Danish-Norwegian Frontiers, *c*. 1580–1680', pp. 1–28; Murdoch, 'Anstruther, Sir Robert (1578–1644/5?)'. Before Murdoch the only research on this field was J.A. Fallon, 'Scottish Mercenaries in the Service of Denmark and Sweden, 1626–1632' (PhD., University of Glasgow, 1972).

16 Lockhart, *Denmark in the Thirty Years' War*, p. 91.

17 One example can be found: KCFB, 2:230–233. See Murdoch, 'Introduction', p. 15 for a further discussion of this. This is incorrectly described as applying to Scottish not British troops in A.I. Macinnes, *The British Revolution, 1629–1660* (Basingstoke, 2005), p. 53.

18 B.F. Porshnev and P. Dukes, *Muscovy and Sweden in the Thirty Years' War, 1630–1635* (Cambridge, 1995), p. 36.

19 Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway*, p. 40 and 190.

soldiers outnumbered their Scottish counterparts by six to one.[20] The relationship between the Stuart monarchy and Denmark was a familial one and this was clearly acknowledged during the recruitment of Englishmen to serve within the Danish army. This dimension had been previously displayed during the Kalmar War, and was again in the reign of Charles I. This was evident in many ways such as in the commissions for service issued within the county of Norfolk.[21]

Moreover, Christian needed such men since Denmark's military resources were limited and comprised of a noble levy or *rostjeneste* (a relic of feudal administration). This meant that a fresh levy was required to create an army for each conflict Christian intervened in.[22] His intervention in the Empire in the late 1620s was no different and made the supply of troops by Charles I all the more important. Denmark-Norway, the Dutch Republic and Britain signed their treaty on 28th November 1625 and the terms committed Charles to providing soldiers and financial assistance to his uncle.[23] Before discussing the main focus of English engagement under Charles Morgan it is worth emphasising that these were not the only English troops within the Danish establishment. In 1625 the Danish Army in Holstein comprised of 12,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry, which was supplemented by the army of Mansfeld which contained between 4,000 and 6,000 English and Scottish survivors of the 1624 levy.[24] The scale of militarisation that followed is remarkable and from 1626 onwards Christian had an army of between 30,000 and 50,000 men under his command.[25] Mansfeld's forces suffered losses during 1625 and Charles emphasised to Buckingham that "without instant help, [Mansfeld] dissolves to nothing."[26] Christian IV wrote to Mansfeld suggesting that his soldiers be delivered to the Danish crown and that Mansfeld should travel to England to recruit more soldiers in a bid to stave off disaster.[27] Despite its shortcomings this was the beginning of a larger commitment and Mansfeld successfully increased the size of his force to between 12,000 and 14,000 men by 1626 though this did little to prevent his defeat at Dessau Bridge.[28] This inauspi-

20 Ibid., p. 200.
21 Rye and Firth, eds., *SP Musters in Norfolk*, p. 36.
22 Lockhart, 'Denmark and the Empire', p. 397. For a more detailed analysis of this and the other systems used to levy armies in Scandinavia see Frost, *Northern Wars*, pp. 139–141.
23 KCFB, 8:69.
24 Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway*, p. 202.
25 Ibid., p. 203.
26 Petrie, ed. *The Letters of Charles I*, p. 42.
27 KCFB, 8:76.
28 Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway*, p. 203.

cious start was indicative of what was to come over the next few years whilst Charles failed to manage his military commitments in Denmark, Cadiz and La Rochelle. It was the impact of Cadiz and La Rochelle that was to prove decisive during the early attempts to levy soldiers for Danish service.

1 Competition with Kejserkrig: The Scale of Stuart Commitments to Cadiz and La Rochelle (1625–1629)

Cadiz, it must be remembered, was not an independent Stuart action (like La Rochelle) but one conducted within a wider Stuart-Dutch alliance and co-ordinated with the States General.[29] This in part explains the presence of members of the Anglo-Dutch brigade such as John Borough in the campaign.[30] Though it is clear both were diversions from the conflict in the Low Countries and the German lands, Cadiz in particular was an attack on Habsburg power, albeit an unsuccessful and poorly organised one. Therefore, the campaign did fit within the broad war aims of Charles and so to describe the attack as "a narcissistic war he [Charles] had engineered with Spain" seems unfair.[31] Although there are a lot of legitimate criticisms of the conduct of foreign policy under Charles it must also be emphasised that the circumstances he was confronted by in 1625 were very different to those James had faced in 1618. Not only had the Palatinate already been lost but domestic tensions had also increased. The extensive work by many historians, notably Thomas Cogswell, on the role and public persona of the Duke of Buckingham means it is unnecessary to delve into the fractious disagreements between Buckingham and Parliament.[32] However, these clearly gave Charles a series of new challenges throughout the late 1620s which required careful handling. Unfortunately, Charles failed to tackle these and his foreign policy became increasingly complex, and unwieldy.

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29 For one example of this see: NA, 1.01.02 5889.30 Letter from the Duke of Buckingham, Earl of Holland and Dudley Carleton (13 February 1626). For recent work on the costs of billeting soldiers for the two expeditions see: G.S. Stivers, '"A Most Grievous and Insupportable Vexation": Billeting in Early Seventeenth Century England' (PhD., University of California (Riverside), 2009), pp. 486–493.

30 NA, 1.01.02 5889.214 List of Officers released to England from service of the States General for service under Charles I (21 November 1626).

31 Redworth, *The prince and the Infanta*, p. 140.

32 T. Cogswell, 'The peoples' love: The Duke of Buckingham and popularity', in ed. T. Cogswell, R. Cust, and P. Lake, *Politics, religion, and popularity in early Stuart Britain: essays in honour of Conrad Russell* (Cambridge, 2002), pp. 211–234.

Although this will not be a rigorous examination of the campaign it is necessary to provide a basic analysis within this context since it affected the English contribution to Denmark.[33] The Cadiz mission has also, in the past, formed the backbone of the very limited analysis of England's engagement with continental warfare in this period.[34] Around 10,000 soldiers and 5,000 sailors were levied from across the Stuart Kingdoms. Many of these were levied from across England, for example 400 came from Norfolk who then met with other soldiers from the levy in Plymouth.[35] The levies actually came from a host of counties as one of the instructions issued by the Privy Council illustrates:

It is clear that this is not a complete list as the 400 soldiers from Norfolk are not included. Many of these men were untrained since the terms for levying specifically forbade the recruitment from the trained bands:

> we have therefore thought good to pray and require your Lordshipp that above all things therbe speciall care had in the choyce of the men that they bee of able bodies and years fitt for this imployment but none of them taken out of the trayned bandes which you are still to keepe entyre.[36]

There were associated costs and wages for their journey to Plymouth of 290*l.* before the troops had even left England's shoreline.[37] A number of disturbances were caused by the earlier levy of troops on behalf of Mansfeld when they had convened in Dover and a number of proclamations were issued to prevent such activities from being repeated.[38] However, when the troops arrived in Plymouth the town's *Black Book* noted that the King and his court inspected the men:

> This Year Kinge Charles came with his whole Courte to Plymouth and remained here tenne days to giue his fleet, that consisted of 120 sailes and his army of 6,000 men, boath under the command of Lord Cecil, Vicounte Wimbleton their dispatch for Cales in Spayne, which they invaded.[39]

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33 Lockhart, *Denmark in the Thirty Years' War*, pp. 137–138 and 143.

34 Sharpe, *The Personal Rule*, pp. 1–62; M.C. Fissel, 'English Amphibious Warfare, 1587–1656: Galleons, Galleys, Longboats and Cots.', in ed. M.C. Fissel and D.J.B. Trim, *Amphibious warfare 1000–1700: commerce, state formation and European expansion* (Leiden, 2006), p. 243.

35 Fissel, *English warfare*, pp. 257–269; Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway*, p. 66; Rye and Firth, eds., *SP Musters in Norfolk*, p. 58. See also: John Rushworth, *Historical collections*, p. 172; APC, 40:136.

36 APC, 40:135–136.

37 Rye and Firth, eds., *SP Musters in Norfolk*, p. 60.

38 John Rushworth, *Historical collections*, p. 172.

39 Plymouth and West Devon Record Office 1/46 Plymouth Borough records: The Black Book (15th–18th century).

Details of this visit were also included in the *Widey Court Book* of the Plymouth council which noted the costs of cleaning the town and paying for the re-trimming of the recorder's scarlet gown which were required for the King's visit.[40] The departure of the fleet was delayed and by the time it finally sailed into the North Atlantic from Plymouth the hurricane season had commenced causing damage to a number of ships.[41] Whilst these ships sailed into the eye of the storm Christian awaited relief but it was not to come.

The next campaigns that caused a diversion of resources from the *Kejserkrig* were those related to the La Rochelle expeditions. In 1628 the troops for La Rochelle departed from Portsmouth in what appears to have been part of a desire to reduce the impact on individual ports.[42] It is clear that the passage of a levy through a port was unpopular since in 1628 Plymouth council records contain an order to prevent soldiers from La Rochelle landing there.[43] In March 1627, shortly before their departure, thirty-six companies (of which many were survivors of the Cadiz campaigns), were re-organised into forty companies within five regiments under the commands of John Borough, Charles Rich, Edward Conway, Alexander Brett and William Courtney.[44] By the 28th May this had increased to seven regiments with Sir Thomas Thornton and Sir Henry Sprie joining the other five colonels.[45] It is worth noting that a significant number of these soldiers were Irish:

> Whereas it is his Majesty's pleasure that twentie companies of soldyors, conteyning a hundreth in each companie (officers and all), shalbe transported out of Ireland to attende his Majesty's armie with all expedition; it is ordered that the troupes retourned from Cales and remayning in that kingdome shall make up tenne of those companies, and if the number of any of the saide captaines be not full the same shalbe supplyed with other sufficient men there of either nation, and that the other ten companies shalbe all Irish voluntaries.[46]

40 Plymouth, Plymouth and West Devon Record Office, 1/132 Plymouth Borough records: The Widey Court Book (15th–18th century), fols. 203–205.

41 Manning, *An apprenticeship in arms*, p. 112.

42 London, The British Library, Additional Manuscripts 34712 Privy Council to the Deputy Lieutenants of Suffolk (18 July 1628), fol. 200.

43 Plymouth and West Devon Record Office 1/132 Plymouth Borough records: The Widey Court Book (15th–18th century), fols. 218–220.

44 APC, 42:187–190.

45 Ibid., pp. 42:299–300.

46 Ibid., p. 42:294.

Not only was Charles causing a recruiting competition between Denmark, Cadiz and La Rochelle but also it seems that at least some of the English officers in Dutch service also continued to recruit.[47] Despite this, the Danish campaign was certainly given priority over some of England's other military commitments. Both Dutch and Swedish levies were in theory postponed until the completion of England's obligations to Christian.[48] This series of concurrent demands meant Charles was bound to increase demand for both men and supplies as is revealed from an early stage. On 27th March, a letter to the earl of Totnes (Master of the Ordinance) showed that supplies were being sent to colonel John Borough.[49] On the very same day a further request read:

> we have thought requisite that the recrutes to be sent for the service of the king of Denmarke, being 3000, should be furnished with swords, girdles and hangers or belts; theise are therfore to pray and require your Lordshipp, etc. to give speedie and effectuall order to the officers of the Ordinance and Armorie forthwith to cause the same, or soe many as may well bee spared, to be furnished out of his Majestie's stores and the rest of them by such other way.[50]

The Royal Armoury was therefore under considerable pressure to supply these men and crucially, unlike the Mansfeld levy or the previous English military commitments in the Palatinate, any deficiency could not simply be covered from within the Dutch Republic since all these soldiers were being despatched straight to the German lands, France and Spain.[51] This is the background to the English levy for Denmark, an undertaking impossible to understand without knowledge of these events.

2 The Levy of Charles Morgan (1625)

Charles I, in June 1625, agreed to give a substantial contribution towards the costs of his uncle's war and committed to supplying 6,000 infantry and

47 Ibid., p. 42:182.
48 Ibid., pp. 42:182–183.
49 Ibid., pp. 42:162–163.
50 Ibid., p. 42:163.
51 In the Danish case they were to meet with some English soldiers removed from Dutch service but many were shipped directly: Hatfield, CP 131/2 The King to the Earl of Salisbury (9 February 1626/27).

1,000 horse alongside a monthly payment of a staggering 30,000*l*.[52] However, as with the previous levies to the Palatinate and Dutch Republic the relationship between the King and Parliament had an influence on events. In 1626 Gustav II Adolf and Axel Oxenstierna noted that Charles I needed to settle his differences with Parliament in order to secure the funding required to intervene in Denmark.[53] The lack of an agreement from Parliament to fund this venture in August 1625 meant that two free subsidies from the city of London (without condition) were issued until the House of Commons provided further funds.[54] This is an excellent illustration of the ongoing support that intervention on the continent received inside England. Money was also levied from the sale of crown lands rather than Parliamentary subsidy.[55] The Danes were keenly aware of the scale of Stuart commitments elsewhere and the problems between Charles and the House of Commons which they closely followed.[56] The problem with this commitment was that it was based on an assumption that Parliament would eventually support the policy and provide the necessary financial backing whereas in reality neither of the two Parliaments called was willing to do so.[57] Despite these difficulties the first British troops to arrive were a company of 500 men which entered Danish service three days before the battle of Lutter-am-Barenberge (27 August 1626) just too late for them to play a role in the Danish defeat.[58] Unlike in earlier campaigns, such as the Palatinate where a small professional force acquitted itself well before ultimately being overcome by a vastly larger enemy, the Danish levy suffered from defeats and setbacks throughout its existence, and consequently has been marginalised by historians.

As already shown, the Danish situation was aggravated by Charles's commitments to the Dutch Republic and Cadiz but it was also hampered by ineffective decision making by Charles.[59] One example of this is the appointment of a commander for the English troops. Initially the post was offered to Lord

52 Copenhagen, Statens Arkiver Rigsarkivet, TKUA, 63-3 Charles I to Christian IV (11 October 1627); Copenhagen, Statens Arkiver Rigsarkivet, TKUA, 63-3 Charles I to Christian IV concerning the levying of 6000 soldiers (24 October 1627); Beller, 'Sir Charles Morgan to Germany', p. 528.

53 Grosjean, *Unofficial Alliance*, p. 52.

54 Razzell, ed. *The English Civil War, Vol. 1*, p. 44.

55 Ibid., p. 109.

56 Copenhagen, Statens Arkiver Rigsarkivet, TKUA, 63–49 and 63–50 Optegnelser om Parlamentsforhandlingerne (1626).

57 Beller, 'Sir Charles Morgan to Germany', p. 528; Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway*, p. 69 and 88.

58 Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway*, p. 203.

59 Ibid., pp. 66–67.

Willoughby, who had just returned from his failed expedition against the port of Cadiz, but he perhaps wisely turned this down.[60] Following this there was an expectation that command would fall to Edward Cecil (Lord Wimbledon) but it was instead offered to a Welshmen, Sir Charles Morgan.[61] This caused a degree of tension, and the earl of Essex was offended when Morgan was appointed and so resigned his commission.[62] Morgan had considerable military experience having served almost continually in the Dutch Republic since 1596.[63] Indeed, in October 1626, it had been proposed that Horace Vere take command illustrating that at least at this point military experience and capability trumped political patronage.[64]

Four regiments of English soldiers from the Dutch army were destined for Danish service and departed in February 1627.[65] Further commissions of around 3000 English soldiers were subsequently to be sent "to the ports of London, Harwich and Hull, from whence they are shortly to be transported to the towne of Stode in Germany, for the service of the King of Denmarke."[66] The correspondence of Robert Anstruther and Edward Conway confirms that these two forces were then to combine under Morgan as an English army.[67] This contingent is an interesting case since it is possible to reconstruct the details of the shipment that sailed from Hull through to its arrival in the Germany. Such an analysis also provides a further example of the poor organisation which ultimately contributed to the outright failure on the part of the English and indeed wider British participation in Danish service.

The practicalities of transporting the levy commenced on the 28th February when the lords of the council ordered the mayor and aldermen of Hull to provide shipping for moving 1,350 soldiers to the German lands.[68] Crucially, this was not just for soldiers but also to supply victuals and two ships of war as an escort.[69] On 7th March Philipp Burlamachi released money for this purpose to the council

60 A. Thrush, 'Bertie, Robert, first earl of Lindsey (1582–1642)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, (2007).

61 E.M. Furgol, 'Morgan, Sir Charles (1575/6–1643)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, (2008); Beller, 'Sir Charles Morgan to Germany', p. 529.

62 Razzell, ed. *The English Civil War, Vol. 1*, p. 109.

63 Furgol, 'Morgan, Sir Charles'.

64 Razzell, ed. *The English Civil War, Vol. 1*, p. 102.

65 Hatfield, CP 131/2 The King to the Earl of Salisbury (9 February 1626/27); KCFB, 2:44.

66 APC, 42:180.

67 TNA, SP, 75/8 (Conway) to Anstruther (21 February 1627), fols. 10–11.

68 Hull, Hull History Centre, C/BR/L221 The Lords of the Council to the Mayor and Mr Lister and Mr Wright, Customers (28 February 1626/1627).

69 Hull C/BR/B3 Minutes of the formal Meetings of the Mayor and Alderman, Bench Book vol. 5 (1609–1650), fol. 161 and 166.

of Hull but such payments were not as prompt in subsequent years as a host of further claims for unpaid debts attest.[70] The finances for the regiments wereco-ordinated by Philip Burlamachi and Julian Calandrini from the spring of 1627 until their return to Dutch service.[71] Again this illustrates the regiment's connection with the Dutch Republic since both of these financiers were based there. Captain Conyngesby was commissioned to take command of the 1,350 foot who had been levied and were to be taken to Hull and then on to "be delivered over to Sir Charles Morgan knight" and afterwards he himself was "to followe such directions as you shall receive from Sir Robert Anstruther."[72] The role of the diplomatic corps in the Dutch Republic and the various German territories, notably Anstruther, Conway and Carleton, becomes clear within the correspondence generated from the levy.[73] In February 1627, Charles first wrote to Christian concerning the earl of Nithsdale, who was responsible for the Scottish contingent, and then in May concerning Morgan's levy of English soldiers.[74] This is perhaps illustrative of the relative importance of the two levies since Nithsdale's levy was clearly larger.[75] There has already been a thorough analysis of this levy undertaken elsewhere enabling this chapter to focus on the English levies.[76]

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70 Hull, Hull History Centre, C/BR/L223 Philipp Burlamache to the Mayor and Mr Lister and Mr Wright, Customers (7 March 1626/1627). For further details of later payments and claims see: Hull C/BR/B3 Minutes of the formal Meetings of the Mayor and Alderman, Bench Book vol. 5 (1609–1650), fols. 164 and 180–182. Burlamachi had been involved in England's financial arrangements during both Cadiz, La Rochelle amongst others: London, The National Archives, Records of the Auditors of the Imprest, Commissioners of Audit, Exchequer and Audit Department, National Audit Office and related bodies, 1/5/4 Burlimache, Agent to pay monies on account of the Elector Palatine and the Queen of Bohemis; expenses of the Army in Germany; ambassadorial services in Denmark, France, and Germany (1628–1632); Parrott, *The Business of War*, p. 228. Burlamachi's involvement in the levies finances spanned its entire existence and ultimately resulted in the financer going bankrupt: A.V. Judges, 'Philip Burlamachi: A Financier of the Thirty Years' War', *Economica*, 18 (1926), pp. 296–299.

71 Grell, *Brethren in Christ: a Calvinist network in Reformation Europe*, p. 112.

72 Ibid.

73 See primarily TNA, SP, 75/8 State Papers Foreign, Denmark (1627). There are also useful records within: Copenhagen, Statens Arkiver Rigsarkivet, TKUA, 63-7 Letter from Dudley Carelton (3 April 1628); Den Haag, Nationaal Archief, 1.01.02 5890 Stukken betreffende Engeland (1627–1628).

74 Copenhagen, Statens Arkiver Rigsarkivet, TKUA, 63-3 Charles I to Christian IV concerning the earl of Nithsdale (February 1627); Copenhagen, Statens Arkiver Rigsarkivet, TKUA, 63-3 Charles I to Christian IV concerning the colonel Morgan (May 1627).

75 It was originally intended to be 9,000 albeit he never commanded the entire force due to objections from his fellow colonel, Alexander Lindsay, Lord Spynie, due to Nithsdale's Catholicism.

76 Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway*, pp. 202–225.

The costs of Morgan's levy spiralled since the troops did not all arrive in Hull at the same time, and on 15th March it was made clear that the levy was to wait for a full complement before departing.[77] This resulted in the requirement for soldiers to be billeted within Hull.[78] The costs associated with this were not originally anticipated and, of course, grew as the departure date was delayed further.[79] Eventually, on 3rd April one hundred more soldiers arrived from the county of Stafford adding to the problems.[80] This delay also provided the opportunity for those soldiers not keen on travelling to the war to desert which some clearly did. Richard Towler was caught in York and sent back to Hull on the understanding that if the fleet had already departed he was to be returned and imprisoned for desertion.[81] At the end of June a number of ships were selected and the *George*, *Charlie*, *Marie Bonaventure*, *Darlinge* and *Constant* appeared to be ready, at last, for departure.[82]

In Germany, too, it appears there was confusion, notably over the landing point for the English. Morgan complained that "after manie letters sent heretofore altogether directing us to land in the Elbe by this his letter you may see his course cleane altered giving us order to take the river Wesser for our landinge."[83] The change to a planned landing on the Weser was clearly not just a problem for Morgan, but also for the council of Hull. On 20th April the Mayor became aware of the issue and issued an instruction enquiring whether it was possible for the levy to sail to the Weser.[84] However, it soon became apparent that is was not practical at short notice since there were no pilots available within the town who had knowledge of the area.[85] Despite the implication that Hull

77 Hull, Hull History Centre, C/BR/L224 The Mayor and Aldermen to Mr Burlamache (15 March 1626/1627); Hull C/BR/B3 Minutes of the formal Meetings of the Mayor and Alderman, Bench Book vol.5 (1609–1650), fol. 162.

78 Hull, Hull History Centre, C/BR/L225 The Lords Council to the Mayor, Alderman and Chief Magistrates (20 March 1626/1627); Hull, Hull History Centre, C/BR/L222 The Lords of the Council (March 1626/1627).

79 Hull, Hull History Centre, C/BR/L228 The Mayor and Aldermen to Sir John Savile (31 March 1626/1627). This was later applied for from the crown: Hull, Hull History Centre, C/BR/L239 The Mayor and Aldermen to the Lords of the Council (22 May 1627).

80 Hull, Hull History Centre, C/BR/L229 Captain Thomas Littleton to the Mayor (3 April 1627).

81 Hull, Hull History Centre, C/BR/L230 Emanuel, Lord Scroope to the Mayor (17 April 1627).

82 Hull C/BR/B3 Minutes of the formal Meetings of the Mayor and Alderman, Bench Book vol. 5 (1609–1650), fol. 168 and 172.

83 TNA, SP, 75/8 Morgan to Conway, Enkhusen (13/23 March 1627), fols. 48–49.

84 Hull, Hull History Centre, C/BR/L234 The Mayor to the Wardens of Hull Trinity House (20 April 1627).

85 Hull, Hull History Centre, C/BR/L235 The Wardens of Hull Trinity House to the Mayor (20 April 1627).

council had made the decision about where to despatch the ships to, it is clear that Anstruther was already aware that the soldiers were coming to the Elbe not the Weser and he wrote:

> word is come to this Towne that those Troupes under the command of General Morgan, should certainly be within the river of the Elbe, so that although I do not receive any letter or message from thence, this day, or tomorrow yet after divine service and Easter day past I intend God willing to go down to Stade, and do all those services and best offices that I possibly can. They were expected to have come a shorter passage and that within the river of the Weser, near Bremen, where their quarters were appointed for them, and it seems that although this kings order come to them, within a letter of mine at Enkhusen, yet their ships been freighted formerly for the Elbe, that may be the reason that the tropes are come hither.[86]

Inevitably this led to problems and was clearly not the most auspicious beginning to the campaign. In March, Christian IV had already pointed out that the English were far less numerous than had been promised.[87] Indeed it soon became apparent that the landing location was the least of the levy's problems since the force was far smaller than expected as only 1,500 men arrived.[88] These were to join with soldiers already under Morgan who were stationed on the Weser which brought the total English force at this point to 3,850 men.[89] Shortly after the campaign's commencement Sir John Borlase wrote that the King of Denmark had effectively left the English without proper support in Wasserbaden.[90] For an effective campaign to be fought it is clear that more soldiers were required and in June 1627 Charles issued orders to levy another 1,000 troops to make up for those who had left Danish service due to illness and desertion.[91] Of these, 250 "able and young serviceable men" were to be levied from Norfolk and again shipped from Hull.[92] The full warrant that was issued for these men also stated again that none of these men could be from

86 TNA, SP, 75/8 Anstruther to Conway, Hamburg (21 February 1627), fols. 57–58.
87 KCFB, 2:65.
88 TNA, SP 75/8 Anstruther to Conway, Hamburg (1 June 1627), fols. 127–129; TNA, SP, 75/8 Anstruther to (Coke?) (1 June 1627), fols. 139–150.
89 TNA, SP, 75/8 Anstruther to Conway, Altona (20 April 1627), fols. 81–81.
90 TNA, SP, 75/8 Sir John Borlase to Conway, Quarter in Wasserbaden (1 July 1627), fol. 186.
91 Rye and Firth, eds., *SP Musters in Norfolk*, p. 79.
92 Ibid.

the trained bands.[93] This specific levy is useful since it is possible to analyse the origins of these men within Norfolk down to city, town and village level.

These records show that only 17 per cent of soldiers came from the city of Norwich despite it being by far the largest possible source of soldiers within the county.[94] This balance implies that, in Norfolk at least, cities were less important than the countryside for recruiting. It also gives an insight into the recruitment system since the men did not simply come from one location within the county but were spread evenly across a variety of towns and villages. The presence of a significant Dutch church and community within the area may have played a role in this recruitment. This community was not only religious, but also played an active role in the local military systems, for example John Cruso was an elder in the Dutch church and commanded a Dutch/Walloon company in Norwich that had existed since at least 1621.[95] These 250 men from Norfolk were due to depart from Hull on 1st August 1627 which meant they would arrive at their mustering points approximately a month later.[96] Despite the levying of these men it should be emphasised that they were not sufficient to help reach the previous commitments of the Stuarts and troop levels remained below the promised amounts.[97] Murdoch's brief assessment seems to be entirely backed up by the fresh archival material used within this chapter since there were 3,850 men initially under Morgan's command but by the end of August this had risen to 4,707.[98] Financial problems with the levying of troops went further since once they were raised it was commented that:

> …our Treasures exhausted, and our Coffers emptye, and our ordinarye reuenue, hardlye suffitient to support our ordinarye charge, much less to vndergoe soe extraordinarye a burthen as warr will produce.[99]

Morgan's troops therefore suffered from lack of funding throughout their campaign. This was in part tied to the debate of whether or not a jewel which was

93 Ibid., p. 81. This restriction is seen at other times throughout the period.
94 Ibid., p. 82.
95 O.P. Grell, *Calvinist exiles in Tudor and Stuart England* (Aldershot, 1996), pp. 64–65.
96 Ibid.
97 Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway*, p. 203.
98 TNA, SP, 81/34 Muster roll of 4 regiments in Germany under General Morgan (31 October 1627), fols. 236–237.
99 Rye and Firth, eds., *SP Musters in Norfolk*, p. 36.

sent to the King of Denmark by Charles constituted payment.[100] The Venetian ambassador believed that this would yield 200,000 crowns for Christian but he was unsure whether merchants or the crown would profit most from its sale.[101] It certainly seems that initially the jewel was accepted as payment and only later did problems emerge within Denmark causing Christian to complain.[102] The uncertainty over their pay caused further desertions and when Christian realised this he sent two ambassadors, George Brahe and Christian Tomasen, to the Stuart court in an attempt to persuade Charles to switch his military focus from France towards Denmark and therefore provide more funding for the Danish army.[103] Anstruther too was increasingly frustrated, writing to Charles enquiring what his aims were in Denmark and whether further support for Morgan's soldiers was going to appear.[104] In a letter written to Conway in November, Anstruther went further stating that unless Burlamachi paid he would "not be trusted neither amongst the English or Dutch."[105]

By the end of July, the Imperial general Tilly had crossed the Elbe and by August had forced Christian to surrender. The defence of the crossing was left to four companies of MacKay's regiment and 100 English troops, but despite a valiant defence the position was soon lost. The 8,000 men left under Danish command were not a match for the 25,000 that Wallenstein had by this time accrued. In October 1627 Morgan was promoted to general over all the infantry south of the Elbe and his men were on the move again, retreating across the Weser and moving to Bremen.[106] Despite Morgan's force being outnumbered and outgunned by Imperial forces, the count of Anholt (Tilly's lieutenant) did not cross the river to engage them. From Bremen, Morgan wrote again complaining that the lack of any pay for his soldiers was causing problems

100 It appears that Christian was initially pleased with the payment and only later complained: KCFB, 2:65.

101 Razzell, ed. *The English Civil War, Vol. 1*, p. 108.

102 TNA, SP 75/8 (Conway) to Anstruther (21 February 1627), fols. 10–11; Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway*, p. 74.

103 Beller, 'Sir Charles Morgan to Germany', pp. 532–533.

104 TNA, SP, 75/8 Things, wherein Anstruther desires to know his Majesty's pleasure (21 February mid 1627), fol. 184.

105 TNA, SP, 75/8 Anstruther to Conway (30 November 1627), fols. 398–408.

106 KCFB, 2:103. There is some confusion surrounding this since in February of 1627 Anstruther was already referring to Morgan as general: TNA, SP 75/8 Anstruther to Conway, Hamburg (21 February 1627), fols. 57–58. It is probably the case that Morgan already was a general, but in October became general of infantry south of the Elbe though the exact command structure in this is far from clear, Lind, *Hæren og magten i Danmark*, pp. 306–307.

with desertion.[107] Indeed these events illustrate again the close Dutch links that existed since despite being in Danish service the only money he could access was from Julian Calandrini (the Dutch paymaster) in Amsterdam. It is perhaps revealing that this English force, operating in the German lands, theoretically within the Danish Army, looked to the Republic for succour in its time of need. Morgan also complained of the lack of soldiers to emerge from Scotland; he stated that of the 9,000 expected, only 2,000 had appeared by this point.[108] Despite the arrival of new soldiers the size of his English force once again began to decline towards the end of 1627, in August there were just of 4,500 men which had reduced further to just over 3,500 men by October.[109] The reasons for this deterioration in strength were various, and are analysed later in this chapter in relation to the siege of Stade, but stemmed primarily from the poorly co-ordinated finances of the regiments. It is worth emphasising that despite these problems, Danish service was still attractive to at least some Englishmen. On 24th March 1628 one wrote to Christian IV that he had:

> ...benn formerly emploed in your majesties designs, against Sweden under the Lord Willoughbyes regiment [and now offered to] raise a 1,000 or 2,000 men according to such condicions as your majesties embassador and you graces most humble servants shall conclude on and be ready to serve your majestie in shorter tyme then others that (in my absence) have engaged themselves.[110]

It seems that his previous service under Christian had resulted in the Danish monarch intervening on his behalf to secure a pardon from James I for some unspecified misdemeanour. This officer was not unique in having served in Denmark previously as James Jewkes illustrates; he had served in Denmark since 1600 finally leaving in 1643 as a captain.[111] Others served during *Kejserkrig* but outside the English regiments under Morgan's command, amongst these are Abraham Pulley in the Landevaern regiment and John Hudson within the Ahlefeldt regiment.[112]

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107 TNA, SP, 75/8 Morgan to (Carleton), Bremen (21 February 1627), fols. 197–198; *Register of the Privy Council of Scotland*, eds. J.H. Burton et al. 36 vols (Edinburgh, 1877–1970) series 2, 2:XIII.

108 TNA, SP 75/8 Morgan to (Carleton), Bremen (21 February 1627), fols. 197–198.

109 TNA, SP 81/34 Muster roll of 4 regiments in Germany under General Morgan (31 October 1627), fols. 236–237.

110 Copenhagen, Statens Arkiver Rigsarkivet, TKUA, 63-7 John Jennis? to Christian IV (24 March 1628), fol. 226.

111 Grosjean and Murdoch, *SSNE*. He lost his leg during this period.

112 Ibid.

3 The Siege of Stade and the End of Kejserkrig

By the end of 1627, the condition of Morgan's four regiments had deteriorated further.[113] Plans were made in September and October to withdraw the English soldiers from many of the garrisons and consolidate Morgan's remaining soldiers in and around Stade.[114] The defence of Stade became the next objective of the English and Welsh soldiers alongside the Scots and Irish.[115] It is clear that this siege was not simply important due to the political and religious allegiances of England during the period but also for economic considerations.[116] Stade is downstream of Hamburg which was crucial for English and Scottish trade and Pembroke emphasised this when arguing that if the town was permanently taken then the east land cloth trade with the staple in Hamburg would also be lost.[117] In April 1628 Charles I requested from Parliament ten ships for the preservation of the river Elbe, placing this ahead of shipping for La Rochelle: indeed, providing troops and ships for the Danish came only second to defending the coasts of Britain.[118]

As the situation concerning pay became worse it was increasingly impressive that the small force was not defeated by the twelve regiments it faced.[119] Morgan's desperate correspondence revealed the bleak nature of the situation. He wrote of the loss of men to Tilly's besieging forces and appealed directly to Buckingham for aid.[120] Emphasising that his garrison felt "forgotten of all the world" he described not only the loss of five captains to the enemy, but the increasingly poor conditions his men operated in with no supplies, pay and the arrival of a frost. Indeed, long before these events in November 1627, Anstruther had already begun to show concern for the future of the English

113 Donald Lupton, *A warre-like treatise of the pike, or, some experimentall resolves, for lessening the number, and disabling the use of the pike in warre with the praise of the musquet and halfe-pike, as also the testimony of Brancatio, concerning the disability of the pike/penn'd for the generall good of our nation, by a well wisher to the compleat musquetier* (London 1642), p. A5.

114 TNA, SP, 75/8 Anstruther to various correspondents (16 September 1627), fol. 307; TNA, SP, 75/8 Anstruther to (Carleton), Hamburg (4 October 1627), fol. 338.

115 There were clearly English officers and Scottish officers within the town between 1626 and 1628. G. Köhn, *Die Bevölkerung der Gründungs-, Residenz-, Garnison- und Exulantenstadt Glückstadt von 1616–1652* (Hamburg, 1970).

116 For work on the role of English and Scots in North-West Germany see Zickermann, *Across the German sea*.

117 CSPV, 21:227; Rye and Firth, eds., *SP Musters in Norfolk*, p. 118.

118 Razzell, ed. *The English Civil War, Vol. 1*, p. 128. For more details of the crowns naval activities including this fleet see: Murdoch, *The terror of the seas?*, pp. 153–189.

119 Reeve, *Charles I*, p. 41.

120 CSPD, 14:25.

garrison stating that unless the paymaster, Julian Calandrini, could secure more funds from his brother then there was "eminent danger of losing both the men and the town of Stade."[121] The letter also discussed the failure of Philip Burlamachi to provide the funding needed for the expedition.[122] This entire affair is illustrative of the confusion surrounding the ownership of the troops, since, although fighting on behalf of Denmark it was the Dutch who were still attempting to organise pay for them. Following this in December 1627, the English colonels in the town wrote to Conway warning him of the "apparent misery that is like to fall upon our troopes, as well unto the officers as souldiers" and it appears that this situation didn't change over the course of the siege.[123]

The formal surrender of Stade to Tilly became increasingly inevitable unless the financial and political situations changed. The further loss of men, no doubt some to the besieging force but others to desertion and disease, meant Morgan had little choice. At the point of surrender of Stade, the Venetian ambassador wrote that there were little more than 800 soldiers still under Morgan's command.[124] This contrasts with a printed Dutch list of the English troops quartered at some point during 1628 which brought the total to 1,318 men, still a significant loss on the original total.[125] This figure seems to be closer to reality since a formal muster of the soldiers taken in October, the same date as the Venetian ambassador's comments, stated there were 1,201 men remaining.[126] This seems staggeringly low and only 20 per cent of its theoretical strength of 6,000 men (though it seems unlikely it ever reached this number in the Weser region). To make matters worse, the terms of the Stade capitulation were very precise and prevented further service from Morgan's troops. They stated:

> (5) When General Morgan reaches Holland, if orders reach him from his king for his troops to stay there, his officers and men from Stadem shall not render any service to the King of Denmark for the space of six months. (6) If he is recalled to England with his troops, all shall be free from this obligation.[127]

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121 TNA, SP 75/8 Anstruther to Conway (30 November 1627), fols. 398–408.

122 Burlamachi is also discussed within NA, 1.01.02 5889.196 Letter from Dudley Carleton (25 August 1625).

123 TNA, SP, 84/135 English colonels at Stade to Conway (27 December 1627), fol. 188.

124 CSPV, 21:367.

125 TNA, SP, 119/410 Inquartieringe van d'Engelsche ruyders (1628).

126 TNA, SP, 84/138 Muster of English companies at Enkhuisen (20/30 October 1628), fols. 85–122. A further identical list supports this TNA, SP, 84/138 List of officers and showing strength of companies (20/30 October 1628), fols. 123–124.

127 CSPV, 21:97; KCFB, 2:231.

To circumvent this, the men were transferred from Danish into Dutch service and it was proposed "to land on these shores [England] the troops that came out of Stade with him, and who are now in the Netherlands, so that they may serve against the emperor before the six months."[128] Morgan himself was formally re-commissioned into the Dutch army soon after.[129] This did not mean the end of the problems for this force and on 3rd November 1628 the English officers at Enkhuisen wrote to the Privy Council outlining their situation:

> The extremity of our necessities bringes us to this exigent that we are not humble and earnest petioners to your lordships that you would be pleased to consider our present miseries… and having since our descent into the low countireyes received pay but onely for two moneths which besides never came to us without extraordinary charge…[130]

Despite this grave state of affairs these men were "neverthelesse commanded to returne to the service of the King of Denmark without satisfact for what is past, or any certainty of payment for the time to come."[131] The situation became increasingly untenable for the soldiers and it was made clear that all the officers had used their own financial contacts to the full and "having wearied our Friends in helpinge us" could no longer support the troops.[132] Morgan's attempts to secure pay for the officers returning to Dutch service were clearly unsuccessful at this point and many were still petitioning the crown for financial recompense a year later.[133] In December 1628 Charles did send a supply ship under the command of captain Minss to relieve the English troops along the Elbe. However, even the author of the report (Sir Thomas Barrington) did not anticipate that the ship would be able reach its destination as "those cold seas have frozen them all fast by this time."[134]

Once the truce had expired Morgan's troops were redeployed to Glückstadt, and on 23rd March 1629 Morgan and his 1,500 men arrived in the southern area

128 CSPV, 21:214–215.

129 NA, 1.01.02 12271 Commissieboeken: Registers van akten van aanstelling van Generaliteitsdienaren onder het zegel en cachet van de Staat (1626–1639), fol. 62. This was reflected in other documentation, such as: TNA, SP, 84/138 English colonels in Dutch service (1628), fol. 233.

130 TNA, SP 84/138 English officers at Enkhuisen to Lords of the Council (1628), fol. 132.

131 Ibid.

132 Ibid.

133 CSPD, 14:590.

134 'Barrington family letters', p. 41.

of Dithmarschen, two miles from Meldorf.[135] At this point the English were committed to a landing on the island of Nordstrand and across Schleswig's western coast.[136] By 6th April this campaign was underway and general Morgan with colonel Marquart had moved to the island of Föhr, but by now it was clear that Danish involvement was coming to an end since negotiations at Lübeck for a general peace had already begun.[137] Three days later the chancellor and councillors to the Duke of Holstein-Gottorf advised the duke to send envoys to Morgan to discuss his intentions.[138] However, since a truce was signed on 30th May 1629 and Morgan ordered a ceasefire, the enterprise had little chance of achieving anything.[139] One month later Morgan's soldiers were shipped back to the Netherlands and Morgan's Danish campaign was over.[140] The reality was that this entire campaign had been a confused affair from the outset. This included the poor levying of the soldiers and the slow transport of them, through to the final stages when the officers were abandoned by the Stuart monarchy and Danish authorities were left to rely instead on their own contacts within the Dutch Republic to support them.

It is clear that Charles and Christian both felt let down by events and attempts to reconcile a broad alliance during the 1630s came to little. In April 1632 the earl of Leicester was appointed by Charles I as an extraordinary ambassador to Denmark with the official aim of offering the Stuart dynasty's condolences for the death of Queen Sophia Frederica the previous year.[141] The reality was that the mission was far more complicated and was part of a wider effort to provoke support for Sweden's anti-Habsburg league.[142] Against the backdrop of past failures the negotiations failed both militarily and economically. No

135 Schleswig, Landesarchiv Schleswig, Abteilung 7 Nr.3404 Peter Bauwman, (ese)bull (23 March 1629).

136 KCFB, 2:191 and 231; Beller, 'Sir Charles Morgan to Germany', p. 539.

137 Schleswig, Landesarchiv Schleswig, Abteilung 7 Nr.3404 Memorial auf Paul Rantzauwen was beidem General Morgan des Nordtstrandeshalberanzubringen (6 April 1629).

138 Schleswig, Landesarchiv Schleswig, Abteilung 7 Nr.3404 Chancellor und Councillors to Duke Friederich, Gottorf (9 April 1629).

139 KCFB, 2:205.

140 Ibid., p. 2:210. Dudley Carleton's correspondence from the Hague refers to Morgan's levy during this period: Den Haag, Nationaal Archief, 1.01.02 5891.259 Letter for the Estates General (24 July 1629).

141 R. Cant, 'The embassy of the Earl of Leicester to Denmark in 1632: Including a transcription of the Instructions issued to the Earl of Leicester (Bodleian Library MS Rawl. C534)', *English Historical Review*, 54.214 (1939), pp. 252–253; I. Atherton, 'Sidney, Robert, second earl of Leicester (1595–1677)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, (2008).

142 For full details of Stuart-Oldenburg relations during this period see: Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway*, pp. 77–89.

agreement could be reached concerning a European alliance which is unsurprising considering the breakdown of Charles and Christian's relationship during Danish intervention in the Holy Roman Empire. Ultimately the mission of 1632 and the subsequent attempt to improve relations in 1638 simply illustrated bitterness between the sides.[143] It was not until 1640 that an accord was reached but this was ultimately too late to help the European Protestant cause.

4 Conclusion

One of the key issues faced by Charles I in the Wars of the Three Kingdoms found its origins amongst these events and centred around complaints relating to the rights of a sovereign to inflict the billeting of soldiers on the population.[144] The events of 1625 to 1629 and the poor management of the Cadiz, Danish and La Rochelle campaigns meant that not only was there considerable upset across England, particularly within the ports used, but also that the Protestants at home saw little had been achieved.[145] Remarkably Denmark itself emerged relatively intact despite the failings of the military campaigns and Christian maintained much of his pre-war territory, simply withdrawing his claims to the North German Bishoprics.[146] Financial problems continued into the 1630s provoking the raising of taxation for passage through the Sound, something both Dutch and English merchants complained about bitterly.[147] The collapse of Danish intervention also caused widespread concern across Protestant Europe.

The English involvement in *Kejserkrig* did not help in this regard. Morgan's levy suffered greatly from disorganisation at the outset, but also Charles's attempts to fight on too many fronts. In particular, the La Rochelle and Cadiz campaigns sapped English manpower and when combined with the failures of Stuart-Oldenburg diplomacy, meant success on the southern 'Danish' front

143 Lockhart, *Denmark in the Thirty Years' War*, p. 255.

144 This became an important clause within the petition of right: G. Vermeesch, 'War and garrison towns in the Dutch Republic: the cases of Gorinchem and Doesburg (*c.* 1570 to *c.* 1660)', *Urban History*, 36.1 (2009), pp. 8–9.

145 The actual presence of soldiers also caused problems, for example in 1628 a group of soldiers were tried for their role in the burning of Banbury: 'Notes of the Debates in the House of Lords, officially taken by Robert Bowyer and Henry Elsing, clerks of the Parliaments, A.D. 1621, 1625, 1628', in ed. R.D. Bowyer, H. Elsynge, and F.H. Relf, *Camden Society, Third Series* 42 (London, 1929), pp. 72–78.

146 Lockhart, 'Denmark and the Empire', p. 409.

147 Ibid., p. 414.

always seemed unlikely. It must be remembered that whereas the English were the major provider of men from Britain for the Dutch Republic, Rhine Palatinate, Mansfeld levies and Cadiz, the Danish campaigns relied heavily on Scottish levies.[148] Unlike the previous work of Beller and Murdoch, this chapter has provided a detailed examination of how the English levies for Denmark were conducted by Charles I and where they fitted within his broader war aims. This gives a more balanced understanding of British involvement within Denmark as well as highlighting the considerable strain the English military community was placed under during the 1625–1630 period.

The British context to *Kejserkrig* in the late 1620s is central to explaining Stuart policy in the 1630s. This marked a shift in the nature of British intervention in the Thirty Years' War, while the commencement of the Personal Rule limited Charles's tactical options further. The problems of securing Parliamentary subsidies caused Charles to run up debts which, as the Venetian ambassador pointed out, were simply not sustainable by 1629.[149] Charles did not, though, withdraw entirely from the conflict giving only Hamilton's levy as a token contribution, as L.J. Reeve has argued.[150] Instead he took advantage of the fact it was not just the domestic situation that had changed but also that abroad, the focus had now shifted to Sweden. This should not undermine the importance of the Dutch Republic and its continuing role in the Thirty Years' War post-1630. Rather it emphasises that the focus of involvement within the German lands undoubtedly became a Swedish concern. This was actually a convenient shift for Charles and in January 1632 the Venetian ambassador pointed this out commenting:

> It was very necessary to think about help for the King of Sweden, but not by such means [calling an English Parliament]. Any other would prove more opportune, if not more easy, and he hoped they would find the means of supplying it to him without opening the dates to fresh scandals.[151]

The Scots dominated huge swathes of the Swedish military – some 15 generals alone served between 1630 and 1648 - allowing Charles to continue his support of the Protestant cause without paying a hefty price (since the Scots served

148 Copenhagen, Statens Arkiver Rigsarkivet, Glückstadt 987-5 Memorial der Englischen Societät in Hamburg wegen des Commercio nach England (1646); Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway*, pp. 202–225.

149 Razzell, ed. *The English Civil War, Vol. 1*, p. 153.

150 Reeve, *Charles I*, pp. 227–228.

151 Razzell, ed. *The English Civil War, Vol. 1*, p. 169.

directly as members of the Swedish military establishment).[152] The role of the English who fought alongside these men will be discussed in the next chapter. Some of these Englishmen who had served in the Danish army simply transferred to fight within the armies of Sweden alongside the Scottish survivors of *Kejserkrig*.[153] The failings of Charles's policies between 1625 and 1629 gave little for Charles to build upon during the subsequent decade. During the 1630s he attempted to mirror his father's policies with two parallel avenues: firstly, by providing discreet military support to Sweden and secondly by continuing diplomatic negotiations with various Catholic nations. Unlike James, who came close to bringing these two seams together, Charles's policies became increasingly divergent, contradictory and self-defeating.[154] Recognising the incompetence of the monarch should not overshadow the scale of Stuart engagement in terms of both manpower and money from 1618 to 1629. A document quantifying the costs of Charles' campaigns was drawn up in 1627 which totalled a staggering 1,578,320*l.*[155] The sums involved show that not only did the English pay a high price on the battlefield, but also that they made a significant financial contribution to the campaigns of the Thirty Years' War.

152 See Murdoch and Grosjean, *Alexander Leslie*, p. passim; Grosjean, *Unofficial Alliance*, pp. 74–111. It is also worth pointing out that the Scottish Parliament also granted him 120,000*l.* sterling over six years from 1633: Razzell, ed. *The English Civil War, Vol. 1*, p. 173.

153 Thomas Conway is a good example of this: TNA, SP, 84/135 Muster of English regiments for August, September and October (26 October 1627); TNA, SP, 16/533 Statement containing the names of the captains of the regiment serving in Germany under [Donald Mackay] Lord Reay in aid of the King of Sweden, presented by Sir Thomas Conway (21 July 1631), fol. 87. See also William Harvey Grosjean and Murdoch, *SSNE*.

154 For details of Charles's Catholic negotiations A. Marks, 'The Scots in the Italian Peninsular during the Thirty Years' War', in ed. T. O'Connor and M.A. Lyons, *The Ulster earls and Baroque Europe* (Dublin, 2009), pp. 327–348; F.C. Springell, *Connoisseur & Diplomat … The Earl of Arundel's Embassy to Germany in 1636 as recounted in William Crowne's diary, the Earl's letters, and other contemporary sources. With a catalogue of the topographical drawings made on the journey by Wenceslaus Hollar.* [*With reproductions and a facsimile.*] (London, 1963); Worthington, 'Alternative Diplomacy?', pp. 51–76.

155 TNA, SP, 81/34 Money disbursed for the Palatinate since 1624 (1627), fol. 276.

CHAPTER 5

The Crucible of War: Sweden in the 1630s

> The King of Sweden hath landed with 200 ships a great army of some 40,000 in Germany, with intention (if the party of our Religion be not all drowsy) to redress the common cause…[1]

∴

During the early seventeenth century the relationship between Sweden and England has received little attention in contrast to the extensive treatment by historians of England who tend to focus instead on the monarch's relations with powers such as France and Spain.[2] This is not say that Sweden itself has not been studied in English, the extensive work of Michael Roberts has addressed the Swedish monarchy in detail, but this work seems to exist separately to work on England in the same period and there is little cross over with the research conducted on the Stuarts and their foreign policy.[3] Indeed, even on its own merits Robert's work is curious since his focus on Gustav Adolf means that the central role of Axel Oxenstierna to the Thirty Years' War remains relatively enigmatic in English language historiography. Sweden first proposed to enter the Imperial arena of conflict as part of a broad Protestant alliance in 1625, demanding that its allies would pay for two-thirds of the endeavour: England and Scotland were to raise four regiments alongside a further four from France.[4] This plan never was rejected as the various allies in question turned instead towards

1 Letters of Henry Wotton, 2:330–331.

2 Sharpe, *The Personal Rule*, pp. 65–104, 509–600 and 825–847. There has been some recent work on the economic relationship between the two countries, in particular see A. Grimshaw, 'Anglo-Swedish Commercial Activity and Commodity Exchange in the 17th Century' (PhD., St Andrews, 2017).

3 M. Roberts, *Gustavus Adolphus: a history of Sweden, 1611–1632* (London, 1953–1958). Considering that many of Axel Oxenstierna's letters have been published since the turn of the twentieth century this is remarkable: *Rikskansleren Axel Oxenstiernas Skrifter och Brefvexling, first series*, eds. C.G. Styffe et al. 17 vols (Stockholm, 1890-); *Rikskansleren Axel Oxenstiernas Skrifter och Brefvexling, second series*, eds. P. Sondén et al. 14 vols (Stockholm, 1888-). One example of this is: A.W. White, 'Suspension of arms: Anglo-Spanish Mediation in the Thirty Years' War, 1621–1625' (PhD., Tulane University, 1978), pp. 4–5.

4 Grosjean, *Unofficial Alliance*, p. 49.

 | DOI:10.1163/9789004522695_007

Denmark's cheaper but ultimately unsuccessful venture.[5] Inevitably, after the failure of the Danish campaigns, this Swedish interest was renewed and subsequently permission granted for the levying of troops both within England and Scotland. This English involvement, though numerically small, in comparison with the levies of Scottish troops, puts English soldiers into the very heart of the German conflict in the 1630s. Indeed, it is worth emphasising that far more soldiers served Sweden than ever did under Morgan in the armies of Denmark-Norway.[6] The presence of English troops throughout the 1630–1648 period is also important because it is during this service that the origins of the later Anglo-Swedish relationship of the 1650s can be found. This alliance, though beyond the focus of this book, superseded the unofficial alliance with Scotland and flourished until the Cromwellian Republic. It did not arise from nowhere and relied on the bond between Englishmen at the highest levels within both nations' governments.[7]

Diplomacy between Britain and Sweden during the 1620s was conducted primarily through Sir James Spens who has been written about extensively by Alexia Grosjean, but there were also Englishmen who contributed to the process even at this early stage.[8] Indeed, there were a number of levies that either contained English troops or English officers.[9] Grosjean as part of her work on the Unofficial Alliance between Sweden Scotland has touched on the relationship between England and Sweden and (in a far less satisfying manner) Mary Elizabeth Ailes has also written on the topic.[10] Grosjean's prosopographical approach initially identified six English colonels in Swedish service: Arthur

5 It is clear that both plans were discussed in parallel for period: NA, 1.01.02 5889.264 Letter for the Deputies of the States General (1625).

6 Beller, 'Sir Charles Morgan to Germany'; Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway*.

7 For a discussion of the nature of the Scottish alliance see: Grosjean, *Unofficial Alliance*, pp. 239–257. Grosjean's thesis also includes a chapter on the events of the 1650s that is not included in the monograph: A. Grosjean, 'Scots and the Swedish State: Diplomacy, Military Service and Ennoblement 1611–1660' (PhD., University of Aberdeen, 1998), pp. 240–268. For more details on the 1640s see: Young, 'The Scottish Parliament and European Diplomacy', pp. 77–106.

8 Notably Sir Peter Young and Sir Henry St George during the missions of the late 1620s. Grosjean, *Unofficial Alliance*, p. 53.

9 A selection of those levying in England are: in 1627 William Faulkner and Robert Douglas; 1629, Henry Muschamp and William Douglas and in 1630 James Spens, Thomas Sanderson and John Caswell. APC, 42:182–183, 251 and 45:33, 140 and 363; RAOSB, second series, XIII:223–224; CSPD, 14:546 and 15:226.

10 M.E. Ailes, *Military migration and state formation: the British military community in seventeenth-century Sweden* (Lincoln, 2002); A. Grosjean, 'Scotland: Sweden's Closest Ally?', in ed. S. Murdoch, *Scotland and the Thirty Years' War, 1618–1648* (Leiden, 2001), p. 111 in particular.

Aston, John Cassels (Caswell), Thomas Conway (who actually commanded the regiment of Caswell in the field), George Fleetwood, Thomas Muschamp and Christopher Potley. This short list does not give an indication of the number of Englishmen who served within the Swedish army at other ranks but does give a strong indicator that such soldiers would be there.[11] This turns out to be the case and by 1632 there were 3,262 officers within the Swedish army of which 413 were Scottish, 4 Welsh and at least 71 English.[12] This meant the English accounted for 2.2 per cent of the Swedish officer corps, hardly service on the scale of the English in the Low Countries but when put alongside the Scottish commitments in Sweden it formed a part of a substantive Stuart presence.

1 The Origins of the English Military Diaspora in Sweden: 1618–1629

The participation of the English prior to 1630 focussed on Sweden's campaigns in Poland.[13] These campaigns of the Vasa Civil War, unlike previous clashes, directly impacted on events elsewhere in Europe.[14] Imperial forces understood the significance of preventing Sweden from intervening in the Empire and to achieve this supported Sigismund III. It seems that these events, in a similar way to the Dutch Revolt, were understood in a broader European context. This is best illustrated by Robert Frost's work which seamlessly flows from the Swedish conflicts of the 1620s to those of the 1630s.[15]

As noted above, between 1626 and 1629 recruitment from England (and Britain) was focussed on the commitments made by Charles to other

11 Grosjean, *Unofficial Alliance*, p. 111.

12 This data is compiled from various, muster rolls held in Stockholm, Krigsarkivet (KRA, MR); Grosjean and Murdoch, *SSNE*; P. Wieselgren, *DelaGardiska Archive eller Handlingar ur Grefl. Dela Gardiska Bibliotheket på Löberöd. Tionde Delen* (Lund, 1838), pp. 16–17. It seems likely that a number of these English officers were Welsh, however, it has not been possible to differentiate any further.

13 Events in Poland were closely followed by the Stuart government for example: TNA, SP, 88/4 A view of the controversy between Poland and Sweden (1627), fol. 193. For an overview of this war see Frost, *Northern Wars*, pp. 102–114. There were English soldiers present as early as 1617 as indicated by records of three men that were accused of rape in Stockholm. K. Jansson, 'Soldaten und Vergewaltigung im Schweden des 17. Jahrhunderts', in ed. B. von Krusenstjern and H. Medick, *Zwischen Alltag und Katastrophe: der Dreißigjährige krieg aus der nähe* (Göttingen, 2001), pp. 195–228.

14 This Civil War (1592–1598) had begun in the previous century when the legitimate, but Catholic King Sigismund Vasa was ousted by his uncle, duke Karl (Karl IX).

15 Frost, *Northern Wars*, pp. 102–135.

campaigns such as La Rochelle and *kejserkrig*.[16] This did not, however, prevent some English officers and soldiers fighting within Sweden's military: colonel Thomas Muschamp, for instance, fought against Poland during the 1620s. Muschamp was initially recruited into Swedish service in 1621 under the command of James Seaton under whom he was appointed as a captain in May and placed in charge of 125 men.[17] It was during this decade that he began his association with the Kronoberg regiment.[18] During this earlier period it is clear from looking at the names of the troops that at least some of the common soldiers were English (such as the surname Peterson which occurs more than once) though it would be easy to overstate their presence.[19] Muschamp is also interesting since he demonstrates that there was a bond between the English and the Scottish soldiers, possibly a necessity in fact for an Englishmen, since he could write in the Scots language and orthography.[20] Muschamp's death on 6 September 1629 means it is not possible to trace his service into the German campaign but the fact that control of his regiment was handed over to a Scot, David Drummond, further emphasises the integration between men of the two nationalities.[21]

A further example of English service in this period can be seen in the James Spens levy of 1623, which was primarily designed to secure Scottish military recruits – and in the hope they would join the allies who eventually signed the Treaty of The Hague in 1625.[22] However, many of the officers in the regiment, as well as the soldiers they commanded, were English. Indeed, there was a captain Henry Muschamp, an Englishmen himself though it is not clear if he was in any way related colonel Thomas Muschamp.[23] Furthermore, that the handwriting on this muster roll reveals even the scribe was English is interesting since it shows that there was clearly a set of Englishmen working together.[24]

16 For example see: APC, 42:182–183. See Murdoch's analysis and chapter 4 of this monograph for more details: Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway*, pp. 203–225.

17 There are two muster rolls for the month of May: one states 112 men which then rises to 125 in a subsequent report: KRA, MR 1621/4 Mansfelds och Setons Regiment (1621), fols. 144–148 and 162–165.

18 Riddarhusets Stamtavlör (Elektronisk resurs Version 3.0) Stockholm 2002.

19 For example see: KRA, MR 1621/4 Mansfelds och Setons Regiment (1621), fol. 164.

20 KRA, 0035:0418 Karl Viggo Key Samlingen, unfoliated.

21 KRA, MR 1629/17 Preussen (October 1629); Grosjean and Murdoch, *SSNE*; *Riddarhusets Stamtavlör*; M.E. Ailes, 'Wars, Widows and State Formation in 17th Century Sweden', *Scandinavian Journal of History*, 31.1 (2006).

22 RPCS, 13:478; Grosjean, *Unofficial Alliance*, p. 58.

23 Just one example of a muster roll giving his rank as captain is: KRA, MR 1626/8 (January–October 1626), fol. 1290.

24 KRA, MR 1626/9 (January–October 1626), fols. 1682–1683.

Muschamp went on to fight at the battles of Breitenfeld (1631) and Nördlingen (1634) and his death there was recorded by John Durie in a letter to sir Thomas Roe: "colonel Muschamp and his brother are both killed."[25]

The only example that has thus far been uncovered of an Englishman serving throughout the three main decades of the Thirty Years' War is colonel Christopher Potley whose career spanned the entirety of Sweden's involvement in the conflict entering service before his retirement in 1645.[26] He first entered service in 1624 in Frans Bernhard von Thurn's regiment where he remained over the next few years during which it gained "hovregementet" or "royal court regiment" status.[27] By 1630 Potley had transferred (remaining as a captain) to the Gula (Yellow) regiment under Maximilian Teufel.[28] In 1632 he transferred into the English regiment of George Fleetwood where he served as a lieutenant colonel until 1635.[29] It is impossible to know his motivations for this transfer but it is interesting that a distinguished and long serving English officer gravitated to a notable English regiment. This small number of officers illustrate that it was possible for English officers to achieve command of Swedish regiments and moreover, as an analysis of the 1630s will show, there was far more to come.

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25 William Watts, *The modern history of the world. Or, An historicall relation of the most memorable passages in Germany, and else-where, since the beginning of this present yeere 1635 Divided into three sections. The eighth part. Amongst various passages which you have contayned in this story is a manifesto or declaration* (*of the French King*) *for a warre with Spaine. After which followeth a manifesto of the Cardinall Infanta, for a warre with France, both by sea and land* (London 1635), pp. A3–A4; P.G. Westin, ed. *Negotiations about Church Unity, 1628–1634. John Durie, Gustavus Adolphus, Axel Oxenstierna* (Uppsala, 1932), p. 304. It seems likely that this was Robert Muschamp who died on the same day`, confirming there were two Robert Muschamps since another was still alive later: KRA, MR 1634/12 Preussen (January).

26 *Svenska Riksrådets Protokoll*, eds. N.A. Kullberg and S. Bergh 18 vols (Stockholm, 1878–1902) XI:98; RAOSB, second series, IX:503. A selection of the muster rolls related to his military career are: KRA, MR 1624/8 (January–June 1624); KRA, MR 1624/9 Thurns Armins Regiment (1624); KRA, MR 1625/4 (May–December 1625); KRA, MR 1626/6 (January–October 1626); KRA, MR 1627/4 (January 1627); KRA, MR 1628/8 (May 1628); KRA, MR 1629/5 Preussen (January 1629); KRA, MR 1630/22 Preussen (January 1630); KRA, MR 1632/16 Preussen (July 1632); KRA, MR 1633/11 Preussen (January 1633); KRA, MR 1634/12 Preussen (January 1634); KRA, MR 1635/20 Preussen (January 1635).

27 KRA, MR 1624/8 (January–June 1624), fols. 715–823; KRA, MR 1624/9 Thurns Armins Regiment (1624); KRA, MR 1625/4 (May–December 1625); KRA, MR 1626/6 (January–October 1626); KRA, MR 1626/7 (January–October 1626); KRA, MR 1626/10 (November 1626); KRA, MR 1627/6 (March 1627).

28 KRA, MR 1630/22 Preussen (January 1630), fols. 39–43.

29 Grosjean and Murdoch, *SSNE*.

2 Englishmen at the Heart of the Thirty Years' War: Swedish Military Service during the 1630s

The ties between England and Sweden intensified during the 1630s on a military and political level. An opening gambit to this had been the raising of Gustav Adolf into the Order of the Garter in 1627 which was followed by the arrival of English officers and men joining the Scots from 1629.[30] Their arrival acted in in tandem with the full-scale Swedish invasion of the Empire in 1630.[31] In so doing, the Swedish King launched a propaganda campaign to justify his actions to countries across Europe, including England, which was partly diplomatic but also surely designed to help promote the levying of soldiers for the Swedish army.[32] As discussed in chapter three this was largely welcomed by Charles since he could continue to support the Protestant cause but without incurring the financial costs he had suffered from 1625 to 1629 when he gave aid to Christian IV. Wider Stuart diplomacy obviously continued to emphasise the need to restore Elizabeth and her family to their Electoral rights in the Palatinate and it is clear that by this point the broader aim of supporting the Protestant cause remained compatible with this goal.[33]

During the dramatic campaigns of the 1630s the Swedish army was seldom composed of a majority of Swedish nationals. At the Battle of Breitenfeld for instance only 25 per cent of the Swedish army was comprised of Swedish troops.[34] Englishmen formed a part of the remainder, variously serving within English, and non-English regiments. The Battle of Lützen provides an illustration of English troops serving in regiments commanded by colonels of other nationalities. Sir John Hepburn had overall command of three brigades of foot, he himself directly controlled the central Brigade, the left was overseen by the count of Thurn and the right by colonel (Johan) Vitzthum. All of these three brigades claimed "some English and many Scots" which "were accounted among the best and surest men of the army."[35] Further evidence of the presence of English officers' actions can be seen at the siege of Ingolstadt where

30 Hatfield, CP 131/191 Warrant for payment of fees to the Heralds and Pursuivants of Arms (After May 1630).

31 The preparatory actions for this invasion had been ongoing since the summer of 1628 led by Alexander Leslie and backed by a Swedish fleet of up to 20 ships. Murdoch and Grosjean, *Alexander Leslie*, pp. 48–52.

32 Piirimäe, 'Just War in Theory and Practice', p. 504.

33 Den Haag, Nationaal Archief, 1.01.02 5892.112 Letter concerning Stuart Policy (1633).

34 Bonney, *The Thirty Years' War*, p. 44.

35 William Watts, *The Swedish discipline*, p. 13. Account of Leipsich.

they suffered heavy casualties.[36] In more general terms there is also indications within is the printed account of the Swedish army's operation: *the Swedish Discipline*.[37]

3 Hamilton's Army and English Levies for Sweden (1629–1632)

In March 1630 two contracts were signed for the levying of English soldiers on a far larger scale than had occurred before. The so-called Hamilton levy is the only part of English service to have been the focus of research and if it had delivered what it promised it would have been significant. As part of this Charles attempted a number of voluntary levies as his father had, but many did not secure funding.[38] The Marquis of Hamilton himself hoped to levy 6,000 Englishmen alongside 6,000 Scots and there is evidence that some of the companies that served under Hamilton, Douglas and Ramsey were raised in Gloucestershire.[39] Further afield there were difficulties and in June 1631 the earl of Arundel received reports about the difficulty of levying men.[40] The second levy was operated by colonel Wolmar von Faresnbach who received permission to levy 4,000 Englishmen. On 18th July the forces from England and Scotland met at Yarmouth in Norfolk from where they set sail with a fleet of between 38 and 40 ships.[41] At this point things became increasingly challenging and it is clear the rate of casualties that this army was either poorly ran or

36 'Barrington family letters', p. 243.

37 William Watts, *The Swedish discipline*, pp. 75–76.

38 SRO Ipswich, EE1 /O1/1/73 Order from the Council (August 1633), fols. 67–67v.

39 TNA, SP, 16/194 Form of letter from the King to the Lord Lieutenants of several counties (19 June 1631), fol. 56; Gloucester, Gloucestershire Archives, GBR H/2/2 6,000 volunteers to be raised by Marquis of Hamilton for service with the king of Sweden; company of 150 volunteers to be raised in Gloucestershire; Captain Wroughton of Sir Jacob Astley's regiment to raise volunteers in Gloucestershire (1631), fols. 167–170; Gloucestershire Archives, GBR H/2/2 Licence to Captain Tirwitt of Marquis of Hamilton's regiment to raise volunteers in Glos. Similar licence to Capt. Archibald Douglas of Sir James Ramsey's regiment (1631), fol. 172. It is unfortunate that since Hamilton's levy was never formerly incorporated into the Swedish Army there are no muster rolls to allow an analysis of the troops that were levied, or even the officers. Contemporary figures suggest that just over 8,000 men entered Swedish service. The size of this levy is discussed in: Grosjean, *Unofficial Alliance*, p. 99.

40 Rye and Firth, eds., *SP Musters in Norfolk*, p. 168.

41 William Watts, *The Swedish intelligencer. Wherein, out of the truest and choysest informations, are the famous actions of that warlike prince historically led along: from his Majesties first entring into the Empire, vntill his great victory over the Generall Tilly, at the Battell of Leipsich. The times and places of every action being so sufficiently observed and described; that the reader may finde both truth and reason in it* (London 1632), p. 108.

made up of poor recruits. Indeed, it seems the force was starving by the time it reached Stettin, causing losses before it had entered combat.[42] By September the English and Scottish casualties had resulted in a large number of idle officers which were asked to "waite upon his [the King's] owne person" before they could find new commissions.[43] The casualties were high and by July 1632 there was just one English and one Scottish regiment remaining of what might be termed the Hamilton army (the English within this were by now commanded by Sir William Bellenden).[44]

The utter failure of the Hamilton levy to make a meaningful military contribution has been adequately covered by other historians and because of this a detailed assessment of the army's record is not required here.[45] Despite these failures after the army's disbandment at least some of the officers went on to pursue careers elsewhere in the Swedish military and this is perhaps its greatest legacy. James Affleck (a Scot) and lieutenant colonel John Chamberlain (English) left Hamilton's force to enter the regiment of George Fleetwood.[46]

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42 TNA, SP, 16/195 Statement of Sir Richard Grosvenor, of a relation made to him by Christopher Crowe touching the Marquis of Hamilton (14 December 1631), fol. 79.

43 William Watts, *The Swedish intelligencer. The third part. Wherein, out of the truest and choysest informations, are the famous actions of that warlike prince historically led along; from the Norimberg Leaguer, unto the day of his death, at the victory of Lutzen. With the election of the young Queene of Sweden: and the Diet of Heilbrun. The times and places of every action, being so sufficiently observed and described; that the reader may finde both truth and reason in it. Vnto which is added the fourth part. Wherein, the chiefest of those military actions of other Swedish generalls, be related: wherein the King himselfe, was not personally with the army* (London 1633), p. 71.

44 Grosjean, *Unofficial Alliance*, pp. 90–91. These were subsequently sent to fight alongside duke William of Saxe-Weimar in Bavaria before being disbanded: William Watts, *The Swedish intelligencer. The third part*, pp. 30–37.

45 In particular see: Grosjean, *Unofficial Alliance*, pp. 88–91. A contemporary account can be found in: William Watts, *The Swedish intelligencer. The third part*, pp. 30–37 and 71; William Watts, *The Swedish intelligencer. The fourth Part. Relating the Chiefest of those Military Actions of the Swedish Generalls: wherein the King himselfe was not personally with the Armie. As in the Palatinate, Triers, Alsatia, Suevia, Westphalia, the Lower Saxony and Silesia. Wherein you have those proceedings, omitted in the Second Part: which are continued until the time of the Kings death.* (London 1633), pp. 107–116 and 127–133. See also throughout: Robert Monro, *His Expedition*.

46 A selection of the muster rolls illustrating their careers are: KRA, MR 1629/19 Preussen (November 1629); KRA, MR 1630/22 Preussen (January 1630); KRA, MR 1630/30 Preussen (September 1630); KRA, MR 1632/18 Preussen (September 1632); KRA, MR 1633/11 Preussen (January 1633); KRA, MR 1634/12 Preussen (January 1634); KRA, MR 1635/20 Preussen (January 1635); KRA, MR 1635/29 Preussen (August 1635); KRA, MR 1637/15 Pommern (July–August 1637); KRA, MR 1638/27 Pommern (November–December 1638); KRA, MR 1639/14 Pommern (February–March 1639).

4 Fleetwood's Regiment, Origins and Composition

Undoubtedly the most significant English contribution to the Swedish military came through the service of George Fleetwood. Fleetwood himself was born in 1605 to Sir Miles Fleetwood and was the older brother of the more famous Charles Fleetwood, a Parliamentarian general and husband to Oliver Cromwell's eldest daughter.[47] In 1640 George married Brita Gyllenstierna, a Lady in waiting to Queen Kristina of Sweden, a match that revealed how successfully he had risen within Swedish society.[48] This was closely followed by a significant reward of land for his military service and his entry into the Swedish nobility as a Baron.[49] Indeed, this donation of land was the fourth largest given to any British officer in Småland (out of twenty-one donations) and had an annual rent of 433.31 Riksdaler, a considerable sum at the time.[50] As early as 1632 he wrote to his father that Gustav Adolf and Axel Oxenstierna would serve as his patrons illustrating that his move to Sweden was motivated at least partially by career.[51] This patronage was undoubtedly important and clearly enabled him to make the most of the opportunities presented to him within Swedish service.[52] However, it alone does not explain his rise within the Swedish establishment. Equally important was his willingness to operate closely the Scottish military leadership embedded within Swedish society and military life.

Little can be said of his early life beyond his attendance at Oxford University and Gray's Inn and even his initial entry into Swedish service is far from clear.[53] His name first appears in Swedish records in July 1629 and before this the only clue is a note that a lieutenant Rover Ravenscroft had died in Danish service and wished to pay debts owed to captain George Fleetwood, the son of Miles Fleetwood.[54] This being the case it seems likely that he did not directly enter Swedish service but transferred from Danish service. Though

47 A. Grosjean, 'Fleetwood, George, Baron Fleetwood in the Swedish nobility (bap. 1605, d. 1667)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, (2004).

48 *Riddarhusets Stamtavlör*.

49 Grosjean, 'Fleetwood, George'.

50 Ailes, *Military migration and state formation*, p. 80.

51 G. Fleetwood, 'Lützen Letter from George Fleetwood to his father giving an account of the Battle of Lützen and the death of Gustavus Adolphus', in ed. B. Egerton Philip de Malpas Grey, *Camden Society Old Series, Miscellany* 1 (London, 1847), p. 4.

52 Ailes, *Military migration and state formation*, p. 51.

53 J. Foster, *Alumni Oxonianses: the members of the University of Oxford, 1500–1886* (Oxford, 1888–1892), p. 505.

54 TNA, SP, 16/186 Petition of Thomas Heskett to the Council of War (7 March 1631), fol. 57.

this cannot be confirmed, it would explain how he entered at a relatively high rank and it was certainly the route into service taken by Scots like Donald Mackay and Robert Monro. Fleetwood was certainly not the only English or indeed Scottish officer with a desire to continue fighting for the Protestant cause after Christian's withdrawal who found their way into the Swedish army.[55] What is not clear is where Fleetwood served. The English troops and officers of Morgan returned to Dutch service when Denmark withdrew contrasting with the Scottish regiments which transferred into Swedish service. It appears, therefore, that Fleetwood took a different route into Swedish service than the soldiers he would command by transferring out of the Danish army and associating himself with the Scots. The regiment which would carry his name provides a unique opportunity to study English participation in the conflict because it makes an excellent stand-alone case study of the establishment, service and eventual disbandment of a military unit over an eighteen-year period.

The actual levy of the common soldiers themselves is first mentioned in a letter to Axel Oxenstierna in 1630 which reveals that they were to be levied in England and then moved directly to Stralsund under the orders of the son and namesake of the Stuart ambassador to Sweden, James Spens.[56] Thomas Sanderson, an Englishmen who would go on to be a captain in the regiment, accompanied Spens throughout this process so it seems reasonable to assume that the majority of the troops were levied during this trip.[57] John Caswell was also given permission to recruit, including: "condemned persons as are capable of the benefit of the King's general pardon".[58] Condemned persons had been included in levies before this but it serves to show that throughout the Thirty Years' War there would also be the need to press common soldiers into service. Caswell was successful in his levy and Sir James Spens wrote to Secretary Dorchester (Dudley Carleton) confirming that the levy of "a company of foot" had occurred and that the arrears owed to Caswell should be paid (around 160*l.*).[59] This recruiting activity resulted in the formation of the

55 See chapter 4 and Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway*.

56 RAOSB, second series, XIII:223–224.

57 Ibid.

58 CSPD, 16: 546; TNA, SP, 16/163 Sir James Spence Recipient: Dudley Carleton, Viscount Dorchester (March 1630), fol. 106. It is likely he is the same John Caswell who petitioned the privy council in 1626 and had served in Italy, Germany, Hungary, Bohemia, under Mansfeld and on the Cadiz expedition TNA, SP, 16/30 Petition of John Casswell to the Council (June 1626), fol. 146.

59 CSPD, 15:226.

regiment within the army of Prussia in July 1629 with both Caswell and Sanderson as officers.[60] The Swedish muster-rolls reveal conclusively that the men levied by Caswell and Fleetwood were English.[61] In many cases, the origins of the officers themselves is far from clear, however, it seems likely some had previous military experience. There was within the regiment two John Berkleys, one a major and the other a captain.[62] Major John Berkley was one of the longest serving officers within the regiment, initially enlisting in January 1630 and remaining until after June 1639 when he died in the service of Sweden.[63] Berkley provides another example of the successful integration of the English into the Scottish diaspora, indeed, he was so successful that when the archivist Karl Viggo Key assembled a collection of documents relating to Scottish involvement he included a muster roll from Berkley's company assuming them to be Scots.[64]

The command structure during these early months was relatively fluid as the regiment was formed. Indeed, the initial structure lasted just one month but the regiment was initially under the overall command of the man responsible for levying, James Spens with Fleetwood appearing as a Major.[65] More changes followed over following months before the gestation of the regiment settled into a period of calm and the following senior command structure that would remain in place for some time.[66]

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60 KRA, MR 1629/11 Preussen (July 1629), fols. 6–35.

61 For example see: KRA, MR 1629/18 Preussen (October 1629), fols. 174–184. John Caswell returned to England in 1632 to levy more soldiers on behalf of Sweden. These entered the regiment of Sir Thomas Conway who drowned on the way to Germany: CSPD, 16:430; Grosjean and Murdoch, *SSNE*.

62 Either of these could be the John Berkley who made up part of the earl of Southampton's levy to the Dutch Republic (1624). BL, Additional Manuscripts 46188 Papers related to regiments raised to assist the Palatinate (1624), fols. 32–33.

63 A selection of the muster rolls related to his career are: KRA, MR 1630/22 Preussen (January 1630); KRA, MR 1632/16 Preussen (July 1632); KRA, MR 1633/11 Preussen (January 1633); KRA, MR 1634/12 Preussen (January 1634); KRA, MR 1635/20 Preussen (January 1635); KRA, MR 1638/24 Pommern (July 1638); KRA, MR 1639/14 Pommern (February–March 1639).

64 KRA 0035:0418 Karl Viggo Key Samlingen, unfoliated.

65 This will be discussed in more detail later in the chapter KRA, MR 1629/11 Preussen (July 1629), fols. 6–35; KRA, MR 1629/14 Preussen (August 1629), fols. 107–136; KRA, MR 1629/16 Preussen (September 1629), fols. 95–127.

66 KRA, MR 1629/18 Preussen (October 1629), fols. 153–186. The final structure can be seen here: KRA, MR 1629/19 Preussen (November 1629), fols. 144–166.

Colonel James Spens
Lieutenant-colonel George Fleetwood
Major John Caswell
Captain Thomas Monepenny
Captain Thomas Sanderson
Captain Benjamin Eldred
Captain John Hall
Captain Gilbert Gordon[67]

The almost unique level of detail that Swedish records contain allows for a more comprehensive analysis of the regiment than we find regarding English units elsewhere.[68] The muster rolls, taken on a monthly basis, list all the officers and common soldiers which means that it is possible to establish that, throughout the regiment's existence, there were usually around 40 officers including those who held 'reformed' positions.[69] This level of detail is simply not available for study of the Dutch regiments or indeed those in Palatine or Danish service. It also means, within a reasonable margin for error, that it is possible say what nationality the officers and soldiers were. The English made up the majority of the officers providing 86 men or approximately 55 per cent of all the officers who served in the regiment between 1629 and 1640.[70]

Distinguishing the nationality of soldiery in the seventeenth century is far from an exact science. However, by cross-referencing the names with surname lists from the respective nations it is possible to make an educated guess what the origin of a soldier was.[71] There are obviously certain examples, notably Tiger Tartillis and Adam Zessi, where this is not possible and these officers are simply unknown.[72] Wales appears to have only provided around 5 per cent but there are a number of names, such as Thomas Wyne (derived from

67 KRA, MR 1629/19 Preussen (November 1629), fols. 144–166.

68 Far more detail can be found with Marks, 'England and the Thirty Years' War', pp. 142–153.

69 For example Reformed Ensign James Achkyne: KRA, MR 1630/28 Preussen (July 1630); KRA, MR 1630/30 Preussen (September 1630). Reformed officers could not take up their actual rank due to a lack of positions within the regiment but were still given the courtesy of their rank while often serving alongside the common men.

70 The figure is from the data contained within Figure 14 that is located at the end of this chapter.

71 Two such lists are: G.F. Black, *The surnames of Scotland: their origin meaning and history* (New York, 1962); P.H. Reaney and R.M. Wilson, *A dictionary of English surnames* (Oxford, 1995).

72 KRA, MR 1631/18 Preussen (1631); KRA, MR 1632/14 Preussen (1632).

Gwyn) which are clearly Welsh.[73] It seems likely there were considerably more Welshmen present but since many have names which were indistinguishable from their English counterparts or were anglicised by the scribes it is now not possible to distinguish them. Indeed, Gwyn is an interesting example of the dangers of drawing too many conclusions from names alone since there are also Scottish officers who carry this name within muster rolls.[74] Around 40 per cent of the officers were Scottish but this number is artificially high if taken for the entire decade since 53 of the 61 Scots officers were appointed in a very brief period when a Scot, namely George Lindsay earl of Crawford and described as George Crawford from here on, attempted to take control of the regiment from Fleetwood and flooded the regiment with his men. This episode will be returned to below. For now, it is enough to state that if the Scottish officers appointed under Crawford's brief tenure are removed from these figures, then the English make up 86 per cent of the regiment's officers which is a far more representative figure.[75]

In 1629 when the levy was assembled it is also clear that relatively few of the officers had seen military service within Sweden before the 1630s. Considering the success and survival of regiment that implies that many officers were veterans of other campaigns, as appears to be the case with Fleetwood himself.[76] Despite this prior lack of traceable service, many of the officers remained within the regiment for a considerable period of time which also demonstrates that despite the short and brutal lives which many common soldiers appear to have suffered during the Thirty Years' War officers could pursue careers over

73 KRA, MR 1630/22 Preussen (January 1630); KRA, MR 1630/24 Preussen (1630); KRA, MR 1630/26 Preussen (May 1630); KRA, MR 1630/27 Preussen (June 1630); KRA, MR 1630/28 Preussen (July 1630); KRA, MR 1630/29 Preussen (August 1630); KRA, MR 1630/30 Preussen (September 1630); KRA, MR 1630/31 Preussen (October 1630); KRA, MR 1630/32 Preussen (November 1630); KRA, MR 1630/33 Preussen (December 1630); KRA, MR 1631/13 Preussen (February 1631); KRA, MR 1631/15 Preussen (May 1631). More information is available on Welsh soldiers in Yee, *'An Investigation into Welsh involvement in the 'Protestant' side of the Thirty Years' War'*.

74 For example, William Gunn: KRA, MR 1630/38 Fälthären (July–December 1630); KRA, MR 1636/20 Pommern (August 1636); KRA, MR 1636/21 Pommern (September 1636); KRA, MR 1636/22 Pommern (October 1636). For more information see: Grosjean and Murdoch, *SSNE*.

75 The figure is from the data contained within Figure 14 that is located at the end of this chapter.

76 There were a few exceptions such as Christopher Potley (who had served in the regiment of Von Thurn), Robert and Thomas Muschamp (who had both served in the latter's regiment) and two Scottish officers. Equally, only one of the English officers had previously served within Hamilton's army, John Chamberlain, who went on to become a close associate of James King. See within the Figure 14 at the end of this chapter.

a long period. Unsurprisingly, a large section only served for one year or less, but this still only accounts for around 40 per cent of the officers. The remainder served longer with the regiment some remaining for up to eleven years. Those that left did not necessarily abandon Swedish service but could have been transferred to another regiment or have perished. Unfortunately, it is not possible to distinguish between these departures find out more.[77]

The records available for this regiment also allow this type of analysis to be undertaken for the common soldiers. The scale and composition of early modern regiments are notoriously difficult to ascertain. Firstly, and most importantly, the English soldiers who were levied clearly appeared in Germany and the regiment was, in 1629 comprised predominantly of English soldiers. In fact, around 80 per cent were English, supported by Scots, Irish and some whose origins could not be ascertained.[78] The following chart shows the development of the regiment throughout the 1630s and when significant casualties were taken. The gap in 1636 is caused by the lack of surviving muster rolls for this period, the only significant gap in the records.[79]



FIGURE 5 The size of George Fleetwood's regiment (1629–1639)[80]

77 The figure is from the data contained within Figure 14 that is located at the end of this chapter.

78 The figure is from the data contained within Figure 14 that is located at the end of this chapter.

79 More details of this can be found in Marks, 'England and the Thirty Years' War', p. 149.

80 KRA, MR 1629/20 Preussen (December 1629); KRA, MR 1630/33 Preussen (December 1630); KRA, MR 1631/15 Preussen (May 1631); KRA, MR 1632/17 Preussen (August 1632); KRA, MR 1633/16 Preussen (June 1633); KRA, MR 1634/19 Preussen (August 1634); KRA, MR 1635/30

5 Fleetwood's Regiment, Internal Politics and War

The first major action which can be linked to Fleetwood's regiment occurred at the handover between Danish and Swedish intervention in 1629. Stralsund was a key Baltic port and control of the town was important in preventing the development of an Imperial navy.[81] The fear of this threat led Sweden to develop relations with the port long before the withdrawal of Denmark from the war and both men and materiel had been poured into the city from 1627 onwards.[82] It is during this early phase that the first confusion over the nationality of the troops occurred. What I have been referring to as the regiment of George Fleetwood was technically at this point not under his command but under that of colonel James Spens the younger who had initially negotiated the levy and the regiment went on to be named the "Gamle Spens" (a title which means venerable implying they had seen significant action).[83] Since a Scot was the figurehead of the regiment and considering it served alongside more well-known Scottish regiments it is perhaps unsurprising this confusion exists.[84] In fact, at the time Fleetwood himself was mistaken for a Scot by the Swedish Riksråd, or perhaps represented himself as such, presumably due to his close relations with the Scottish military establishment within Sweden.[85] This assumption was a fair one to make, however, a return to the muster rolls changes our understanding, not only of the ethnicity of this regiment, but also of English involvement in one of the Thirty Years' War's most successful armies.

Preussen (September 1635); KRA, MR 1638/23 Pommern (May–June 1638); KRA, MR 1639/14 Pommern (February–March 1639).

81 This has been challenged recently by Geoffrey Mortimer on the grounds that a Catholic navy already existed in the Baltic though although it seems clear that Stralsund was still important since there was a distinction between a Catholic Polish navy and a Catholic Habsburg navy. Mortimer, *Wallenstein*, pp. 95–105.

82 Grosjean, *Unofficial Alliance*, p. 69; Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway*, pp. 215–216; Petersen, 'The Danish intermezzo', pp. 67–68.

83 "Literally: The Old Spens Regiment. When a regiment gets the name Gamle it can mean two things. Either the colonel has two regiments and gamle is given to the first levied or it can mean venerable (as in the Gamle Yellow)- implying that it has been around for a while and seen it all. I can see an etymology for 'formerly', but do not think that is what it is saying here I think it was probably built around veterans from James Spens senior (and had been around for a while and seen it all….)". My thanks to Steve Murdoch for this succinct definition.

84 Grosjean, *Unofficial Alliance*, p. 86; W.P. Guthrie, *Battles of the Thirty Years War: from White Mountain to Nördlingen, 1618–1635* (London, 2002), p. 170; William Watts, *The Swedish intelligencer. The first part*, p. 63. Grosjean does note the incoming English in the footnote and queries the numbers of Scots.

85 SRP, VII:474.

The initial appointment of James Spens as Colonel was primarily due to the patronage of his father and his role in the levying of the regiment rather than any role in command. The next most senior officer was George Fleetwood and it seems that it was he who actually was responsible for the day to day command of the regiment.[86] This was acknowledged when a year later Spens relinquished this title and requested that command be formally handed over to Fleetwood. That Fleetwood was running the day to day of the regiment is supported by the fact it was he who reported on the condition of the regiment in March 1630.[87] The presence of a Scottish commander combined and the prevalence of Scottish regiments within the army means it is an easy mistake to assume the regiment itself was Scottish.[88] This process was complicated because despite Spens's recommendations, command was initially handed to another Scot, George Crawford, as alluded to earlier in this chapter.[89] The reason for this appointment is not entirely clear but it seems that it was connected to his noble status which at this point made him socially superior to Fleetwood. Crawford's appointment was clearly not popular and caused tension within the regiment as Axel Oxenstierna noted:

> the Scottish count Crawford has arrived he has not been getting on with the English lt col [Fltwd] and the major and the captains; he got hold of the major [index has John Caswell] by the beard at one point; so now they all want to leave; which means that regiment is of little use but causes much worry.[90]

When these tensions within the regiment were reported, Axel Oxenstierna went even further stating that it would have been far better if Fleetwood had originally been appointed as the commander over Crawford, as Spens had desired.[91] It seems that part of these tensions were because Crawford brought his own officers in and demoted Fleetwood's initial choices. There is at least one case of an Englishman, Thomas Middleton, who was reduced in rank from a lieutenant to an ensign when Crawford took over the regiment. No reason is given for this but upon the re-assertion of Fleetwood within the regimental command structure he was promoted back to lieutenant and by 1639

86 KRA, MR 1629/20 Preussen (December 1629); Grosjean and Murdoch, *SSNE*.
87 RAOSB, first series, V:181.
88 For example: William Watts, The Swedish intelligencer. The first part, p.49.
89 KRA, MR 1630/27 Preussen (June 1630); KRA, MR 1630/28 Preussen (July 1630).
90 RAOSB, first series, V:474.
91 Grosjean and Murdoch, *SSNE*.

had risen to the rank of captain.[92] The Scottish officers brought in by Crawford all left soon after staying with the regiment for less time than the English officers.[93] Throughout these tensions the command structure remained in place until finally in 1632 Fleetwood was finally put in charge of the regiment.[94]

The Siege of Stralsund marked the handover from Denmark to Sweden and the successful defence of town was undertaken mainly by three Scottish regiments (Mackay's, Spynie's and Seton's) and one Danish regiment under Henrik Holke. These were reinforced with Scottish volunteers under Alexander Leslie who gained governorship of the town and environs.[95] Once Wallenstein had been turned away from the city, Stralsund served as the base of operations for clearing remnant garrisons in preparation for the main Swedish landing in 1630. It was in this period that the English troops of Fleetwood's 'Gamle Spens' regiment served.[96] These regiments having cleared the way; Gustav Adolf prepared the invasion of the Empire through Pomerania. Although tactically an obvious target, Pomerania was also important since the Swedish crown had long held territorial ambitions over the area. The initial invasion forces contained three regiments (around one-quarter of the force) which were described within the *Swedish Intelligencer* (one of the many regular sources of news in England during the 1630s) as Scottish.[97] These regiments were soon restructured into four and it was stated by Monro that "these four regiments

92 The time period for his promotion from lieutenant to captain is normal for the period A selection of muster rolls from his career are: KRA, MR 1629/18 Preussen (October 1629); KRA, MR 1629/19 Preussen (November 1629); KRA, MR 1629/20 Preussen (December 1629); KRA, MR 1630/26 Preussen (May 1630); KRA, MR 1630/27 Preussen (June 1630); KRA, MR 1630/28 Preussen (July 1630); KRA, MR 1630/29 Preussen (August 1630); KRA, MR 1630/30 Preussen (September 1630); KRA, MR 1630/31 Preussen (October 1630); KRA, MR 1630/32 Preussen (November 1630); KRA, MR 1630/33 Preussen (December 1630); KRA, MR 1631/15 Preussen (May 1631); KRA, MR 1632/16 Preussen (July 1632); KRA, MR 1632/17 Preussen (August 1632); KRA, MR 1632/18 Preussen (September 1632); KRA, MR 1632/19 Preussen (October 1632); KRA, MR 1632/20 Preussen (November 1632); KRA, MR 1632/21 Preussen (December 1632); KRA, MR 1638/23 Pommern (May–June 1638); KRA, MR 1638/27 Pommern (November–December 1638); KRA, MR 1639/14 Pommern (February–March 1639).

93 This is derived from the data contained within figure 14 at the end of this chapter.

94 KRA, MR 1632/16 Preussen (July 1632).

95 Murdoch and Grosjean, *Alexander Leslie*.

96 Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway*, pp. 215–216; RAOSB, second series, XIII:223–224; Grosjean, *Unofficial Alliance*, pp. 68–71.

97 William Watts, *The Swedish intelligencer. The first part*, p. 49. Note the *Swedish Intelligencer* describes Spens's regiment as Scottish.

of foot followed his majesty on all occasions".[98] One of these was Fleetwood's Englishmen and the regiment would go on to fight at the famous Swedish victory at Breitenfeld (7 September 1631) alongside Mackay's regiment, capturing a number of enemy colours.[99]

Fleetwood's service at the Battle of Lützen (6 November 1632), at which the Swedes emerged victorious but for the price of the life of their King, is perhaps more curious. This is the first point at which Fleetwood and his soldiers part company, since although Fleetwood himself was present, there is no evidence for his regiment (of around 1,400 men) taking part.[100] This is odd and there is a chance that either the regiment was missed from the order of battle, Fleetwood was there alone, or that Fleetwood was relaying an account from someone else. Whichever of these is the case, Fleetwood's account of the battle is interesting, since it shows that both sides of the conflict were matching each other in the development of tactics as he recounts that the Imperial army was structured in the same way as the Swedes.[101] It also provides an account of the death of Gustav Adolf:

> [the] King at the first charging to the graft, was shott through the arme and his horses neck; upon which they would fayne have perswaded him to have retyred, which he refused, rideing to the heade of the right winge of horse, incourageing them, saying nothing ailed him, and with that, comandeing them all to follow him, he leaped over the graft and charged the enimie; but there followed him but fower regiments, which weare encountred with soe many of the enimie that they were forced to retyre. And there the Kinge fell, being shott through the heade and through the bodye.[102]

This account, although undoubtedly dramatic, is not entirely accurate since the manner of the King's death does not agree with other accounts.[103] Whether this means Fleetwood was somewhere else on the battlefield and just trying to impress his father (to whom the account was directed) is not clear.

98 Robert Monro, *His Expedition*, pp. 11, p.107; Guthrie, *Battles of the Thirty Years War*, pp. 170–178; Grosjean, *Unofficial Alliance*, pp. 84–87.

99 William Watts, *The Swedish discipline*, p. 24 Account of Leipsich.

100 KRA, MR 1632/17 Preussen (August 1632); Wieselgren, *DelaGardiska Archive*, pp. 22–23.

101 Fleetwood, 'George Fleetwood to his father on the Battle of Lützen ', p. 6. For a contemporary order of battle of Lützen see: KB 14/3 Eenige quartiers en slagorders onder de Princen van Oranje (1622–1643), fol. 49.

102 Fleetwood, 'George Fleetwood to his father on the Battle of Lützen ', pp. 7–8.

103 Grosjean, 'Fleetwood, George'.

Although not at Lützen, the regiment suffered from heavy losses during the campaign and when mustered in June 1633 it had fallen from 1370 men to just 827 meaning it had suffered casualties of around 40 per cent.[104] Nevertheless the regiment continued to be a part of the Swedish "army of Prussia" until September 1635 when George Fleetwood's own name disappears from the muster rolls for his regiment.[105] Constructing what happened to the regiment over the period has proved particularly difficult, not least because Fleetwood and his troops potentially parted ways. It was around this time that Fleetwood prepared to go on a diplomatic mission to the Stuart court in London while his soldiers remained together in the field. It seems he was still present in January 1636 as Axel Oxenstierna defended Fleetwood's actions to the Duke Adolf Friedrich of Mecklenburg-Schwerin.[106] In the same month Johan Banér wrote to Oxenstierna requesting that Fleetwood should join Francis Ruthven and general Torstensson since he knew:

> Ruthven's humour and as General Torstensson has reported to me, what kind of difficulties he produced in Prussia and that he therefore has greatly damaged our estate and has caused delay, he will not be of service to me.[107]

This implies Fleetwood could not have left for London before early 1636. In February 1636, the regiment was commanded to join with a number of others in the Weser region to become a small 'volant' army operating across the region.[108] By March all six companies had been ordered into Westphalia to replace the losses that had been suffered there by the reconstituted Army of the Weser.[109]

In July 1636 the regiment was one of three to be transferred into the Army of the Weser under the direct command of field-marshal Alexander Leslie, and probably participated in the battle of Wittstock (October 1636).[110] Wittstock was one of the most remarkable (and bloody) battles of the conflict and was reliant on the exact co-ordination of the Swedish army to outflank and defeat a far larger Imperial force.[111] This involved the rapid movement of cavalry

104 KRA, MR 1632/17 Preussen (August 1632); KRA, MR 1633/16 Preussen (June 1633).
105 The last entry is: KRA, MR 1635/30 Preussen (September 1635), fols. 19–65.
106 RAOSB, first series, XV:92–93.
107 RAOSB, second series, VI:289.
108 RAOSB, first series, XV:127 and 165.
109 Ibid., pp. XV:127 and 289–290.
110 SRP, VI:389.
111 For more details of this battle and of the role of Scottish soldiers in it see: Murdoch, Zickermann and Marks, 'The Battle of Wittstock 1636', pp. 71–109.

through a dense forest on the left of the battlefield. Command of this action was undertaken by lieutenant-general James King and proved key to the outcome, but the pressure placed on the remaining two-thirds of the Swedish army was significant. Despite the success of the strategy there were many casualties taken by the army which in battle reports are almost universally blamed on the Swedish Field Marshall Banér and credit for the victory ascribed by Banér himself to Alexander Leslie.[112]

The muster rolls of the Army of the Weser do not survive to confirm this, so we are reliant on the instructions of the Riksråd to corroborate the English participation. Certainly a number of Swedish historians have noted that English soldiers did fight at the battle.[113] A number of "orders of battle" were produced for the battle of Wittstock which do indicate the positions of the various regiments across the field but there are significant differences between them.[114] One of these indicates that the co-commander of the reserve, major-general John Ruthven, commanded two regiments which were placed one either side of the other commander Johan Vitzthum von Eckstädt.[115] Ruthven was a close friend, relative (son-in-law) and ally of Alexander Leslie and this was to prove significant.[116] Vitzthum refused to commit the reserve when instructed and that eventually his men went forward against his orders (he was later tried for treason for this) it seems likely that Ruthven had been placed in the reserve with a pair of loyal regiments as a surrogate commander.[117] Considering that Fleetwood's regiment had already proved itself over the previous six years and was not listed elsewhere on the field of battle it seems possible, though this is far from certain, that one of the regiments was his English regiment. This is far from conclusive but the commands issued in 1636 combined with the rather

112 Stockholm, Riksarkivet, AOSB, AFD II, band 9 Alexander Leslie, Earl of Leven Report on the battle of Wittstock (1636); TNA, SP, 80/9 General King's Report of the Battle of Wittstock (1636), fols. 275–276. For a more detailed analysis of these differing reports and their impact on our understanding of the battle see: Murdoch, Zickermann and Marks, 'The Battle of Wittstock 1636', pp. 71–109.

113 Grosjean, *Unofficial Alliance*, p. 101; B. Steckzén, 'Wittstock 1636', in ed. N.F. Holm, *Det Svenska svärdet. Tolv avgörande händelser i Sveriges historia* (Stockholm, 1948), p. 112.

114 See between: KRA, Sveriges Krig 3/206 Wittstock Ordres de bataille (1636); KRA, Sveriges Krig 3/208 Wittstock Ordres de bataille (1636); KRA, Sveriges Krig 3/209 Wittstock Ordres de bataille (1636).

115 Ruthven is listed as a co-commander within the reports of James King and Alexander Leslie but not by Banér: SRA, AOSB, AFD II, band 9 Alexander Leslie, Earl of Leven Report on the battle of Wittstock (1636); TNA, SP 80/9 General King's Report of the Battle of Wittstock (1636), fols. 275–276; RAOSB, second series, VI:856–866.

116 Grosjean and Murdoch, *SSNE*.

117 SRP, VII:279, 285, 524 and 532.

grim fact that the regiment halved in size between September 1635 and January 1638 when Fleetwood retook control makes it likely that Fleetwood's regiment was present at Wittstock.[118]

Whilst Wittstock was being fought Fleetwood himself had returned to England on the instruction of the Swedish Chancellor. During his journey he met with Elizabeth of Bohemia who paid close attention to his attempts to negotiate an alliance with Charles I.[119] This was, as ever, agreed as part of a plan to restore the Elector Palatine to his German lands.[120] Fleetwood was one of a number of officers who were given money by Axel Oxenstierna to secure fresh levies for Swedish service:

TABLE 8 Officers sent to secure fresh levies in Britain by Axel Oxenstierna

Colonel Fleetwood	2,250 rdr
Colonel Monro	3,000 rdr
Colonel Cunningham	3,000 rdr
Lieutenant-colonel Monro	1,500 rdr
Lieutenant-colonel Leslie	1,500 rdr
Lieutenant-colonel Stewart	1,500 rdr
Total	12,750 rdr[121]

These negotiations were, as with those of his father, complicated by Charles's attempts to simultaneously negotiate with the Imperial side a tactic that he would repeat in the 1640s. Eventually he broke a promise to the Emperor not to allow levies whilst still claiming that although he was "a man of his word" since the Emperor had reneged on his obligation he now "offers and promises new recruitments as

118 Considering the scale of casualties within other regiments at the battle this is consistent and seems to support the case for their presence. KRA, MR 1635/30 Preussen (September 1635); KRA, MR 1637/15 Pommern (July–August 1637). However, the figures for this year are problematic. The only data available in this year is from Axel Oxenstierna who wrote that: "I have sent from Pomerania Erich Hansson's regiment of 12 companies, Berg's Finnish regiment of eight companies and Fleetwood's English regiment of 6 companies; which totals 2,000 men." If all companies were the same size it would be possible to deduce the scale of the regiment but the massive variation from company to company makes this impossible. RAOSB, first series, XV:290.

119 Grosjean, 'Fleetwood, George'; CSPD, 21:559.

120 TNA, SP, 95/4 Instructions for the servant of Sir George Fleetwood (26 October 1636), fol. 140; SRP, VI:772.

121 RAOSB, first series, XV:402–403.

with the old regiments to take place freely within his country."[122] Fleetwood's job was made more complicated through the competition that existed with the Dutch to secure any English soldiers available to fight for the Protestant cause. Fleetwood seems to have been given considerable latitude to negotiate for either a full alliance between Britain and Sweden or a simple levy of troops.[123] This confusion caused some delays and on the 16 December 1636 it was noted that:

> the Chancellor had told Fleetwood that it was unnecessary to enter into negotiations here before it was certain whether the King in England wanted to see the German war as his war or whether His Majesty only wanted to supply Her Majesty in Sweden with suitable weapons. Fleetwood could not answer.[124]

There was some initial delay in securing permission to levy whilst it was debated whether Charles would agree to the possibility of an alliance with France, invasion of the Empire or of using the Royal Navy to attack Imperial shipping in the North Sea.[125] These negotiations concerned not only the levying of English troops but also Scots and from 1637 onwards there appears to have been a focus on Scots in response to the continued difficulties in securing a levy in England.[126] The negotiations were not simply the affair of Fleetwood, but a series of discussions carried out by an Englishman since the envoy of the King during the period was John Berkley, another Englishman, who may have been related to the Berkleys serving within Fleetwood's regiment.[127] Certainly it seems to be a reasonable assumption that there was some link between these men considering that all were linked to Fleetwood in some capacity.

Attempts to secure this alliance were further hampered by a lack of funding. Correspondence between Joseph Averie (a merchant adventurer and Stuart merchant consul) based in Hamburg and Fleetwood reveals the increasing frustration felt by the two men.[128] In simple terms Oxenstierna did not wish

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122 SRP, VI:772. It is worth noting that from this it is not clear whether the country concerned is England, Scotland or indeed Britain.

123 Ibid.; ibid., pp. VII:32–34.

124 Ibid., p. VI:772.

125 Akkerman, ed. *Correspondence of Elizabeth Stuart. vol. 2*, p. 589; SRP, VI:772 and 778.

126 SRP, VII:22 and 37.

127 Ibid., p. VII:36; D.W. Hayton, 'Berkeley, John, first Baron Berkeley of Stratton (bap. 1607, d. 1678)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, (2004).

128 TNA, SP, 95/4 Joseph Averie to Sir George Fleetwood (15/25 June 1636), fol. 126. For more information on Averie see: Zickermann, *Across the German sea*, pp. 138–150.

to pay until a levy had been granted and Charles, fearing the financial consequences, refused to issue permission until money had appeared.[129] Fleetwood, in a final bid to help secure his arms, created a list of costs for the proposed regiment comparing it favourably to the costs of an English regiment in Dutch service.[130] There was competition with the States General to secure this levy and the Dutch ambassador kept track of Swedish progress noting in May 1637 that:

> His Majesty in the same session permitted the Swedish colonels, namely, Colonel Leidbout [Fleetwood] [to enlist], twelve hundred, Colonel Monroy [Monro] eight hundred, Colonel Kunningham [Cunningham] and another each eight hundred men, and further (as I understand) to enlist up to four thousand men, one-half in England and the other half in Scotland. The Spanish ambassador takes this very ill, saying that his master will look upon it as having been done against him particularly.[131]

Frustratingly it is unclear from either English state paper records or Swedish council records what the end result of these negotiations was but a degree of caution is needed surrounding the Dutch ambassador's figures since the privy council in Scotland only awarded Cunningham 400 men not the 800 stated.[132] What is clear is that by January 1638 when Fleetwood retook control of his greatly reduced regiment he had secured the levy of some English soldiers. He then continued to command his regiment throughout the campaigns of that year surrounding the Pomeranian town of Stettin.[133] His regiment was described as being in Ribnitz and Damgarten in November 1637 though it is unclear if Fleetwood was with his men.[134] After the commencement of hostilities within Britain Fleetwood and an English regiment passed through the Danish Sound accompanying Monro and his regiment before he became commandant at Greifswald and then Kolberg in the following year.[135] Subsequently he took up command of the Jönköping regiment which, although it contained

129 TNA, SP 95/4 Joseph Averie to Sir George Fleetwood (15/25 June 1636), fol. 126.

130 TNA, SP, 95/4 Cost of a Regiment of Foot by Colonel Fleetwood (1636), fol. 144.

131 Scots-Dutch Brigade, 1:436.

132 RPCS, 6:458.

133 W.P. Guthrie, *The later Thirty Years War: from the Battle of Wittstock to the Treaty of Westphalia* (London, 2003), pp. 68–69; KRA, MR 1638/21 Pommern (January–February 1638).

134 TNA, SP, 75/14 De Vic to (Coke), Hamburg (7/17 November 1637), fols. 411–412.

135 *Kancelliets Brevbøger, vedrørende Danmarks indre forhold I uddrag, udgivne ved E. Marquard af rigsarkivet, 1637–1639* (Copenhagen, 1944), p. 338. Orders to Admiral Mowatt from Christian IV, 11 April 1638. See chapter 6 for more information. Fleetwood himself

English officers, was not an English regiment.[136] Nor was Fleetwood's regiment the last English attempt to intervene in the Empire at this stage. The veteran, lord William Craven, also made one last attempt.

6 The Levy of William, Lord Craven (1638)

In July 1637 lord Craven, the Elector Palatinate, prince Rupert and the earls of Northampton and Warwick all met to organise one of the most curious investments of the English in the Thirty Years' War. This came in October 1638 when Craven privately funded and levied troops for service under Charles Louis, Elector Palatine.[137] The levy of 3,000 men was not successful and was destroyed in its first engagement resulting in the capture of not only Craven but also Prince Rupert. The defeat actually occurred at Vlotho on the Wesser.[138] Although eccentric in some ways Craven was clearly not new to war and had previously served within the Swedish army. His actions at the siege of Donnawert were praised within the *Swedish Intelligencer*.[139] Nadine Akkerman has provided the most optimistic assessment of the levy stating that financially the concept could have made a profit and alongside the presence of veterans and the experience of Elizabeth's own sons meant the campaign had far more chances of success than is often assumed.[140]

The forces of Craven and the Elector Palatine also joined forces with the experienced Swedish general, James King (a Scot who had served at the battle of Wittstock before being appointed governor of Vlotho in 1637).[141] As Thomas Roe noted "much is expected from him [King] here".[142] The early stages of the battle appear to have progressed relatively well with the combined forces of Sweden and Craven reaching 5,000 men opposing 6,000 Imperialist soldiers

never ceased to be in Swedish service during this period and on 5th March 1639 he received 1,000 Rdr from the Riksråd: SRP, VII:474.

136 KRA, MR 1645/21 Pommern (March–April 1645), fols. 157–166.

137 Murdoch, *Britain, Denmark-Norway*, p. 110.

138 Ibid., p. 111.

139 William Watts, *The Swedish intelligencer The second part. Wherein, out of the truest and choysest informations, are the famous actions of that warlike prince historically led along: from the victory of Leipsich, unto the conquest of Bavaria. The times and places of every action, being so sufficiently observed and described; that the reader may finde both truth and reason in it* (London 1632), p. 138.

140 Akkerman, ed. *Correspondence of Elizabeth Stuart. vol. 2*, p. 12.

141 Ibid., pp. 690–691 and 699.

142 Ibid., p. 691.

under General Hatzfeldt.[143] The turning point occurred when the Duke of Lüneburg with 1,000 horse and 1,000 foot split the Swedish and English troops resulting in the encirclement and capture of a large part of the army.[144] A number of important prisoners were taken by the Imperialists including Lord Craven but crucially the Elector Palatine managed to escape.[145] According to Elizabeth her sons "had lost no honour in this action".[146] It is clear that the escape of the Elector Palatine was more than a simple flight since he managed to withdraw a number of soldiers to the city of Minden where they were garrisoned and where King himself needed time to recover from his wounds.[147] Colonel Faulkner, who commanded 700 English and Scottish soldiers on behalf of the Elector Palatine, attempted to enter the city of Bremen but was denied entrance. He was permitted to pass over the Weser where after two days of fighting without victuals most of the men were slain or had fled.[148] The remaining Swedish and Palatine (i.e. English) forces continued to harass the enemy in the region of Minden and Osnabrück resulting in the re-capture of 14 standards and ensigns alongside taking prisoners.[149] The fate of the captured Lord Craven was written in a letter by Elizabeth who emphasised he was not going to suffer a forced conversion to Catholicism that "his disposition is good, and he neuer did disobey me at any time".[150] More importantly, the demise of the expedition, and the departure of the Englishmen in Fleetwood's regiment to participate in the Civil Wars ended 'large scale' participation – but not the influence – of Englishmen within the Swedish military.

7 Conclusion

The focus by historians on the English troops under Hamilton's forces completely ignores the far more significant role of not only Fleetwood's regiment,

143 Anon, *Numb*[*er*]. *1. An abstract of some special forreigne occurrences, brought down to the weekly newes, of the 20 of December. Or, The severall passages and novels which have happened in Germany, France, Spaine, Italy, and other places some few moneths since* (*printed* [*by T. Harper?*] *for Nathaniel Butter and Nicholas Bourne*) (London, 1638), p. 51.

144 Ibid.

145 Ibid., p. 52.

146 Akkerman, ed. *Correspondence of Elizabeth Stuart. vol. 2*, pp. 726–727 See also pp. 721–722.

147 Anon, *Numb*[*er*]. *1. An abstract of some special forreigne occurrences, brought down to the weekly newes, of the 20 of December.*, p. 64 and 73.

148 Ibid., p. 63.

149 Ibid., p. 92.

150 Akkerman, ed. *Correspondence of Elizabeth Stuart. vol. 2*, p. 726.

but also of the other English officers and soldiers present throughout the course of the conflict. In reality events of the 1630s were built upon the 1620s as some English in Sweden continued to fight for the Vasa crown. The actions of men such as Christopher Potley, Thomas and Henry Muschamp clearly inspired others to attempt to pursue a military career in Sweden and paved the way for the Englishmen who followed them in the 1630s. Englishmen in the levies of Hamilton and Fleetwood (Spens) fought within some of the most critical engagements of the conflict. The account of George Fleetwood's regiment is significant not just because it places English troops at the heart of the Swedish army but also within the very crucible of the Thirty Years' War.

TABLE 9 Timeline of Fleetwood's regiment (July 1629–March 1639)

July 1629	Entry to latter stages of siege of Stralsund (Pomerania).
June 1630	Gustavus Adolphus invasion of Pomerania.
April 1631	Battle of Frankfurt an der Oder (Brandenburg).
August 1631	Battle of Werben (Brandenburg).
September 1631	Battle of Breitenfeld (Saxony).
November 1631	Capture of Gartz (Brandenburg).
April 1632	Battle of Lech (Bavaria).
July 1632	Battle of the Alte Veste (Southwest of Nürnberg, Bavaria).
April 1633	Siege of Landsberg (takes place early 1633, month is a guess) (Bavaria).
September 1635	Fleetwood departs, regiment into Army of Weser.
October 1636	Battle of Wittstock (Brandenburg).
November 1636	Siege of Leipzig (Saxony).
December 1636	Siege of Leipzig (Saxony).
January 1637	Retreat to Torgau (Saxony).
January 1638	Fleetwood returns, by now retreated to Stettin (Pomerania).
February 1638	Participation in Stettin Breakout attempts.
March 1639	English Troops leave.

As this timeline of Fleetwood's regiment shows, English troops were present during the post-Stralsund period (1628–9) in a stage of the conflict vital to the preparation of the landing of the Swedish Crown Army in Northern Germany. They also fought in the battles of Breitenfeld (1631), Lech and Alte Veste (1632). Fleetwood's regiment also appear to have been part of the great turning points of Swedish fortunes: the Battle of Wittstock (1636) and the Stettin Breakout (1636–1638). Given these facts, we should consider this group of Englishmen,

if not England itself, as an ally of Sweden during the period, even if in a covert capacity. Certainly the Stuart crown was using the resources of all three kingdoms to support the Swedish campaigns in the Empire.

The breakdown of relations between the English Parliament and Charles meant that his limited English support of Sweden was attractive because it did not cost him as much as campaigns like Cadiz. As his father discovered before him, the use of covert force was a highly effective method of supporting an ally. Charles's use of Scottish and English soldiers to counterbalance the other negotiations he undertook during the 1630s has clear similarities with his father's actions of the 1620s. However, unlike his father's actions his covert (and overt) Catholic negotiations never appeared to be working in tandem with his Swedish and Dutch allies.[151] Indeed, Charles's inability to heed advice from his experienced diplomats and soldiers caused significant problems, notably through his appointment of court favourites to positions of authority within the Cadiz and La Rochelle expeditions.[152] This pattern was repeated in the 1640s when he again ineffectually dragged out negotiations with multiple parties during the Wars of the Three Kingdoms.[153]

Along with the actions of the Anglo-Dutch brigades the presence of some English soldiers in Sweden adds to the significant questions about whether the 1630s were a peaceful period (as often espoused), and about the extent to which Charles was still actively involved in the Thirty Years' War. Atherton and Sanders wrote that peace was "the defining characteristic of the 1630s" but the continued presence of English soldiers within the Dutch Republic and Sweden, combined with the continued public interest in war, challenges this and demands a more nuanced explanation.[154] Atherton himself argues for some caution here, pointing out that England was not alone and must be analysed within a European

151 For details of these see: T. Lindquist, 'John Taylor (1597–1655), English Catholic Gentleman and Caroline Diplomat', *Recusant History*, 28.1 (2006), pp. 75–94; Marks, 'The Scots in the Italian Peninsular during the Thirty Years' War', pp. 327–348; M. Smuts, 'Religion, European Politics and Henrietta Maria's Circle, 1625–41', in ed. E. Griffey, *Henrietta Maria: piety, politics and patronage* (Aldershot, 2008), pp. 13–38; Worthington, 'Alternative Diplomacy?', pp. 51–76.

152 Jacqueline Rose has also pointed out within an ecclesiastical context that: "Charles was not a king who tended to be amenable to counsel if it did not contain the advice which he wished to hear." J. Rose, 'Kingship and Counsel in Early Modern England', *The Historical Journal*, 54.01 (2011), p. 62.

153 C. Holmes, *Why was Charles I executed?* (London, 2006), pp. 97–99.

154 I. Atherton and J. Sanders, 'Introducing the 1630s: questions of parliaments, peace and pressure points', in ed. I. Atherton and J. Sanders, *The 1630s: interdisciplinary essays on culture and politics in the Caroline era* (Manchester, 2006), p. 3.

context.[155] The scale of involvement must also be emphasised since, albeit over a longer time period, more English soldiers were levied for Swedish service than for Danish, despite the greater previous historiographical attention towards the latter. This chapter has outlined a significant part of this context.

All of this must be placed against the background of the extensive Scottish involvement in Sweden since under Charles far more Scots than Englishmen entered Swedish service. Those Englishmen who managed to forge successful careers did so by integrating themselves with the Scots. The interaction between the Scottish and English troops is significant. At least two Scottish colonels commanded wholly English regiments in the 1630s, Sir William Bellenden and Sir James Ramsay (the fair).[156] There were numerous other groups of English soldiers in the field, for example, a group in 1637 under the command of William Vavasour who had previously served in Hamilton's army.[157] There were also individual Englishmen operating beyond the ethnically English regiments. At the siege of Donnawert in 1632 three Englishmen: William Lord Craven, Nicholas Slanring and Robert Marsham all volunteered to serve alongside Sir John Hepburn.[158] In combination with the co-operation clearly occurring within the Dutch Republic the level of familiarity and integration challenges broad statements such as "one cannot help but notice there was always a certain degree of friction between the different nations of the British Isles when they served together in foreign armies."[159] The co-operation between the English and Scottish soldiers had a significant legacy and throughout the British Civil Wars it must be remembered that many of the officers on all sides had fought side by side in the Low Countries and Sweden. Though 1638 marked an end of English involvement in some cases, notably Fleetwood's regiment, many Englishmen did stay on including Fleetwood himself, Christopher Potley, Hugh Potter and Bryan Stapelton. Indeed, alongside Robert Douglas, Patrick More and Alexander 'Arvid' Forbes, Fleetwood became one of just four British veterans of the Thirty Years' War who would go on to serve on the executive board of the *Krigsråd* (college of war), a potent illustration of his influence within the Swedish military establishment.[160]

155 Ibid., p. 13. Jonathan Scott has also argued this: Scott, *England's troubles*, pp. 113–135.

156 Bellenden is referred to as Bellenden, Bellentine and Valentine in various places but is the same person. Robert Monro, *His Expedition*, p. 2 'List of Officers'.

157 Grosjean and Murdoch, *SSNE*.

158 William Watts, *The Swedish intelligencer. The second part*, p. 138.

159 Manning, *An apprenticeship in arms*, p. 93.

160 This appointment was made after the Thirty Years' War. Ailes, *Military migration and state formation*, p. 56. See also Murdoch and Grosjean, *Alexander Leslie*. For details of Patrick Moore see: Zickermann, *Across the German sea*, pp. 165–172.

TABLE 10 List of officers who served under George Fleetwood (1629–1639)

Surname	First name	Nationality	Rank	Dates
Achkyne	James	English	Reformed Ensign	1630
Afleck	James	Scottish	Reformed Ensign	1631
Alcock	Thomas	English	Ensign	1637
Apleyard	Matthew	English	Captain	1632–1637
Apleyard	Thomas	English	Captain	1632–1638
Aston	Robert	English	Ensign	1638
Auchterlony	John	Scottish	Quartermaster	1631–1632
Barker	Anthony	English	Lieutenant	1630–1635
Bates	Cuthbert	English	Ensign	1632
Bates	George	English	Reformed Ensign	1633–1635
Berkley	John	English	Major	1630–1639
Berkley	John	English	Captain	1638–1639
Best	Paul	English	Ensign	1632–1637
Betz	William	English	Lieutenant Captain	1630–1631
Bleare	Peter	English	Reformed Ensign	1633–1635
Boles	Richard	English	Reformed Captain	1635
Brakton	Thomas	English	Reformed Ensign	1635
Bredte	David	Scottish	Captain	1631–1632
Brellford	Theophilius	English	Ensign	1632–1635
Brookes	William	English	Reformed Ensign	1630
Brounker	Henry	English	Captain	1632–1633
Brown	James	Scottish	Lieutenant Captain	1633
Buchan	John	English	Reformed Ensign	1630–1631
Burrell	Timothy	English	Ensign	1632–1634
Carmer	Lawrence	English	Reformed Ensign	1631
Caswell	John	English	Colonel	1629–1636
Chamberlain	John	English	Lieutenant Colonel	1632–1639
Chamberlain	John	English	Reformed Ensign	1632–1638
Christie	George	Scottish	Auditor	1630
Clapp	James	English	Lieutenant	1632–1635
Clerk	Francis	Scottish	Captain	1630–1631
Cobreth	John	Scottish	Reformed Ensign	1631
Coffinger	William	English	Lieutenant	1631–1633
Collar	David	Scottish	Reformed Ensign	1630
Colombell	Thomas	English	Reformed Ensign	1632–1634
Colmwood	William	English	Reg. Secretary/ Officer	1630

TABLE 10 List of officers who served under George Fleetwood (1629–1639) (*cont.*)

Surname	First name	Nationality	Rank	Dates
Cook	Thomas	English	Major	1632–1635
Coult	George	English	Reformed Ensign	1632
Coutes	Alexander	Scottish	Reformed Lieutenant	1630–1631
Crawford	Alexander	Scottish	Lieutenant Colonel	1633–1635
Crawford	George	Scottish	Colonel	1629–1633
Cullon	Aleander	Scottish	Reformed Lieutenant	1630–1632
Cunningham	William	Scottish	Captain	1630
Cunningsby	William	English	Captain	1637–1638
Cutbert	Alexander	English	Ensign	1638
Davis	Robert	English	Lieutenant	1632–1638
Dillon	Nathanael	British	Reformed Ensign	1632–1635
Duncan	David	Scottish	Captain	1630–1632
Duncombe	Edward	English	Reformed Lieutenant	1632–1635
Edwards	Thomas	Welsh	Lieutenant	1629–1632
Ernesdaile	Francis	English	Lieutenant	1637
Erskine	James	Scottish	Reformed Ensign	1631–1635
Feathersbie	John	English	Ensign	1632
Fleetwood	George	English	Colonel	1629–1630
Fleetwood	James	English	Lieutenant	1630, 1634–1639
Fleetwood	Oliver	English	Ensign	1637–1639
Forat	John	Scottish	Captain	1629
Forbisher	John	English	Ensign	1637–1638
Forrester	Edward	English	Lieutenant	1631
Foster	Edward	English	Captain	1629–1638
Fotherby	Henry	English	Ensign	1633–1635
Fraser	Thomas	Scottish	Ensign	1630–1632
Gaul	Osvald	British	Captain	1631–1632
Gladstone	Hebert	Scottish	Lieutenant	1632
Goodrick	Daniel	English	Captain	1632–1635
Gordon	Gilbert	Scottish	Captain	1629–1631
Gordon	John	Scottish	Reformed Lieutenant	1630
Grant	James	Scottish	Reformed Lieutenant	1630
Haddon	Richard	English	Ensign	1639
Harrison	Charles	English	Reformed Lieutenant	1629–1631
Hay	Robert	Scottish	Captain	1632
Heale	Francis	English	Ensign	1632–1634

TABLE 10 List of officers who served under George Fleetwood (1629–1639) (*cont.*)

Surname	First name	Nationality	Rank	Dates
Henderson	James	Scottish	Reformed Ensign	1631
Hickerngill	Edmond	English	Captain	
Hide	David	English	Reformed Ensign	1637
Hobby	Thomas	English	Reformed Lieutenant	1632–1633
Hull	John	English	Captain	1629–1635
Hull	Thomas	English	Reformed Ensign	1631
Hume	William	Scottish	Lieutenant	1630
Ironsdale	Francis	English	Lieutenant	1638
James	Edvard	Scottish	Ensign	1638
Keith	James	Scottish	Lieutenant	1630–1631
Kinnemond	Jakob	Scottish	Major	1631–1632
Landon	Edvard	English	Ensign	1637–1639
Lawder	James	Scottish	Major	1633–1636
Leist	Hans George	English	Captain	1631–1632
Leslie	George	Scottish	Ensign	1639
Lindsay	Alexander	Scottish	Colonel	1632–1636
Lindsay	Andrew	Scottish	Lieutenant Colonel	1631–1632
Lindsay	David	Scottish	Reformed Ensign	1630
Lindsay	Francis	Scottish	Ensign	1631–1632
Lindsay	John	Scottish	Ensign	1630–1631
Lindsay	William	Scottish	Ensign	1630–1635
Linvingstone	John	Scottish	Reformed Lieutenant	1630–1632
Maynore	Andrew	English	Reformed Lieutenant	1632–1633
Middleton	Thomas	English	Captain	1629–1639
Miller	James	English	Ensign	1629–1639
Mills	Francis	English	Ensign	1629–1631
Moncor	Andrew	Scottish	Reformed Lieutenant	1630–1632
Monnepenny	Thomas	Scottish	Captain	1630
Montgomery	James	Scottish	Captain	1631
Monypenny	David	Scottish	Reformed Ensign	1631
Morgan	Alexander	Welsh	Ensign	1629–1630
Morrison	Richard	English	Reformed Captain	1632–1634
Muschamp	Robert	English	Captain	1630, 1633–1634
Muschamp	Thomas	English	Reformed Lieutenant	1637
Norwood	Henry	English	Ensign	1632–1639
Nudegat	Henrik	English	Ensign	1637

TABLE 10 List of officers who served under George Fleetwood (1629–1639) (*cont.*)

Surname	First name	Nationality	Rank	Dates
Ogilvie	George	Scottish	Captain	1629–1633
Owen	Gerald	English	Lieutenant	1632–1640
Parry	Richard	English	Ensign	1638
Pashley	George	English	Reformed Ensign	1632
Pate	Adam	English	Reformed Ensign	1638
Pitblade	Andrew	Scottish	Ensign	1630
Potley	Christopher	English	Lieutenant Colonel	1632–1635
Potter	Hugh	English	Lieutenant	1637–1640
Preston	Thomas	Scottish	Ensign	1630–1631
Ramsay	James	Scottish	Captain of Arms	1632–1633
Ramsay	William	Scottish	Ensign	1632–1633
Rashley	George	English	Reformed Ensign	1632
Richelieu	George	Unknown	Reformed Ensign	1637
Rigslay	George	English	Ensign	1639
Robertson	Alexander	Scottish	Lieutenant	1632–1633
Sambroke	William	English	Reg. Chaplain	1639
Sanderson	Thomas	Scottish	Major	1629–1632
Santler	Edvard	English	Reformed Ensign	1637
Savage	John	English	Reformed Ensign	1632–1635
Semple	John	Scottish	Reformed Ensign	1632
Shardelon	Thomas	English	Lieutenant	1629–1631
Sheild	John	English	Lieutenant	1637–1639
Shorland	Richard	English	Captain	1638–1639
Sinclair	Francis	Scottish	Reformed Ensign	1630
Sinclair	William	Unknown	Reformed Ensign	1630
Smith	John	English	Ensign	1638–1639
Spry	Richard	English	Ensign	1629–1635
Stapleton	Brian	English	Quartermaster	1630–1640
Stewart	David	Scottish	Reformed Lieutenant	1630–1631
Strang	John	English	Reformed Lieutenant	1630–1632
Stuart	James	Scottish	Captain	1631
Sydserfe	Alexander	Unknown	Ensign	1631
Tartillis	Tiger	Unknown	Reformed Lieutenant	1632
Waddel	Thomas	Scottish	Lieutenant	1637–1638
Walsh	William	Scottish	Doctor	1630
Ware	William	English	Reformed Ensign	1633

TABLE 10 List of officers who served under George Fleetwood (1629–1639) (*cont.*)

Surname	First name	Nationality	Rank	Dates
Waterstone	William	Unknown	Reformed Ensign	1630
Weare	William	Scottish	Reformed Ensign	1634–1635
Wells	Cuthbert	English	Lieutenant	1632–1635
White	John	English	Lieutenant	1630, 1634–1635
Willmar	William	English	Lieutenant	1637–1639
Wiske	Salomon	Scottish	Captain	1631–1632
Wood	John	Scottish	Captain	1630–1631
Wood	Ralph	English	Reformed Ensign	1638
Wood	Robert	Scottish	Reformed Ensign	1631
Wright	Robert	English	Reformed Ensign	1632
Wyne	Thomas	Welsh	Reformed Ensign	1630–1631
Young	Archibald	Scottish	Ensign	1631–1632
Zessi	Adam	Unknown	Lieutenant	1631

THIS INFORMATION IS COMPILED FROM TWO PRINCIPAL SERIES WITHIN SWEDISH KRIGSARKIV: THE MUSTER ROLLS FOR FLEETWOOD'S REGIMENT (NAMED SPENS AND CRAWFORD DURING THE APPROPRIATE PERIOD) AND THE KARL VIGGO KEY SAMLINGEN (0035:0418). THE SCOTLAND SCANDINAVIA AND NORTHERN EUROPE DATABASE OF ALEXIA GROSJEAN AND STEVE MURDOCH ALSO PLAYED AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN AIDING THE COLLECTION OF THIS DATA.

Legacy

> A good number of officers here, both English and Scots, are asking permission to return to their native country, some to take sides with the king's forces and others in favour of the opposite faction, according to their natural inclinations or through the more fervent stimulus of passion. The Prince resigns himself to this most unwillingly, as by such means he sees a considerable number of his tried military leaders disappearing.
>
> (The Venetian Ambassador to The Hague, 25 October 1638).[1]

⁘

1638 changed everything for the English soldiers of the Thirty Years' War. Suddenly many of the issues that had motivated them to leave their homes became the focus of a violent conflict across the Stuart kingdoms. The responses to this change were individual, not as a coherent block. The diversity and individuality of these responses means that trying to draw broad conclusions is difficult, as indeed it is to draw them about their motivations for fighting in the Thirty Years' War in the first place. As to be expected in a Civil War some fought for and against the Stuart crown whilst others felt that the more important fight remained on the continent. The most fundamental shift was simple. England was no longer as significant a contributor to the Thirty Years' War but many of the arguments and personnel continued the same fights but across Britain and Ireland. Whilst it is clear this was not a direct copy of the German conflicts it was a relative of them. It is more than a decade since Allan Macinnes postulated that the Civil Wars constituted a "British theatre" of the Thirty Years' War and this thesis needs to be reassessed in the context of England.[2] At times, and perhaps understandably, there has been a domestic focus to English Civil War studies which has been combined with a failure to engage with continental sources due to the overwhelming scale and quality of the sources available in English archives. Perhaps inevitably, this has led to many downplaying the role of Thirty Years' War veterans on the conflict.

1 Razzell, ed. *The English Civil War, Vol. 1*, p. 225; CSPV, 24:464–465.

2 Macinnes, *British Revolution*, p. 119.

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This final section will not seek to provide a definitive answer to the questions that inevitably arise from linking the Civil Wars and the Thirty Years' War, that would require far more focussed work on the 1640s, but the body of evidence analysed up to this point shows that the scale of English engagement within the wars of 1618 to 1638 was so great that such engagement did not just stop. The conflicts of the 1620s and 1630s would clearly have consequences for the disputes of the 1640s both at home and abroad. Jonathan Scott has perhaps gone the furthest trying to set the Civil Wars within in a European context:

> The last act of the Thirty Years' War was not the Peace of Westphalia, or that of Münster, but the execution of Charles I. For what distinguished the English experience of this conflict was not its causes – by which we have been so fruitlessly obsessed – but its consequences. These were not, as in the Habsburg case, a victory for monarchical state-building and Counter-Reformation. In England they were the destruction of monarchy; a first experience in state-building (and military strength) under a republic; and that radical Reformation that we call the English Revolution.[3]

Such a case appears uncontroversial considering that the personnel who fought across Europe and came to the British Isles as the leaders of the various factions were either products of the Thirty Years' War directly or influenced by it. The recent work of Steve Murdoch and Alexia Grosjean has convincingly shown the almost seamless continuity between motivation and personnel in a Scoto-Swedish context.[4] They have also shown that these men played a pivotal role in the wars that took place in Britain. In an English context one example, of the no doubt many that may exist, which shows the scale of English veteran involvement is at the Battle of Edgehill where both Swedish and Dutch tactics where deployed.[5] A brief analysis of the upper command of the two armies shows why:

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3 J. Scott, 'England's Troubles 1603–1702', in ed. R.M. Smuts, *The Stuart court and Europe: essays in politics and political culture* (Cambridge, 1996), p. 29; Scott, *England's troubles*, pp. 29 and 157–158. Perhaps the first attempt in the twentieth century to engage significantly with the Thirty Years' War was by Ian Roy and this two is worth mentioning since it comments that continental veterans were found within the senior levels of command within the various Civil War armies. Roy, 'England turned Germany?', pp. 127–144.

4 In particular chapters 5 and 6. Murdoch and Grosjean, *Alexander Leslie*.

5 C.L. Scott, A. Turton and E. Gruber von Arni, *Edgehill: the battle reinterpreted* (Barnsley, 2004), pp. 34–35. For an analysis of the size of each army see: A. Graham, 'The Earl of Essex and Parliament's Army at the Battle of Edgehill: A Reassessment', *War in History*, 17 (2010), pp. 276–293.

TABLE 11 List of staff commanders at Edgehill

Rank	Parliament	Royalist
General	*Robert Devereux, third earl of Essex*[a]	*Robert Bertie, earl of Lindsey*[b]
Lieutenant General	William Russell, earl of Bedford	*Patrick Ruthven, earl of Forth*[c]
Sergeant Major General	*Sir John Meyrick*[d] Thomas Ballard (acting)	*Sir Jacob Astley*[e]
Lieutenant General of Horse	*Sir William Balfour*[f]	*Prince Rupert of the Rhine.*[g]

(*Those with continental service are in italics with one illustrative source footnoted.*)[6]

a BL, Additional Manuscripts 46188 Papers related to regiments raised to assist the Palatinate (1624), fols. 29–31.

b BL, Additional Manuscripts 46188 Papers related to regiments raised to assist the Palatinate (1624), fol. 28.

c RAOSB, second series, IV:457–8.

d A.J. Hopper, 'Meyrick [Merrick], Sir John (c. 1600–1659)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, (2008).

e Grosjean and Murdoch, *SSNE*.

f Hatfield, Hatfield House, the Cecil Papers, CP 129/145 Sir Dudley Carleton to the Earl of Salisbury (24 November 1618); BL, Additional Manuscripts 46188 Papers related to regiments raised to assist the Palatinate (December 1624), fols. 50–51; Petrie, ed. *The Letters of Charles I*, pp. 50–51.

g As a member of the Palatine family this seems to speak for itself.

Before the full scale of the crossover between the two can be firmly concluded more research would be needed, but from 1638 onwards although some English stayed on the continent many English participants of the Thirty Years' War were clearly focussed on their homeland.[7] None of these people changed overnight, nor appear to have lost their motivations and even many of those who had never left England were impressionable to the same ideas, motivations, and combat techniques as those who came home incubating them. When John Rushworth, the secretary of the Council of War for the New Modelled Army,

6 Information on the commanders at Edgehill is taken from: Scott, Turton and Gruber von Arni, *Edgehill*. There were also Dutch officers present at Edgehill, see: M. Stoyle, *Soldiers and strangers: an ethnic history of the English Civil War* (New Haven, 2005), p. 103.

7 Murdoch, 'Nicrina ad Heroas Anglos', p. 16.

set about writing a history leading up to the Civil Wars he framed it within the context of the Thirty Years' War.[8] Rushworth argued vehemently that the origins were not simply domestic but tied to the failure to restore the Palatinate during the 1620s.[9] Such an argument can be viewed as simply trying to reframe domestic events but considering the personnel involved in the conflict I do not think it is a stretch to suggest that there may be something more concrete and that for many English officers there was a genuine mental link between the two. For those that did not embark on a bittersweet homecoming the Thirty Years' War remained an active conflict. For instance, in 1643 four colonels still commanded Englishmen in the State General.[10] The existence of these regiments shows that involvement in the continental events of the Thirty Years' War did not end for England in the 1640s. This is important to keep some sense of perspective. Yes, it is true that to a significant number of English soldiers the Civil Wars became their focus, but even during this latter period the English regiments within the Dutch Republic continued to fight. An important example of this is the siege of Hulst in 1645 where around one quarter of the Dutch Republic's army comprised of British companies.[11]

It has long been accepted that understanding a conflict as complex as the Thirty Years' War requires multiple perspectives.[12] This monograph serves to add another one of these and alongside existing research on the conflict fills a lacuna which I hope enriches our understanding of both the conflict itself and of Stuart Britain. The defence of the Palatinate between 1620 and 1623 was a significant and often ignored English military enterprise that also played an

8 Scott, *England's troubles*, p. 28.

9 John Rushworth, *Historical collections*; Scott, 'England's Troubles', pp. 28–29. Arthur Wilson also produced an account critical of Stuart policy which was published in 1653: Arthur Wilson, *The history of Great Britain being the life and reign of King James the First, relating to what passed from his first access to the crown, till his death* (London, 1653). Conversely it is clear that Charles's European diplomats were kept informed of domestic events. William Boswell, for example, received a copy of the Lord Keeper's speech in 1640: Den Haag, Nationaal Archief, 1.01.02 5895.118 Transcription of the Lord Keepers Speech (1640).

10 Scots-Dutch Brigade, 1:328; Murdoch, 'Nicrina ad Heroas Anglos', pp. 32–34. The regiments were commanded by colonels Goring, Herbert, Grave and Cromwell and in 1643 a further round of recruitment took place. A year later in 1644 several Royalist prisoners were sent to France where they continued to fight against the Habsburgs.

11 Murdoch, 'Nicrina ad Heroas Anglos', p. 34.

12 Murdoch, 'Introduction', p. 2; W. Maltby, 'Review: The Thirty Years' War. by Geoffrey Parker', *The Sixteenth Century Journal*, 17.4 (1986), p. 526. Geoffrey Parker's edited volume is also an excellent example of this: G. Parker, ed. *The Thirty Years' War* (London, 1997).

important role in the diplomacy of the period. The presence of armies that were commanded by an Englishmen, relied upon English recruits and that were under the orders and pay of the Stuart crown throughout the Thirty Years' War had consequences for the failure of attempts to make peace in the early 1620s. Though clearly there were other more influential powers during the conflict, a fact this monograph has never sought to dispute, this is one of a few crucial moments that are inexplicable without analysing the role of England. Without the presence of these men, the Palatinate would have been surrendered far sooner, and Spain would have gained a crucial upper hand far earlier in the war. The strategy of holding Heidelberg, Mannheim and Frankenthal was a Stuart plan that linked military and diplomatic policy. It also bought the time James needed to find out what, if any, response could be mustered from the English Parliament and crucially whether he could secure a satisfactory outcome to the Spanish match negotiations.

Building upon this Charles's engagement in the failures of *Kejserkrig* increased the sense of frustration felt by many Englishmen. That the Anglo-Dutch brigades were scattered between three campaigns (Cadiz, *Kejserkrig* and La Rochelle) without an apparent coherent set of objectives meant that they were overstretched and ultimately unsuccessful in securing any positive outcomes. Ironically, since few appeared to notice, Charles's policies in the 1630s were far more successful at supporting the Protestant cause. The success of the Scottish and English soldiers in Sweden alongside those at the major engagements in the Low Countries showed that England was still a capable military power that could significantly influence events on the battlefield. Such a record means that the oft unchallenged assertion that the English remained separate from the war does not match the reality of tens of thousands of Englishmen fighting across the battlefields of Europe.

Whilst it is clear there is far more work that could be done, the research I have conducted on the role of the English within the Low Countries has exposed the details of a particularly close military alliance that endured both changes of national leadership and the ebb and flow of war. The central importance of the Anglo-Dutch brigades to both the Dutch and broader Stuart policy means that without them the war in the Low Countries would have taken a very different course and that neither the Palatinate nor the Danish campaigns could have been undertaken. The Cadiz and La Rochelle expeditions also relied heavily on the regiments of the Dutch Republic in terms of personnel and expertise. In themselves, these four campaigns are important, but the English contribution to the Eighty Years' War had an even greater impact.

The English contribution to warfare in the Low Countries continued into the seventeenth century and the systems, administrations, personnel and policies of Tudor England did not disappear overnight. It is possible to see the engagement of the English within the Thirty Years' War as a progression of policy rather than a radical break from it. Indeed, the alignment of objectives and policy between the Anglo-Dutch and Scotch-Dutch brigade from 1603 was in keeping within Stuart policy across the board. The Anglo-Dutch brigade post 1603 should therefore not be treated as an endnote to the Elizabethan campaigns as some of their most important contributions took place after the arrival of the Stuarts to the English throne. The English forces at the siege of Breda, and particularly the assault on Terhyde (1625), played a key role in shaping the course of the battles in question. Subsequently, the English led the assaults at s'Hertogenbosch (1629) and then the siege of Maastricht (1632). Victory at Maastricht split the lines of communication between the capital of the Spanish Netherlands and the Habsburg forces in Westphalia marking a significant victory for the Dutch. It was English soldiers who commanded and, in many cases, lost their lives in the assault that led to this victory. Five years later, despite the intervening death of Horace Vere who had commanded the regiments at Maastricht, the English again were central to the Dutch victory at the second siege of Breda. These men, and other soldiers from outwith the Low Countries need to be placed firmly into the canon of the Eighty Years' War and Thirty Years' War to gain a more nuanced understanding of the warfare and politics of the period.

Understanding English military engagement on the continent during the period of 1618 to 1648 is required not only to show that England was in fact a participant in continental warfare and enrich our understanding of Stuart policy but also to add to our understanding of the war itself. There are wider lessons to be learned from this research. In particular, I agree with David Parrot that the temptation to view early modern armies and foreign policy through the prism of nation states is clearly inadequate to explain the many layers to the legal and political structures of the time.[13] The Dutch army throughout the period was raised from a variety of European territories and to fully understand its operations we need to understand the terms by which those soldiers fought.

The role of the English is important to understanding specific moments on the battlefields of the Thirty Years War' but also in explaining some of these wider trends. Through treating them as a case study it illustrates effectively how the Stuart kingdoms could remain involved in the persecution of a war

13 Parrott, *The Business of War*, p. 2.

that they claimed to be separate from when diplomatically expedient. Through incorporating the role of the English abroad into our understanding of Stuart foreign policy this monograph has moved the usual diplomatic and political narratives that surround them. The significance of the English military diaspora to development and execution of policy means that they need to be understood alongside the more traditional analysis of the relations between the Crown and Parliament. My research highlights the significant capacity of the Crown to conduct policy outwith the control of the House of Commons. The military policies of James and Charles in Sweden and the Low Countries are stark reminders that the English parliament did not have a monopoly on military force. The English military community, fashioned primarily around the Dutch Republic, acted as the backbone of English military power during the period and constituted a *de facto* standing army. Whilst the actual standing armies of Charles II and James II are perhaps more obvious contenders for this title the Anglo-Dutch brigades were certainly treated as such by James I and Charles I. This army could be called upon to fight elsewhere in Europe when required by the crown and proved adept at doing so. Indeed, it seems fair to argue that the New Modelled Army and the other tactically advanced armed forces of the 1640s did not materialise from the ether, but rather it is more likely that they were built by the English and Scottish military communities abroad.[14] That in the 1640s Charles could no longer command this force that both Elizabeth I and James I had used successfully is a key failing of him as a King. English engagement in the Thirty Years' War was therefore not just a key part of Stuart foreign policy but also the foundations for many of the conflicts to come.

14 Within a Scottish context this argument has been successfully put forward by Alexia Grosjean and Steve Murdoch in Murdoch and Grosjean, *Alexander Leslie*. In an English context more detailed work is need but Mark Stoyle's work also indicates the importance of Thirty Years' War veterans to the English Parliamentarian army Stoyle, *Soldiers and strangers*, pp. 91–109 and 117.

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